It has been sixteen years since I last blogged about the PLA’s Army‑operated vessels. Some things have changed, but many aspects of the PLA Ground Force’s “navy” — especially around the Taiwan Strait remain familiar.
As noted in my February 20, 2018 blog below, before the PLA’s sweeping reforms, coastal defense was an Army mission and continue to be so. The Ground Force maintained a surprisingly large network of Coastal Defense Regiments (CDRs), Coastal Defense Brigades, and Army‑operated landing ship units, all reporting through the old chain of command of Provincial Military District → Military Region → General Staff Department.
There's historical logic behind it. After 1949, the PLA fought off multiple KMT raids across the Fujian and Guangdong coasts. The most famous example is the Battle of Dongshan Island (1953), where Nationalist forces attempted a large amphibious assault to retake the island. The PLA’s defense units repelled the attack, cementing their role as frontline guardians of China’s near‑shore islands.
Emerson Tsui offers a view from Taiwan on the battle (link)
"A decisive conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (國民黨, KMT) occurred in July 1953. Known as the Battle of Dongshan Island (東山戰役), the conflict involved an assault by the KMT’s air, sea, and land forces (三棲作戰), backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency. Occurring in the last year of the Korean War, the operation was an attempt to divert the PLA’s resources from the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan Strait.
A second failed operation in 1965 to recapture Dongshan led the KMT to refocus on defending its offshore islands rather than “reconquering the mainland” (反攻大陸). Consequently, both the PRC and Taiwan have integrated lessons from the Dongshan conflicts into their education programs for soldiers and national security personnel. Fujian Province has appropriated funds for a national-level memorial to commemorate the 1965 battle. Multiple military contests for control of Dongshan have reinforced the island’s enduring role in both the symbolic and operational dimensions of cross-Strait security."
Outside the historical context, the arrangement seem to make sense as Army control kept manpower and logistics manageable for remote islands as many of which lack fresh water and require constant resupply. These units could draw on Provincial Military Districts, Police Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs), and local militia/reserve networks to supplement limited resources. It was an earlier form of Military‑Civil Fusion (MCF), a concept that has been written about by the US Government (link)
Even after the 2017/18 reforms, the legacy persists. Some CDRs were consolidated into brigades, others absorbed or reassigned, but the underlying logic remains: low‑cost manpower, integration with local militia, redundancy in amphibious lift, and — most importantly — freeing the actual Navy to operate further offshore.
The reforms dissolved the Military Regions and reorganized the PLA into Theater Commands. Today, the chain of command runs Provincial Military District → Theater Command Ground Force → CMC Joint Staff Department. They remain Army units, reporting through Army channels. Their naval pennant numbers still follow the old GDxxx format inherited from the former Nanjing Military District, now the Eastern Theater Command responsible for the Taiwan Strait.
The Military Balance counts roughly 50 border and coastal defense brigades/regiments, which analysts estimate could total well over 100,000 personnel. As Shanshan Mei and Dennis J. Blasko (one of the most respected PLA watchers out there, in my book) note (link), these units remain a significant part of China’s ground‑based territorial defense architecture.
As for hardware, they continue to “soldier on”, see pun intended. A single RO/RO LCM (that we know of), hand‑me‑down Type 271 LCU, updated Type 067 landing craft, and other miscellaneous Army‑operated vessels clearly not meant for open‑ocean operations. These ships are built for short‑range logistics, day‑long supply runs, and the unglamorous task of keeping remote Taiwan Strait islands functioning. And yes, I do feel bad for the engineers keeping those old diesel engines alive in summer heat, with air conditioners that may or may not be working in those 30/40 years old boats.
Conclusion
The PLA’s Ground Force “navy” is one of those enduring quirks of Chinese military organization, a legacy structure born from 1950s coastal warfare, sustained by decades of practical necessity, and only partially reshaped by modern reforms. While the PLA Navy grabs headlines with blue‑water ambitions, the Army’s coastal defense units continue doing the quiet, unglamorous work of guarding islands, running logistics with old boats, and maintaining a territorial presence where the Navy doesn’t need to be.
In short: the PLA may be modernizing at breakneck speed, but along the Taiwan Strait, you can still find an "Army at sea".
Type 271 mods , photos from last two years
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Army's (not Navy) island garrison
This might come as a surprise to many outside observers -- it is the ground army's area-of-responsibility to garrison and protect China's coastal islands, especially those dotted the Taiwan Strait. Before the 2017 reorg, each coastal province has at least one Coastal Defense Regiment (CDR). They are jointly supported by the local Police Armed Forces Departments(PAFDs) and the provincial Military Distract. This arrangement helped to reduce the overall cost of manned those remote outpost, many of them without access to fresh water. After 1949, many of Coastal Defense units saw action against KMT raids, such as the battle of DongShan Island in 1953 (here)
Shortly before dawn on 16 July 1953, the nationalist commander Hu Lien (胡琏) commanding his troops, totalling two divisions in 13 naval vessels and more than 30 motorized junks, sailed toward Dongshan Island, Fujian, attempting to retake the island from the communists who took the island from the Nationalists three years earlier in the Battle of Dongshan Island. In addition to the two army divisions, an elite paratroop division totaling 2,000 personnel in two brigades was deployed for the mission, and the total Nationalist force committed was just over 10,000.
Before the 2017 reorg, there were one CDR at Shantou Garrison District, one CDR at Zhuhai garrison District, and one LSM Dadui (regiment), one CDR at Zhanjiang military district, Three CDR, one LSM Dahui under the then Nanjing MR and three CDR garrisoned in Shanghai. Up north, there are four Coastal Defense Brigades (two in Liaoning and another two in Shangdong)
Photos of the Beishuangdao Island coastal defense garrison taken Feb 14th this year
Tuesday, September 06, 2011
Nanjing MR Landing Ship Unit
Those amphibious assets are not tracked by most PLA watchers and generally ignored by those with only a passing interest.
Previous blog entry;
Friday, March 19, 2010
An Army At Sea
Besides the PLAN, the Army also has an organic fleet for amphibious operations. Curious to see what "combat team" means.
Army vessels conduct exercise on sea
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2010-03/19/content_4156420.htm
(Source: PLA Daily) 2010-03-19
At the beginning of the Year of Tiger, a vessel group of the Nanjing Military Area Command (MAC) of the PLA staged a maritime joint combat exercise in complex electromagnetic environment in a sea area of the East China Sea, symbolizing the leap of the army vessel troop unit from a “support team” to a “combat team”.
Since the founding of the team 8 years ago, the team has gradually gotten rid of the traditional mode of self-training, self-examination and self-assessment and actively carried out trans-theatre training, trans-sea-area support and trans-arm-and-service cooperation. It carried out joint trainings and joint exercises with more than 30 specialized teams of 10-plus arms and services in succession.
When it took back a batch of new equipment last November, it organized trainings on a multiple of key and difficult subjects including night navigation, navigation under foggy condition, navigation in the sea area with submerged reef, and navigation by breaking the ice in its voyage of more than 1,000 nautical miles.
In recent years, the team participated in 40-plus key exercises and trainings in succession with a total voyage of more than 240,000 nautical miles, and transported troops for more than 80,000 persons/times and heavy equipment for more than 3,000 units. Therefore, it was awarded the title of “Outstanding Unit in Military Training” by the general headquarters/departments of the PLA and the Nanjing MAC.
By Ni Minzhi and Duan Yaohui
Editor:Yang Ru
Landing and Support Ships of the Nanjing MR
Saturday, August 18, 2018
Photos of the day: Army's (not navy) Eastern Theater Command amphibious landing exercise
Tuesday, December 03, 2013
A new Amy (not Navy) Landing Ship Medium (LSM) undergo sea trials
Officially described as an Army Ro/Ro Transport, it is really a Landing Ship Medium (LSM), equipped with the with the typical kedging anchor of landing ships, even though the bulbous bow would preclude the ship from beaching.
The ship is equipped with both bow and stern ramps and a short helicopter platform aft. The armament consists of four twin 14.5 mm guns, two forward and two aft. Twin funnels indicate twin-screw propulsion; in addition, it has a bow thruster for improved maneuvrability.The lifting capacity is probably a mechanised infantry company.
The ship is a striking departure from the Type 271III YUWEI class Landing Craft Tank (LCT) that has been building for decades for the Army, and of which there currently are some 85 in service with the Army’s landing craft units. The dark grey colour, too, is a departure from the usual blue of Army vessels.
It is not known if the new ship will go into series production nor which unit will operate the new ship. In view of its experimental nature, a good possibility would be the Ship Squadron (Unit 73502) at Dongshandao, attached to the Nanjing MR Amphibious Training Base.
Songlia Shipyard built another unique ship in 2012, the training vessel AL201 belonging to the Training Squadron of the Army/Air Force Navigation School at Zhenjiang. That ship was based on the Sea Police’s Hai Jing 31101 PUDONG (Type 718).
-- franco-russe
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