From "Sea Eagles" to Flying Sharks? The Curious Case of the PLAN's 4th Naval Aviation Division

 

In a recent PLAN publicity photo showing a group wedding ceremony (yes, group weddings are a fairly common military and state-enterprise tradition in China), one detail caught the attention of a number of Chinese military watchers (see below)

Behind the newlyweds sat two factory-fresh J-15T carrier fighters and that alone is interesting.

The lineage traces back to the former PLANAF 4th Aviation Division and the legendary "海空雄鹰团" unit, one of the PLA Navy's most prestigious fighter formations(link). Open-source reporting indicates the brigade received J-11BH fighters around 2020 (link), making the appearance of brand-new J-15Ts only a few years later particularly noteworthy.

The question being raised in Chinese military circles is fairly straightforward:

Why is a land-based Eastern Theater Command naval aviation unit receiving carrier fighters?

The J-15T is not simply another Flanker derivative. It was specifically developed for catapult carrier operations, featuring strengthened landing gear, structural reinforcement, carrier-compatible avionics, and other modifications designed to survive repeated arrested recoveries and catapult launches. In other words, this is not the aircraft one would normally choose if all you wanted was another shore-based air defense unit.

A High-Readiness Unit with an Unexpected New Aircraft:

The former PLANAF 4th Aviation Division has long been regarded as one of the PLA Navy's more operationally active formations. Historically associated with the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait directions, the unit has maintained a relatively high profile compared to many other naval aviation formations.

What makes this development intriguing is that the brigade remains a land-based unit.  Unlike the established carrier aviation brigades already operating J-15 variants from Liaoning and Shandong, the "海空雄风" brigade does not currently belong to an embarked carrier air wing.

So why the J-15T?  Nobody outside the PLAN knows.  Naturally, that has not stopped the speculation.

Theory #1: Preparing for Carrier Number Four

One theory floating around Chinese milblog circles is that the brigade is being groomed as the nucleus of a future carrier air wing.  China currently operates Liaoning and Shandong, while Fujian continues flight testing and operational workups. A fourth carrier is widely expected, although details remain unknown.

If that assumption is correct, converting an experienced fighter brigade years ahead of commissioning a future carrier would make sense. Carrier aviation is fundamentally a people business. Aircraft can be delivered relatively quickly; experienced aviators, maintainers, LSOs, and deck crews cannot.

From that perspective, early conversion could simply be a long-term investment.

Theory #2: Why Not Just Give Them the J-35?

The obvious counterargument is equally valid. If the ultimate goal is building a future carrier air wing, why not skip directly to the J-35? After all, most observers expect the J-35 to become the PLAN's long-term carrier fighter.

This is where another theory emerges. It may simply be too early.

Even under optimistic assumptions, it will likely take years before enough carrier-configured J-35s exist to equip multiple carrier air wings. In the meantime, the PLAN may need a larger pool of pilots already familiar with carrier aviation fundamentals.

A pilot who has spent years flying the J-15T, practicing carrier procedures, and potentially accumulating carrier experience is much easier to convert to the J-35 than a pilot coming straight from a land-based fighter community. Under this scenario, existing carrier aviators would likely receive priority for J-35 conversions first, while their J-15Ts trickle down to follow-on units. The newly converted "海空雄风" brigade would then serve as a convenient reservoir of partially prepared carrier aviators.

At least, that's how the theory goes.

The Training Pipeline Matters More Than the Airframe:

This is where comparisons with the U.S. Navy become useful. For the U.S. Navy, a pilot typically requires roughly 18 to 24 months from the beginning of flight training before becoming carrier qualified, although timelines vary depending on training availability and aircraft pipelines. After that, a pilot still requires additional fleet training and operational experience before reaching the status of a fully combat-ready carrier aviator.

In practice, it can take several more years before a junior pilot evolves into an experienced fleet operator capable of contributing to high-end carrier combat operations.

The key takeaway is that producing carrier aviators takes far longer than producing carrier aircraft.

The United States has spent decades building an institutional pipeline containing flight instructors, replacement squadrons, carrier qualification programs, and operational fleet units. Every new naval aviator enters a system that has been continuously refining itself since the Second World War.

China's carrier aviation community does not have that luxury of generations of accumulated experience. As a result, Beijing appears to be expanding its naval aviator pipeline aggressively. In recent years, the PLAN has broadened recruitment sources for carrier pilot candidates, drawing from naval aviation schools, universities, military academies, and other pathways while continuing to develop training programs through the Naval Aviation University.

Viewed through that lens, assigning J-15Ts to a prominent land-based brigade becomes easier to understand. Even if those aircraft never see a carrier in the near term, every additional pilot learning carrier-compatible procedures potentially expands the PLAN's future carrier aviation talent pool.

In other words, the aircraft themselves may be less important than the people sitting inside them.

Final Thoughts:

For now, there is no public evidence that the "海空雄风" brigade is becoming a carrier air wing tomorrow.

There is also no public evidence that it is not.

What we do know is that a brigade that was reportedly operating J-11BH fighters only a few years ago is now appearing publicly with brand-new J-15Ts. For a unit whose historical mission has been land-based naval aviation, that is enough to raise some eyebrows.

Whether this turns out to be preparation for Carrier No. 4, a stepping stone toward eventual J-35 operations, or simply a way to grow the PLAN's carrier-qualified pilot pool remains to be seen.

As always, this post reflects discussion and speculation commonly found within the Chinese military blogging community and should not be confused with a formal military assessment or professional analytical study. Sometimes a J-15T is just a J-15T. And sometimes a wedding photo tells a bigger story than intended.

 

Saturday, September 10, 2011

Photo of the day: J-11BH

22nd Fighter Regiment, 8th PLA Navy Fighter Division.

PR Video: Type100 MTB featured

 credit goes to 长征后卫薛伯陵的微博.

"The Chinese Are Coming, The Chinese Are Coming"

 The PLA is sending some of its best armored elements to Russia for the Tsentr (Center)-2026 exercise at the Chebarkul Training Range in Russia's Chelyabinsk Region, beginning September 28. The exercise includes troops from Russia, Belarus, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and several other participants, with a reported total strength of around 47,000 personnel. No detailed breakdown by country has been released.(link) (link)

So which PLA unit showed up?  That part is actually pretty easy to figure out.

Official statements only say the deployment comes from the 82nd Group Army, Central Theater Command. But once photos started appearing, the answer practically revealed itself. The vehicles on display are Type 99A main battle tanks and Type 04A infantry fighting vehicles. Within the 82nd Group Army, that points directly toward the 112th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade, one of the PLA's premier armored formations. Sometimes military OSINT is complicated. Sometimes it's just a matter of asking, "Who else owns those toys?"

I know Xi and Putin are best friends these days. Throw Trump into the mix and you've practically got a Three Amigos thing going on. Even so, it still feels a little surreal seeing a PLA armored fist rolling across the wide-open Russian steppe.

 

For years, Chinese heavy armor has mostly been associated with Taiwan scenarios, northern exercises, or the endless training grounds of Inner Mongolia. Seeing 99As and 04As rumbling around Chelyabinsk feels like one of those alternate-history screenshots somebody accidentally uploaded.

Can the PLA learn anything from this deployment?  Absolutely.  Let's check the list:

• Cage armor everywhere. Check.
• FPV drones everywhere. Check.
• Camouflage covering everything that doesn't move. Check.
• Underground shelters and bunkers to hide from drones. Check.
• Everyone suddenly discovering that the sky is now the most dangerous direction. Check.

At some point, a PLA officer probably looked across the training area and thought:

"Wait a minute... haven't I seen this movie before?" Asking for a friend.

Jokes aside, this is probably one of the few places outside Mongolia, Central Asia, or Russia where Chinese heavy armor can really stretch its legs in classic maneuver warfare terrain. Wide open spaces, long sight lines, large mechanized formations, and plenty of room to practice operational-level movement.

China simply doesn't have many training environments that replicate this scale of armored maneuver.

More importantly, the PLA gets a chance to observe the latest battlefield adaptations firsthand from forces that have been refining them daily under real-world conditions. Drone integration, camouflage discipline, survivability measures, dispersion techniques, engineering works, command-and-control adaptations, and the increasingly uncomfortable reality that a $500 FPV drone can ruin a very expensive day for a tank crew.

That kind of experience is difficult to replicate at home, no matter how realistic the exercise script.  

Friday, September 10, 2010

All dressed up and nowhere to go

PLA's 113th Mechanized Infantry Division, 38th Group Army waiting for the the Peace Mission 2010 to start.

SCO anti-terror drill kicks off in Kazakhstan

(Source: Xinhua) 2010-09-10

　　ALMATY, Sept. 10 (Xinhua) -- "Peace Mission 2010," a multi-national anti-terror military drill under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), kicked off here on Friday.

　　At 10:15 a.m. local time (0415 GMT), the chiefs of the general staff of the armed forces of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan ordered the start of the drill, which is to be participated by 5,000 troops from the five countries.

　　The exercise is the seventh of its kind organized by the SCO members in recent years, and is scheduled to conclude on Sept. 25.

　　Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said Thursday the exercise aims to demonstrate SCO member states' determination and capacity to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism.

　　It also aims to showcase SCO member states' mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation, their shared wish to protect regional peace and stability and to boost common development and prosperity, he said.

　　According to Geng, along with the chiefs of the general staff, defense ministers of the SCO member states would also be in Kazakhstan to observe the war game.

　　Chinese armed forces have participated in anti-terrorism drills under the framework of the SCO since 2002.

Editor:Zhang Qingxia

Type 99

China's Second Potential Basic Trainer Replacement and the PLA Procurement Approach

 StarAir, formally Hunan Sunward Technology Co., Ltd., saw its SA218 conduct its maiden flight on October 1. It now appears to be one of two, perhaps three, contenders for the PLA's basic trainer requirement intended to replace the aging CJ-6. The other publicly known option is the TA-20 from Wuhu Zhongke Aircraft.

Performance. Cost. Scale.

Bear with me for a bit.

When discussing military procurement, three factors tend to matter:

• Performance: Does the system meet the requirement?
• Cost: What does it cost to acquire and sustain? (BBC- but at what cost)
• Scale: How many can be built, and how quickly?

The first two are fairly well understood.

There's certainly no shortage of commentary, from defense professionals to YouTube armchair generals, on how to counter China. Opinions cover the entire spectrum, as one would expect. One thing I've noticed is that commentators with military backgrounds tend to focus heavily on performance and the "wiz-bang" capabilities of a weapon system. Some venture into cost considerations. Scale, however, is often treated as an afterthought.

By contrast, commentators from industry or business backgrounds often spend more time discussing manufacturing capacity, supply chains, and production throughput.

Oddly enough, the group that frequently talks about all three, performance, cost, and scale, tends to be WWII historians. After all, WWII was as much a contest of industrial systems as it was a contest of armies.

 

 

The CJ-6 Replacement and Competing Chinese Designs

If we go back to the PLA's effort to replace the CJ-6, the procurement approach superficially resembles the old Soviet design bureau model.

For those who follow military aviation, names like Mikoyan (MiG), Sukhoi, Tupolev, and Yakovlev are familiar. Multiple organizations competed to satisfy military requirements, with the state ultimately choosing a winner.

China appears to have a similar arrangement at first glance. Names such as Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), Xi'an Aircraft Corporation, and Nanchang Aircraft Corporation regularly appear behind major PLA aircraft programs.

The comparison works only up to a point.

The Soviet OKBs were primarily design organizations. Actual manufacturing was often carried out by separate factories. China's aviation industry is structured differently. Companies such as Chengdu and Shenyang are largely vertically integrated organizations, handling design, development, testing, and production under the broader AVIC umbrella.

A useful example is the relationship between Chengdu and Shenyang.

Chengdu produced aircraft such as the J-10 and J-20, while Shenyang developed the J-11, J-15, J-16, and more recently the J-35. In spirit, this resembles the old MiG versus Sukhoi rivalry. In practice, however, both organizations sit inside a much larger state-owned industrial structure and benefit from shared suppliers, electronics firms, engine developers, and government coordination.

The result is competition, but competition within an integrated industrial system.

Why Scale Matters

If China's electric vehicle and shipbuilding industries are any guide, vertically integrated firms can scale production rapidly once a design matures.

That matters.

• Performance gets government attention.
• Cost gets finance department attention.
• Scale wins wars.

A company capable of designing and manufacturing in-house can spread fixed costs across large production runs, streamline supply chains, and reduce per-unit costs over time. Scale itself becomes a competitive advantage.

This is one reason why I find the CJ-6 replacement competition interesting. Beyond finding a suitable trainer, it serves as a glimpse into how the PLA may be leveraging broader industrial capacity.

 

Let the Civilian Sector Compete

Another noteworthy trend is the willingness to allow civilian firms to bid on certain categories of equipment.

A basic trainer aircraft is not a stealth fighter or an airborne early warning platform. It is relatively low risk, dual-use, and commercially adjacent. By opening the competition to civilian firms such as StarAir, the state can potentially free up its top-tier defense aerospace companies to focus on more advanced programs.

This may be a more significant development than it initially appears.

After all, every engineering team working on a trainer is an engineering team not working on a next-generation combat aircraft.

The Mengshi Example:

The Dongfeng Mengshi family provides another useful example.

This is where China differs rather sharply from Russia.

The original EQ2050 Mengshi drew inspiration from the HMMWV concept but was built on the foundation of Dongfeng's commercial automotive expertise. Today, Dongfeng produces:

• Commercial trucks
• Civilian SUVs
• Military tactical vehicles

These products share portions of the same ecosystem:

• Manufacturing facilities
• Supply chains
• Engineering talent
• Component suppliers

Not every component is common, of course. Military vehicles require armor, military communications gear, electronic warfare systems, and other specialized equipment.

But the underlying industrial base already exists.

This is considerably easier when a country possesses one of the world's largest automotive industries.

 

China's Real Advantage May Be Industrial Integration

One advantage China holds over modern Russia is not necessarily technological brilliance in any individual weapon system.

It's scale.

Russia inherited much of the Soviet military-industrial complex, but its civilian industrial base is far smaller.

China can leverage:

• Massive automotive production
• Large-scale electronics manufacturing
• Commercial drone companies
• Commercial shipbuilding
• Telecommunications industries

for military programs.

Examples include:

Civilian Sector	Military Benefit
Commercial drone ecosystem	Military UAV technologies
EV battery industry	Military energy storage and power systems
Commercial shipbuilding	Naval construction
Semiconductor and electronics industry	Military electronics
Heavy truck industry	Tactical vehicles and logistics

This broader strategy is often described as Military-Civil Fusion (军民融合).

Whether the policy achieves all of its intended goals is another debate entirely. However, it is difficult to deny that China has access to a much larger civilian industrial ecosystem than the Soviet Union ever had, and certainly more than modern Russia possesses today.

Final Thought:

None of this is intended to argue that China's R&D and procurement system is inherently superior. Outsiders rarely understand the internal workings of a military bureaucracy, and China's own media has reported no shortage of corruption investigations and procurement scandals over the years.

What it does suggest is that evaluating military power solely through the lens of weapon performance risks missing part of the picture.

The SA218 is interesting not because it might become the PLA's next trainer. It is interesting because it offers another window into how China approaches procurement: encouraging competition, leveraging civilian industry, and building systems designed not just for performance, but also for cost and scale.

As the old saying goes, quantity has a quality all its own.  Performance, cost, and scale are not competing ideas. They are simply three parts of the same equation.

 

 

Tuesday, September 08, 2026

Replacing the CJ-6 Basic Trainer for Good?

At the 2025 Dubai Airshow, China's new XJJ basic trainer made its first public appearance, offering the clearest sign yet that the People's Liberation Army Air Force may finally be preparing to retire the venerable CJ-6 from frontline basic training duties.

The XJJ program appears to be moving forward steadily, with reports indicating that the aircraft will be powered by a new turboprop engine developed to replace the aging HS-6A (Huosai-6A) piston engine that has powered generations of CJ-6 trainers. The shift reflects a broader modernization effort, bringing primary pilot training closer to the performance and operational characteristics of modern military aircraft.

The CJ-6 has had a remarkably long career. First flown in the late 1950s and entering service in the early 1960s, it became the backbone of Chinese military basic pilot training for decades. While often compared to the Soviet Yak-18, the CJ-6 was substantially redesigned by Chinese engineers and evolved into a highly successful aircraft in its own right (too successful as one might argue or the PLAAF really is that cheap) .

For generations of PLAAF, PLANAF, and civilian pilots, the CJ-6 represented the first step into military aviation. The aircraft earned a reputation for being rugged, forgiving, easy to maintain, and inexpensive to operate. Those same qualities helped it find a second life abroad, where large numbers of surplus aircraft were exported and became popular among warbird collectors and recreational pilots, particularly in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

Even as newer trainers entered service, the XJJ for example, the CJ-6 remained difficult to replace. Its low operating costs and proven reliability made it a practical solution for basic flight instruction. However, the aircraft's piston-engine design increasingly contrasted with the needs of a modern air force training pipeline centered around advanced jet trainers and fifth-generation combat aircraft.  There's rumor flying around (pun intended) that the PLAAF might have sixth-generation flying as well.

The appearance of the XJJ suggests that Chinese military planners finally have a successor capable of taking over the CJ-6's role. A modern turboprop trainer would offer better performance, lower lifecycle support challenges, and a training experience more representative closer to the contemporary military aviation.

That said, replacing the CJ-6 is more than simply introducing a new aircraft. It marks the possible end of one of the longest-serving training platforms in Chinese aviation history. Few military trainers anywhere in the world can claim over six decades of continuous service.

But, eventually every aircraft reaches the end of its journey.

PLAAF, it may finally be time to let the old trainer go. Long overdue.  "Let It Go"

  

Wednesday, November 05, 2025

Elephant walk Nanchang CJ-6

Step aside, sixth-generation fighter Chengdu J-36 and Shenyang J-50, below is the pride of the PLAAF

Saturday, August 30, 2025

Nanchang CJ-6, the old and the new

As the PLA Navy intensifies its push train more naval aviators, it can rely on the time-tested CJ-6 as its basic trainer aircraft. Yup, the pilots who now command the cutting-edge J-35 stealth fighter began their careers in a far humbler 60-year-old, radial-engined trainer with tricycle landing gear. 

 

 

Monday, December 30, 2024

Forever CJ-6

CCTV captured footage of a newly minted Nanchang CJ-6 taking off.  Some in China requested that the PLAN be photographed a CJ-6 taking off from one of her new flattops, as a reenactment to a WWII Pacific Theater scene.    Personally, I believe that's a terrific concept; let's do it.

Thursday, August 22, 2024

Yup, CJ-6 trainer still in production

This tiny trustworthy basic training is still in production after 60 odd years, according to this AVIC PR photo.   It now has a civilian variant to offer as well. 

Sunday, July 29, 2012

Capitalism, can't have a modern Military–Industrial Complex wihtout it.

Thanks XYZ for this news update.

China to Further Open Defense Industry to Private Capital
2012-07-24 13:34:56 CRIENGLISH.com Web Editor: Mao Yaqing

China's military authorities are planning to further open the country's defense-related industry to private capital.

Authorities says private investors will enjoy the same treatment as their state-owned counterparts in taxation and licensing.

CRI's Suyi has more.


The guideline released by the General Armament Department of the People's Liberation Army is designed to bring competition into the defense industry.

Private investors are encouraged to take part in weapon development, production and even the restructuring of state-owned enterprises.

It also highlights security protocols for private players and sets out to boost supervision for the sake of national security.

Yin Xingming, Deputy Director of the China Center for Economic Studies, says the plan is a good start.

"For long term benefits, all competitive industries should be open for private investment. And based on the experiences in the global market, encouraging private investment in the defense industry will help to beef up product standards and technical know-how."

Last year, China's J-20 stealth fighter had its first test flight, making China the third nation in the world to have stealth technology, right after the US and Russia.

However, most of the fighter jets are either produced by the AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Corporation or the AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, both under the state-owned Aviation Industries of China.

In a bid to bring diversity to the industry, the latest guidelines pledge to shorten the period for qualification assessment and licensing for private investors who apply for weapon development and production.

However, Yin points out that an effective implementation of the guidelines needs facilitating measures.

"It does not provide detailed measures as to how to put the guidelines into action. Should we stick to the previous practice where stated-owned companies dominated the market, or should we open all sectors to private investment? Will the private companies be allowed to produce missiles on their own? These questions remain unsolved."

Yin also advises authorities to draft laws to protect the rights of private companies that are venturing into the field.

China will spend 670 billion yuan on the military sector based on this year's budget plan.

Back in 2005, the State Council released guidelines encouraging non-state owned capital to enter the defense-related industries.

However, state-owned enterprises still dominate the market, with some private businesses joining the industry as suppliers for electronic devices and other facilities.

For CRI, I'm Suyi.

*ttp://english.cri.cn/7146/2012/07/24/2702s713349.htm