It should not be news to anyone by now that the PLA is undergoing a profound organizational restructuring, perhaps the most dramatic since 1949. To help us to get a better handle on the effects of those changes, CDF is proudly present the latest by the “A” “B” and “C” of the PLA watching community (Allen, Blasko, and Corbett), the single best scholarly article published on this subject thus far. Enjoy.
** A great thanks goes to Jamestown for putting everything together on this important work **
The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What is Known, Unknown and Speculation (Part 1)
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45069&no_cache=1#.VrnQzPErc0I
Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 3
February 4, 2016 05:56 PM Age: 5 days
PLA Theater Commands. For a full size image see below.
Note: This article is part of a two-part series examining
changes to China’s Military organizational structure and personnel. Part
1 examines what is known and unknown. Part 2 contains speculation as to
changes that may occur in the future.
On December 31, 2015, the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
began its eleventh major reorganization since 1952. Most previous
reorganizations focused on reducing the size of the infantry and bloated
higher-echelon headquarters, turning over entire organizations, such as
the railway corps, to civilian control, and transferring units to the
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP).
[1]
To date, most Western analysis of the current reorganization has
addressed the reasons for and policy implications of the current
reorganization. Instead, this article addresses what is known about
changes to the PLA’s organizational structure—the essential factor
needed to inform any credible analysis of the reasons for and the
implications of the current reorganization.
[2]
Although there are lots of media reports and blogs writing about the
reorganization, much of what has been written has been incorrect or
based on speculation. As a result, the “known” component of this article
is based on official Chinese reporting in Chinese and English from the
Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) website,
China Daily, and Xinhua.
Although there are many media and blog articles about various parts
of the reorganization, until the information is available in official
PLA or Xinhua reporting, this article identifies them as “unknown” or
“speculation.” Another issue arising from the variety of reporting on
the reorganization is terminology. One example is the “official” English
translation for the geographic groupings that are replacing China’s
military regions (军区). For example, the PLA officially has translated
the term “
zhanqu” (战区) as “theater of war,” “theater,” and
“battle zone”; however, various Western analysts have translated it as
“war zone” and certain unofficial media reports have used “combat zone” (
Bowen, January 9).
[3] Due
to the use of “Theater Command” in an article published by the Chinese
MND announcing the official “standing up” ceremony on February 1, this
article will use “Theater Command” (
MOD, February 1).
What is “Known”
In November 2013, the Third Plenum of 18th Party Central Committee
announced the decision to “optimize the size and structure of the army,
adjust and improve the balance between the services and branches, and
reduce non-combat institutions and personnel.” This rebalance is meant
to correct the domination of the PLA Army, which with the Second
Artillery, currently has 73 percent of the PLA’s total troops, followed
by 10 percent for the Navy (PLAN) and 17 percent for the Air Force
(PLAAF). The Central Committee also announced creation of a “joint
operation command authority under the Central Military Commission (CMC),
and theater joint operation command system” and to “accelerate the
building of new combat powers, and deepen the reform of military
colleges” (
CNTV.com,
November 16, 2015). This announcement pointed to upcoming changes in
four main categories: 1) PLA personnel size and force structure, 2)
command organization and structure from the CMC down to the unit level,
3) modern military capabilities as found in “new type combat forces,”
and 4) the PLA professional military education system of universities,
academies, colleges, and schools.
Nearly two years passed before CMC Chairman Xi Jinping announced the
first details of these reforms. At the September 3, 2015 military parade
in Beijing, Xi proclaimed a reduction of 300,000 PLA personnel,
bringing the size of the active duty PLA down to two million. An MND
spokesman further clarified the cuts would be completed by the end of
2017 and would mainly affect “troops equipped with outdated armaments,
administrative staff, and non-combatant personnel, while optimizing the
structure of Chinese forces” (
Xinhuanet,
September 3, 2015). The only specific unit reported so far to have been
eliminated is the Nanjing Military Region Art Troupe, one of numerous
performing arts troupes, which have traditionally provided entertainment
for PLA units (
Global Times, January 25).
In November 2015, Xi declared the “current regional military area
commands [also known as Military Region headquarters] will be adjusted
and regrouped into new battle zone commands supervised by the CMC.” A
three-tier combat command system from the CMC to theater commands to
units would be created. But this system will be separate from the
administrative chain of command running from the CMC to the four service
headquarters to units. As such, service headquarters are responsible
for “construction” functions, such as organizing, manning, and equipping
units (
Xinhuanet, November 26, 2015). These changes will take place over the next five years through the year 2020.
[4]
On the last day of 2015, Xi presided over the establishment
ceremonies for the PLA Army’s leading organ (national-level
headquarters) (PLAA), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the PLA
Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and named their respective commanders
and political commissars (
Chinamil.com,
January 1). The Army headquarters was charged to transform from “the
regional defensive type to the full-spectrum combat type” and the Rocket
Force, identified as China’s “core strategic deterrence power,” was
upgraded to a full service (军种) from its former status of “an
independent branch treated as a service,” (兵种). Later the
PLA Daily indicated Rocket Force units would be the same as the former Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) (
www.81.cn, January 10). As a service, the Rocket Force eventually could be expected to have its own distinctive uniform.
Though buried in an article about the reforms, another important
target of the reforms was mentioned: reducing the size of the militia (
Chinamil.com,
January 1). The militia is not part of the PLA, but one of three
elements of the Chinese armed forces (the other elements being the
active and reserve units of the PLA and the PAP). Militia units are
commanded by the system of local PLA headquarters from provincial
Military Districts down to Military Sub-districts/Garrisons to People’s
Armed Forces Departments (PAFD) in counties and below. No details of the
militia reduction have been announced, but this development opens the
door for potential reductions also in local headquarters, particularly
at the Military Sub-district/garrison and PAFDs at county and grassroots
levels.
On January 11, 2016, a new CMC organization with 15 functional departments, commissions, and offices was announced (
Chinamil.com,
January 11). One significant detail included was that the new CMC
National Defense Mobilization Department will be responsible for
“leading and managing the provincial military commands [i.e., also known
as Military Districts],” a task previously assigned to Military Region
headquarters. A photograph accompanying the announcement showed a total
of 69 uniformed officers, of which 58 were PLAA/PLARF, six were PLAN,
and five were PLAAF, which is not an auspicious start for greater
jointness at the most senior levels of the PLA command structure.
On February 1, at a ceremony attended by the entire CMC, five new
“theater commands” were established and their commanders and political
commissars (PC) announced. In what appears to be their protocol order,
the new headquarters are the Eastern (东部), Southern (南部), Western (西部),
Northern (北部), and Central (中部) Theater Commands.
[5] The new
headquarters have been tasked to respond to security threats from their
strategic directions, maintain peace, deter wars and win battles, and
assist in “safeguarding the overall situations concerning the national
security strategy and the military strategy” (
Chinamil.com,
February 1). All theater commanders and PCs were senior Army officers.
The theater commands will have Army, Navy, and Air Force components
based, respectively, on the “relevant naval fleets” and air forces of
the former Military Regions (MR)—Rocket Forces were not mentioned. On
February 2, PLA Daily reported the formation of the Army headquarters
under the Eastern Theater Command (东部战区陆军) in Fuzhou, Fujian Province,
but the ceremony to establish the new headquarters had been held earlier
on January 24. This first Army headquarters to be set up in one of the
new theater commands is commanded by LTG Qin Weijiang (秦卫江), son of
former Defense Minister GEN Qin Jiwei, with MG Liao Keduo (廖可铎) as PC (
81.cn, February 2).
[6] PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian presided over the creation of five PLAAF theater commands on February 5 (
81.cn, February 5).
More general information about the reforms is expected to be
announced officially over time, but many operational- and tactical-level
details likely will only be learned by close analysis of the Chinese
media. Since an objective of the reforms is to improve the “joint
operation command authority” of the force, it will be necessary to
restructure PLA officer corps billets to create new opportunities for
non-Army personnel to serve in senior joint command and staff
assignments. The new force and personnel structure may require changes
to the PLA’s existing system of grades and ranks.
The Grade and Rank Foundation
The foundation for understanding the reorganization is the PLA’s
15-grade structure shown in Table 1, which was last modified in 1988.
[7] Under
the existing system, every PLA organization and officer is assigned a
grade from platoon level to CMC to designate their position in the
military hierarchy. Organizationally, units can only command other units
of lower grade levels. For example, a corps leader grade unit is
authorized to command divisions, but not vice versa. Officers are
assigned grades along with military ranks. Each grade has two or more
ranks assigned to that level. On average officers up to the rank of
senior colonel are promoted in grade every three years, while they are
promoted in rank approximately every four years. In the PLA, an
officer’s grade is more important than his rank.
[8]
Part 2 of this article will address the options for changes in the
grade and rank systems that appear likely to accompany the extensive
changes anticipated in the PLA organization and structure. Table 1 is
included here to assist in understanding the organizational changes
already underway and discussed in Part 1.
Table 1: PLA’s 15-grade Structure since 1988
| Grade | Primary Rank | Secondary Rank |
CMC Chairman (军委主席)
Vice Chairmen (军委副主席) | None
General |
| CMC Member (军委委员) | General |
| MR Leader (正大军区职) | GEN/ADM | LTG/VADM |
MR Deputy Leader (副大军区职)
副大军区职
) | LTG/VADM | MG/RADM |
| Corps Leader (正军职) | MG/RADM | LTG/VADM |
| Corps Deputy Leader (副军职) | MG/RADM | SCOL/SCPT |
| Division Leader (正师职) | SCOL/SCPT | MG/RADM |
| Division Deputy Leader (副师职) (Brigade Leader) | COL/CPT | SCOL/SCPT |
| Regiment Leader (正团职) (Brigade Deputy Leader) | COL/CPT | LTC/CDR |
| Regiment Deputy Leader (副团职) | LTC/CDR | MAJ/LCDR |
| Battalion Leader (正营职) | MAJ/LCDR | LTC/LCDR |
| Battalion Deputy Leader (副营职) | CPT/LT | MAJ/LCDR |
| Company Leader (正连职) | CPT/LT | 1LT/LTJG |
| Company Deputy Leader (副连职) | 1LT/LTJG | CPT/LT |
| Platoon (排职) | 2 LT/ENS | 1LT/ENS |
New CMC Organizations
As mentioned above, on January 11, 2016, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping met
with all of the new leaders of the reorganized CMC’s directly
subordinate elements. Table 2 provides information about the 15
functional sections comprised of seven departments (including the
important General Office), three commissions, and five directly
affiliated offices. The new CMC structure expanded its former
subordinated elements though the incorporation of many functions
previously found in the former four General Departments, namely the
General Staff Headquarters (also known as the General Staff Department
[GSD]), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department
(GLD), and General Armament Department (GAD).
As can be seen from the new CMC structure, the biggest loser
organizationally is the former General Staff Department and its leader,
the Chief of the General Staff. The new Joint Staff Department has lost
the GSD’s oversight of military training and education, mobilization,
strategic planning, and likely cyberwar and electronic warfare units,
not to mention the personnel and functions transferred to the new Army
headquarters. Moreover, the new Political Work Department is responsible
for “human resources management,” which implies that it has taken over
the GSD’s oversight of enlisted personnel in the former Military Affairs
Department. If true, the new Political Work Department will be
responsible for all personnel matters concerning both cadre and enlisted
personnel.
Table 2 includes the current organization name, the name of the
person who has been assigned as the leader, as well as that person’s
previous position and grade. Based on each person’s previous grade, it
is assumed that they are still filling a billet of the same grade. It is
also assumed that the MR Leader Grade and Deputy Leader Grade will be
renamed Theater Leader Grade (正大战区职) and Deputy Leader Grade (副大战区职),
respectively.
While the new offices are identified as CMC “functional sections,” it
is not yet clear how the command or leadership relationships will work
between the CMC leadership and the subordinate organizations. Also,
while the general departments have gone away in name, the functions of
all four departments continue under the new CMC structure and the new
organizations have retained their same CMC member as the Chief of Staff
(formerly Chief of the General Staff) or Director (for the GPD, GLD, and
GAD). Only one of the functional sections—the Agency for Offices
Administration—appears to be a new entity, probably because it is not
clear where its component offices came from (possibly a management
office from each general department). The other functional sections can
be traced back to their former general department or office and, in many
cases, they have retained the same leadership. As discussed elsewhere
in this paper, it is not yet clear what the organizational grade of the
15 sections will be. For example, the corps-grade organizations listed
in Table 2 could reasonably be expected to be raised to a higher grade
reflecting their apparent enhanced status as a CMC-subordinate
organization; however, any such change will affect every billet in the
organization.
Table 2: CMC Functional Sections
| CMC Organization | Organization Assessed Grade | Leader | Leader’s Previous Position | Leader’s Previous Grade |
General Office
(办公厅) | Theater Deputy Leader | LTG Qin Shengxiang | Director CMC General Office | MR Deputy Leader |
Joint Staff Department
(联合参谋部) | CMC Member | Gen Fang Fenghui
(房峰辉) | Chief of the General Staff | CMC Member |
Political Work Department
(政治工作部) | CMC Member | GEN Zhang Yang
(张阳) | Director, GPD | CMC Member |
Logistic Support Department
(后勤保障部) | CMC Member | GEN Zhao Keshi
(赵克石) | Director, GLD | CMC Member |
Equipment Development Department
(装备发展部) | CMC Member | GEN Zhang Youxia
(张又侠) | Director, GAD | CMC Member |
Training and Administration Department
(训练管理部) | Theater Deputy Leader | MG Zheng He
(郑和) | Deputy Commander, Chengdu MR | MR Deputy Leader |
National Defense Mobilization Department
(国防动员部) | Theater Deputy Leader | MG Sheng Bin (盛斌) | Deputy Commander, Shenyang MR | MR Deputy Leader |
Discipline Inspection Commission
(纪律检查委员会) | Theater Leader | Gen Du Jincai
(杜金才) | Deputy Director, GPD & Secretary, CMC Discipline Inspection Commission | MR Leader |
Politics and Law Commission
(政法委员会) | Theater Deputy Leader | LTG Li Xiaofeng (李晓峰) | Chief Procurator, PLA Military Procuratorate | MR Deputy Leader |
Science and Technology Commission
(科学技术委员会) | Theater Deputy Leader | LTG Liu Guozhi
(刘国治) | Director, GAD S&T Commission | MR Deputy Leader |
| Office for Strategic Planning (战略规划办公室) | Corps Leader | MG Wang Huiqing
(王辉青) | Director, GSD Strategic Planning Department | Corps Leader |
| Office for Reform and Organizational Structure (军委改革和编制办公室) | Corps Leader | MG Wang Chengzhi (王成志) | Director, GPD Directly Subordinate Work Department | Corps Leader |
| Office for International Military Cooperation (国际军事合作办公室) | Corps Leader | RADM Guan Youfei
(关友飞) | Director, MND Foreign Affairs Office (Director, GSD Foreign Affairs Office; Director, CMC Foreign Affairs Office) | Corps Leader |
Audit Office
(审 计署) | Corps Leader | RADM Guo Chunfu
(郭春富) | Director, CMC Auditing and Finance Department | Corps Leader? |
Agency for Offices Administration
(机关事务管理总) | Corps Leader | MG Liu Zhiming
(刘志明) | Deputy Chief of Staff, Shenyang MR | Corps Leader |
The Four Services and Strategic Support Force
Table 3 provides a list of the four services—PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and
PLARF—and the PLASSF (MOD, January 1). The table includes the current
organization name, the name of the person who has been assigned as the
leader, as well as that person’s previous position and grade. Based on
each person’s previous grade, it is assumed that they are still filling a
billet of the same grade.
The PLAA now has an official headquarters at the same level as the
PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF. Previously, the four General Departments served
as the Army Headquarters and the Joint Headquarters for all the PLA.
Second, the PLASAF, which was previously an independent [Army] branch
treated as a service, is now a full service equal to the PLAA, PLAN, and
PLAAF. Third, the PLASSF does not appear to be a “service.” It is a
“force,” a status similar to that of the former PLASAF. The key is the
Chinese terms: Second Artillery Force and the Strategic Support Force
are “
budui” (部队), which the PLA translates as “force,” while the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF use the term “
jun”
(军) and “junzhong” (军种), which means “service.” The Chinese use of the
term “leading organ” for the PLAA, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF is because the
PLA does not have an official term for “headquarters.”
Table 3: PLA Services and Strategic Support Force
| Organization | Organization Assessed Grade | Leader | Leader’s Previous Position | Leader’s Previous Grade |
Army Leading Organ
(aka PLA Army)
(陆军领导机关) | Theater Leader | GEN Li Zuocheng
(李作成) | Commander, Chengdu MR | MR Leader |
PLA Navy
(海军) | Theater Leader | ADM Wu Shengli (吴胜利) | Commander, PLA Navy | CMC Member |
PLA Air Force
(空军) | Theater Leader | GEN Ma Xiaotian (马晓天) | Commander, Air Force | CMC Member |
| PLA Rocket Force (火箭军) | Theater Leader | GEN Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) | Commander, PLA Second Artillery Force | CMC Member |
PLA Strategic Support Force
(战略保障部队) | Theater Leader | LTG Gao Jin
(高津) | Commandant, Academy of Military Science | MR Leader |
Theater Commands
The new theater command organizational structure is one more step in
the consolidation and evolution of Military Regions that began with 13
MRs in 1955 and then reduced them to 11 MRs (1970) and 7 MRs (1985).
[9]
After extensive speculation, on February 1, CMC Chairman Xi Jinping
presided over the inauguration ceremony formally establishing the five
new “theater commands” or “zhanqu” (战区), replacing the previous seven
Military Regions. Table 4 shows the five new theater commands in
protocol order along with the new commanders’ and political commissars’
names and rank, as well as their previous position and grade. Of note,
four of the five commanders came from an MR that was not part of the new
theater command, while four of the five PCs came from the same MR that
formed the base for the new theater commands.
Table 4: PLA Theater Commands
| Organization | Organization Grade | Commander | Commander’s Previous Position/Grade | Political Commissar | PC’s Previous Position/ Grade |
Eastern
Theater Command
(东部战区 ) | Theater Leader (正大军区级) | GEN Liu
Yuejun
(刘粤军) | Commander, Lanzhou MR/ MR Leader | GEN Zheng Weiping
(郑卫平) | PC, Nanjing MR/MR Leader |
Southern Theater Command
(南部战区) | Theater Leader (正大军区级) | GEN Wang Jiaocheng
(王教成) | Commander, Shenyang MR/ MR Leader | GEN Wei Liang
(魏亮) | PC, Guangzhou MR/MR Leader |
Western Theater
(西部战区) Command | Theater Leader (正大军区级) | GEN Zhao Zongji
(赵宗岐) | Commander, Jinan MR/ MR Leader | LTG Zhu Fuxi
(朱福熙) | PC, Chengdu MR/MR Leader |
Northern Theater
(北部战区) Command | Theater Leader (正大军区级) | GEN Song Puxuan
(宋普选) | Commander, Beijing MR/ MR Leader | GEN Chu Yimin
(褚益民) | PC, Shenyang MR/MR Leader |
Central
Theater Command
(中部战区) | Theater Leader (正大军区级) | LTG Han Weiguo
(韩卫国) | Deputy Commander, Beijing MR/ MR Deputy Leader | GEN Yin Fanlong
(殷方龙) | Deputy Director, GPD/MR Leader |
At
a press conference following the official announcement of the theater
commands, the MND spokesman used the term “theater leader” (正大军区级) to
identify the grade level of the new theater commands, which is the same
term used for grade of the former MR leaders (
www.81.cn,
February
1). This arrangement suggests that Han Weiguo, shown as a LTG
in the photograph of the establishment ceremony, likely will be promoted
in rank and grade, even though he only received his second star in July
2015 and has been one of the Beijing MR deputy commanders.
The various announcements have not yet included specific details on
the organizational structure of the new theater commands. Also, to date,
there has been no official announcement as to what provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities the theater commands will
include, or where the headquarters are located. At least four different
maps have been published in the unofficial Chinese and Western media
showing different sets of boundaries for the new theaters (
Tieba, January 15;
nddtv.com, January 29;
cjdby.net;
Sina Blogs, January 27;
Phoenix, February 1).
Prior to the establishment of the theater commands, activities taking
place clearly indicated the change was imminent. For example, in
mid-January,
PLA Daily announced that all seven MR newspapers had ceased operations (
China Daily,
January 22). It is not clear whether the new theater commands will have
their own newspapers or not. The websites for the former MRs were also
shut down; however, they have been replaced by new theater websites
(db.81.cn; nb.81.cn; xb.81.cn; b.81.cn, and zb.81.cn). Also, the Hong
Kong-based
Wenweipo published photographs of ceremonies
transferring units from the Chengdu, Nanjing, and Lanzhou MRs, but did
not specify where the units were now assigned (
Weiwenpo,
January 18). It is likely that similar ceremonies were held in the
other military regions. Associated with the dissolution of the Military
Regions, “transitional work offices” (善后办公室) were established to manage
holdover personnel and property issues (
Chinamil.com, February 2).
Unanswered Questions
Many unknowns concerning the reorganization remain. The following
questions identify topics for further examination as the reforms unfold
in the coming months and years.
The CMC:
Will the CMC departments/commissions/offices and theater headquarters
become true “joint” organizations with a balanced mix among members
from each of the four services plus the PLASSF?
The MND:
Has the role of MND been changed? Previously, the MND was not in the
chain of command from the CMC to MRs to units. The latest official
announcements do not insert the MND into the operational or
administrative chain of command. In September 2015, a three-part series
of articles laid out a very aggressive reorganization that basically
took all non-combat and combat-support organizations and placed them
under MND; however, it does not appear that this has occurred (
gwy.yjbys.com, September 2, 2015;
gwy.yjbys.com;
gwy.yjbys.com). Will there be any significant changes to the role of the MND in the new structure?
Personnel Cuts:
Although one of the first announcements Xi made about the
reorganization concerned a 300,000-man downsizing, to date, no specifics
have officially been announced other than the abolition of the
performing arts troupe in the Nanjing MR (
MOD,
January 22). How will the remaining 2 million personnel be balanced
among the services? Even if all 300,000 cuts were made only to the Army,
it would still amount to some 63 percent of the 2 million-man force.
Therefore, the other services would need to receive additional billets
to better balance the force. This has done in the past by reassigning
entire units from one service to another.
How will the PLA’s 2 million personnel be divided among officers,
uniformed civil cadre, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and
conscripts/volunteers? In 2003, the PLA implemented a 200,000-man
downsizing, of which 85 percent were officers, including over 200
one-star generals and admirals. In addition, about 70 junior officer
specialty billets were turned over to NCOs. To date, thousands of NCOs
have now filled those billets; however, they are still called “acting”
(代理) leaders.
Will the local headquarters system of provincial Military Districts,
Military Sub-districts, and Peoples Armed Force Departments be altered?
Operational Units:
What operational units will be disbanded? A review of internet
sources since January 1, 2016 indicates that all 18 group armies remain
operational. Will there be any change to the organization and
subordination of the PLAN’s three fleets? Currently, all three fleets
are reported operational.
[10] There has been no official reporting on any changes in PLAAF units (
MOD, February 2).
The Strategic Support Force:
To what headquarters (or CMC) is the PLASSF subordinate? What units
comprise the PLASSF? What are the specific missions of the PLASSF? How
many personnel are in the PLASSF? The reporting that the PLASSF will
include responsibility for space-related activities as well as
cyber/electronic warfare-related activities raises the likelihood that
former GAD launch and monitoring bases and GSD Third Department
Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus will be re-subordinated to the PLASSF,
but this remain to be confirmed. Additionally, will any other
operational units that previously were directly subordinate to the
various General Departments be reassigned to the CMC functional
departments, such as other intelligence, electronic warfare, political
warfare, and logistics units?
Militia and the Reserves:
In addition to reductions in the militia, will PLA reserve units
undergo change? Some active duty units equipped with older weapons could
be transferred to either the reserves or militia.
Education:
What is the status of the Academy of Military Science, National
Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology? Will
they continue to be directly under the oversight of the CMC? What
changes will occur in the PLA system of educational academies and
schools? Will the number of new students be reduced because of the
300,000-person reduction? Will new academies be formed or former
academies transformed into new entities based on changes in personnel
and force structure? For example, will more NCO schools or more command
academies be established?
Will PLA-wide guidance be issued establishing education and
experience requirements for officers to be considered qualified as joint
officers?
The People’s Armed Police (PAP):
Will there be any changes to the CMC and State Council/Ministry of
Public Security’s dual command of the People’s Armed Police? If so, this
will require a change to the National Defense Law. Will the size and
composition of the PAP remain the same?
Conclusion
As can be seen thus far, the PLA is in the early stages of an
extensive and complex reorganization, the objective of which is to
enhance CMC Chairman Xi Jinping’s goal for “…conducting military reform
and building a strong military… on the road of building a strong
military with Chinese characteristics” (
MOD,
January 12). The amount of available information is limited, as the
reorganization is being implemented in a deliberate step-by-step manner
and details revealed piecemeal; the “unknowns” far exceed the “knowns.”
The changes are likely to continue through the 19th Party Congress in
2017 with full implementation possibly as far away as 2020—previously
identified as the intermediate milestone year in the modernization
process with the final goal of completion by the middle of the century.
Part 2 of this report moves deeper in to the area of speculation and
will discuss the options and ramifications of reforming the grade and
rank system along with the prospects for reform of the CMC itself.
Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at Defense Group Inc.
(DGI) and a concurrent Senior China Analyst with the USAF’s China
Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). He is a retired U.S. Air Force
officer, whose extensive service abroad includes a tour in China as the
Assistant Air Attaché. He has written numerous articles on Chinese
military affairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an M.A. in international
relations from Boston University.
Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), served
23 years as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer
specializing in China. Mr. Blasko was an army attaché in Beijing from
1992–1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995–1996. He is the author of The
Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).
John F. Corbett, Jr., an Analytic Director with CENTRA Technology,
Inc. since 2001, specializes in China, Taiwan, and Asian military and
security issues. He is a retired US Army Colonel and Military
Intelligence/China Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and served as an army
attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong. He has published articles in The China
Quarterly and The China Strategic Review and has contributed chapters
to the NBR/U.S. Army War College series of books on the Chinese
military.
Notes
- See Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds, The PLA as Organization v2.0, p. 34, found at http://www.pla-org.com/downloads/.
- See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) hearings on January 21, 2016 found at www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-developments-chinas-military-force-projection-and-expeditionary-capabilities.
- For the PLA’s official definition see: Military Terminology of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(中国人民解放军军语), Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September
2011, p. 77; The 2012 and 2015 Defense White Papers both referred to zhanqu simply as “theater”; an article in the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, by contrast, translated zhanqu as “battle zone” (Xinhua, November 26, 2015). Most recently, The PLA’s English website used the term “Theater Command” (Chinamil.com, February 2).
- This
system of dual responsibilities is similar to, but not exactly the
same, as the U.S. military’s division of responsibilities between
combatant commands and the services.
- This order breaks from the
previous precedence that reflected the sequence in which the various
regions were brought under control from the Kuomintang.
- Qin’s previous grade was MR Deputy Leader; Liao’s was Corps Leader.
- Pollpeter and Allen, p. 19.
- Pollpeter and Allen, pp. 10-15.
- Pollpeter and Allen, p. 54.
- Evidence of the status of the respective fleets can be found below:
East Sea Fleet:
http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-01/19/content_6862367.htm; North Sea Fleet:
http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-01/26/content_6868961.htm; South Sea Fleet:
http://navy.81.cn/content/2016-01/26/content_6868928.htm .
