Boring Logistics of the Day: Degaussing at Sea and the Quiet Naval Worker Bee Behind PLAN Readiness

A recent photo captures a very PLAN moment: the Type 072A landing ship Baxianshan getting degaussed at sea, with the Type 911 degaussing vessel Dongqin‑870 working fore and aft. It is not headline‑worthy, and definitely not the kind of thing CCTV runs in prime time. But it’s exactly the sort of quiet, routine sustainment work that keeps the fleet moving without sending ships back to port for every minor calibration task.

Dongqin‑870’s job here is simple and very practical. As a mobile degaussing ship, it handles magnetic‑signature maintenance for PLAN vessels while they’re still in the operating area. Instead of tying up a berth at a naval base, a ship like Baxianshan can have its magnetic field measured, adjusted, and tuned right at sea. The PLAN does care about short on dedicated military repair yards pushing small‑scale maintenance out to the water is a meaningful efficiency gain. Every task done afloat is one less slot consumed ashore.

Ship's magnetic signature discipline is one of the oldest,  but still a relevant survivability measures in naval warfare. Steel hulls naturally accumulate magnetic fields over time. Left alone, that magnetic buildup makes a ship more vulnerable to:

• Magnetic‑influence naval mines, which trigger when a large magnetic mass passes overhead
• MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection) sensors carried by ASW aircraft
• Interference with onboard navigation and sensitive instruments 

 

Degaussing trims that magnetic footprint, making a ship harder to detect, harder to target, and less likely to set off a mine.  In my book, just my book, not getting blown up by a mine is generally considered a good day for any naval ship, agree?  Just carelessly citing a Gulf of Hormuz reference here,

 

 

Degaussing ship Nanqin 207 (front) attached to aflotilla with the navy of Chinese PLA conducts magnetic risk management for another ship (rear) under the help of a tugboat on November 12, 2025. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Jiang Mengda) 

 

PLA TACP: What We Actually Know (and What’s Still Guesswork)

Information on the PLA’s TACP  "Tactical Air Control Party” is fairy limited on the internet.  Still, there’s enough scattered evidence to sketch out what these teams look like and where they sit in the force structure. Based on the limited official reporting, TACP‑type elements appear to be found at the brigade level, though the exact echelon inside of the brigade: company, battalion, or a dedicated brigade fire‑support cell, remains unclear.  One official article (link) describes a reconnaissance platoon equipped with: 

• Laser target designators
• Forward air‑control terminals
• Digital fire‑support tablets
• Secure datalinks to PLAAF strike aircraft, in the article example, 2x PLAAF  strike aircraft against an ammo depot guided by the ground force.  

 That’s not just “recon.” That’s a full air‑ground integration package.

Well, PLA doesn’t publish equipment designations or performance specs, but given how much emphasis Beijing places on joint operations and informationized warfare, it’s hard to imagine these capabilities being confined to a single platoon. The most plausible placement is inside a combined‑arms battalion’s combat support company, specifically the reconnaissance platoon (侦察排), which already handles UAVs, target acquisition, and forward observation.

And realistically, none of this would be surprising to find in PLA special operations detachments as well. If the PLA is serious about precision fires and joint strike coordination with all evidence says it is, then TACP‑equivalent teams are going to be embedded wherever the PLA expects to fight fast, dispersed, and with real‑time air support.

 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0123/c1011-40651279.html

 

第81集团军某旅与空军某旅携手开展空地联合引导员人才培养——

陆军单兵顺畅呼叫空军战机

2026年01月23日08:58 | 来源：解放军报

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该旅侦察引导组观察远方目标，为呼叫空中火力支援收集信息。曾阳程摄

“‘金雕01’，现将航空简令报送你……”深冬塞北，野外训练场，第81集团军某旅侦察排排长陈聪隐蔽在灌木丛中，通过电台呼叫空中火力支援。

不一会，两架战机低空掠过山脊，精准投弹，火光照亮天际。

“陆军单兵顺畅呼叫空军战机，这是我们紧盯一体化联合作战能力短板狠下功夫取得的实效。”走下训练场，陈聪向记者介绍旅队开展跨军种联训取得的成果。

“与空军部队并肩作战不是新鲜事。”陈聪一边整理战术简报一边说道，“但以前很多时候，是‘你打你的，我打我的’，协作‘契合度’与实战要求相距甚远。如今，我们实现了互通有无、配合默契，取得‘1+1>2’的效果。”

该旅郝参谋长介绍，在过去一段时间里，陆军部队呼唤空中火力支援，很多时候要等空军引导员到位、靠引导员指挥。2024年深秋的一场跨军种对抗训练，让该旅官兵至今记忆犹新。

当时，红方侦察组深入“敌”后，发现一处隐蔽的装甲集结点，立刻请求空中火力打击。可陆军上报的目标坐标格式与空军不兼容，两边官兵只能反复核对确认。等空军引导员赶到现场，蓝方装甲部队早已转移阵地，红方还因暴露位置遭到反扑，导致3名战士“负伤”。

“战场态势瞬息万变，稍有耽搁便可能贻误战机。单纯依靠空军引导员，信息传递链条长、响应效率低，难以满足实战需求。”郝参谋长坦言，陆军官兵对空域管控规则、战机技战术性能、火力打击精度知之不深；空军飞行员对地面部队的战术节奏、实时战场感知、前沿火力需求也是“雾里看花”。双方指挥体系分属不同建制，术语规范不统一、通联手段不兼容、数据接口不互通……凡此种种，成为掣肘联合作战效能释放的“隐形壁垒”。

陆军新军事训练大纲明确：基层作战分队必须编配兼职引导员，侦察专业军官须具备空地联合引导能力。这一要求，为破解联合作战难题提供了制度保障。

在集团军协调下，从去年开始，该旅与常年配属协同的空军某旅打破建制界限，携手开展空地联合引导员人才培养。

在相关集训中，该旅官兵走进空军飞行塔台、指挥所，学习空域管理规则、联合通信协议、战机打击性能参数；空军战友则深入该旅侦察班排，了解地面态势研判流程、目标识别标准、战场动态更新机制……集训结束时，双方明确6项训练标准、完成7个训练课目的组训与考核，制订《战术引导员训练手册》，用统一的术语、标准化的流程、可复用的模板，把“陆军语言”和“空军语言”翻译成彼此听得懂的“联合代码”，摸索出一套联合训练机制。

本着谋联合、共成长的原则，集训结束没多久，双方就组织了一场空地联合对抗训练，针对引导打击过程中发现的难题，共同改进演训方案、研究协同良策、探索“最优”思路。陆军引导员从“被动接收指令”转向“主动研判协同”，空军飞行员从“单向接收信息”转向“双向感知战场”……这次训练，让两支部队在实战环境中，逐步熟悉对方的作战节奏、战术逻辑、战场习惯。

此后，他们又在多个复杂课目中反复锤炼，从夜间引导到电磁干扰环境下的协同，从多目标分批打击到临机突发目标的快速响应……每一次训练，都是对默契配合的考验；每一次成功，都是向“联合制胜”的迈进。经过近一年的磨合，他们已建立常态化联合合作机制，并依托大项演训任务，围绕重难点课目展开攻关。

前不久，双方组织联合对抗训练，该旅空地联合引导员迅速完成建立联络、指挥交接、态势更新、攻击规划等操作，引导多波次空中火力，对“敌”弹药库、指挥所等高价值目标进行定点摧毁。

联合作战演训场上，“隔墙对话”的尴尬消失无踪，取而代之的是“同屏研判、同频指挥、同向发力”的协同图景。“如今，在我们的作战指挥链条上，空地联合引导员已成为融合战场信息、实施火力打击的重要节点。”该旅领导介绍，他们将与更多军种单位建立联系，携手培养联合战术引导员。（曾庆旺、王若龙、宋子洵）

亲历者说

站在联合的前沿

■第81集团军某旅侦察排排长 陈 聪

作为空地联合引导员，我第一次在实兵对抗训练中呼叫空中火力支援，是去年6月。

当时，硝烟笼罩着靶区，我站在远处，感觉心跳比耳边的风声还响。直到耳机里传来指令，仿佛整个世界都突然安静下来——“准备引导，目标坐标已锁定。”

我深吸一口气，手指在战术平板上快速滑动，调出电子地图，将“敌”前沿指挥所的坐标输入系统：“‘敌’炮兵阵地，确认为高价值目标，请求打击。”“收到，目标已确认，攻击编队正在转向，预计90秒后进入攻击航线。”

2架战机呼啸而至，爆炸声未落，我已通过态势感知系统更新目标状态——“已摧毁”。

看着目标建筑化为废墟，我忽然想起空地联合引导员集训刚开始时的场景——在空军某旅的飞行塔台，我和参训战友被一群飞行员围着问：“你们地面部队，到底想让我们打哪儿？”

实话说，这个问题我们当时并不知如何回答：一个在地上跑，一个在天上飞，怎么协同？怎么联合？我们又靠什么引导空中火力？

果不其然，第一次实操课，双方沟通就遇到了“障碍”。我打开地面态势图与飞行员对接，对方却一脸茫然：“这个红点是什么？是炮位还是装甲群？”我也是一愣——原来，我们习以为常的战术符号，在对方眼中却很陌生。当我们说到“敌方指挥所隐蔽在林地边缘”时，飞行员们更是直皱眉头：“林地边缘？哪片林地？面积多大？我们飞得高，看不清地表细节。”

集训期间，我们和空军飞行员一起坐在电子沙盘前，从最基础的通信频率、识别代码、坐标格式学起。他们教我们如何用空地协同简令传递信息，我们则把地面侦察流程、目标优先级判断、战场动态更新规则等，一个个掰开揉碎讲给他们听。

一位空军飞行中队中队长曾对我说：“地面部队是‘眼睛’，我们是‘拳头’。‘眼睛’看不清，‘拳头’再硬也没用。”我意识到，身为空地联合引导员，不仅要找准目标、引导火力，更要成为一座打通军种的“桥梁”。

如今，我已能熟练使用空地联合通信系统，在规定时间内完成目标识别、坐标传递、任务规划与简令发送。像我这样的官兵，以后会越来越多。那道曾经横亘在军种之间的“隐形壁垒”，正被一点一点打破。何其有幸，我亲身经历并见证了这个过程，站在了联合的前沿。（卢大力整理）

Just High Res Photos: JL-3 'Giant Wave 3' 巨浪-3

China's third-generation intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

 

Just photos: J-8F fighters are being dismantled, heading to an aircraft boneyard

 

July 4th, happy 57th birthday, J-8I

 J‑8I turns another year older every July 4th, PLAAF's Cold War interceptor sharing a birthday with fireworks. Born from China’s push for a true high‑altitude, high‑speed fighter, the J‑8I was ole-school, fast, and unapologetically 1970s. It never became a superstar, but it marked China’s first real step toward actual airpower.

 

 

Return of the PG59 — China’s Nostalgia‑Powered Air Defense Debate

One of the more amusing trends floating through Chinese milblogs lately is the sudden rediscovery — and proposed recommissioning — of the old PG59 57mm anti‑aircraft gun. Yes, the same Soviet‑era AAA that saw heavy action in Vietnam, spraying the sky at F‑4s and A‑4s half a century ago. The argument goes like this: Taiwan’s defense strategy is increasingly drone‑centric, (link) and many of China’s soft logistics hubs, depots, and supply nodes are theoretically vulnerable to long-range drone attacks. So why not dust off the PG59 57mm AAA, bolt on a modern fire‑control system, and turn it into a cost‑effective point‑defense solution. In other words: if you can’t beat drones with lasers and railguns, beat them with something affordable already found in the warehouse.

The counterargument is equally predictable and equally valid: who exactly is going to man these guns, and how are they going to be trained. China’s military modernization has spent decades moving away from manpower‑heavy systems, not toward them. Reintroducing a weapon that requires a full crew, constant drills, and old‑school gunnery discipline is a romantic idea, but not necessarily a practical one

The point of highlighting this little trend isn’t to endorse the PG59 revival or dismiss it.  It’s to note that there’s a real, active segment of China’s online population that follows military development closely and debates it seriously. How loud their voice is, and how much influence they actually have, is harder to measure. But they’re there, and every now and then, they latch onto something like a 1950s AAA gun and remind you that military enthusiasm in China spans everything from hypersonics to hardware that smells faintly of cosmoline.  (old Type56 SKS reference inserted) 
 

 

Moscow oil refinery hit by long-range suicide drones from Ukraine

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Cheaper to buy new than used.

Over the last two years, China’s Y‑8 tactical transport has kept up its quiet, steady export run. Yes, this Soviet‑era Antonov An‑12 derivative is somehow still in production, and that’s exactly the point: in a niche market where buyers can get a freshly minted mid‑size transport straight off the assembly line, the Y‑8 beats the alternative of a “lightly used” ex‑Soviet airframe that spent the last decade dissolving in a leaky warehouse. For a certain tier of customers, new beats questionable used every time. 

Take Myanmar, where budgets are tight, runways are rough (there's war going on), and Western procurement channels have long since closed. They can still pick up two new Y‑8F‑200s and keep their national airlift backbone functioning without having to gamble on ancient Antonovs. 

Sri Lanka continues to run its Y‑8s for maritime patrol and transport because Western MPAs are priced into the stratosphere, and China provides support without the geopolitical fine print. 

Kazakhstan’s National Guard is also expanding its fleet, with three additional Y‑8 Pegasus aircraft arriving in 2025, bringing its operational total to six.  

As with many Chinese military exports, the Y‑8 keeps winning small orders for three very simple reasons. First, price and politics: if you’re under sanctions or just not on Washington’s Christmas card list, the Y‑8 is one of the few tactical transports you can actually buy. Second, ruggedness over refinement: it’s not a C‑130J, and it doesn’t need to be. It’s a medium‑lift truck with wings, and for many militaries, that’s exactly what they need. Third, China delivers fast and without drama: no congressional hearings, no export‑control purgatory, no multi‑year wait times. For some of buyers, that alone is worth more than any avionics upgrade. 

The Y‑8 isn’t glamorous, but it’s dependable, politically accessible, and still rolling off the production line. In this corner of the global market, that’s enough to keep the production line open.

 

 

Monday, June 16, 2025

Are those two Y-8 transports newly acquired by the Myanmar Air Force?

 As reported in Jan 2025 that the "The Myanmar Air Force has inducted at least eight new aircraft to partly replace losses in aircraft incurred since 2021" (link).  One of them identified as Y-8F200 transport aircraft.  Recently two newly produced Myanmar Air Force Y-8F200 were spotted in China (tail numbers MAF 5923 and 5924), suggesting that delivery has been completed.    

Interesting item number one - China can restart older aircraft manufacturing line open as the case of  the Y-8.    

Interesting item number two -  The Myanmar Air Force has chosen not to upgrade to the newer, more capable Y-9. Is this a cost-saving measure? To maintain consistency in training, logistics and maintenance across their Y-8 transport fleet? Your guess is as good as mine.

 

 

Hi Res Photos Of The Day: J-20 mid air refueling probe, mid air

When it comes to refueling solution, clearly there's a different between PLAAF's J-20 and the USAF's F-22

 

 

F-22 photo credit goes to https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/202122/jefx-08-demonstrates-f-22-raptor-sensor-capabilities/