Military Reports, "With Chinese Characteristics": Women Pilots

 This post is not me weighing in on the "women in the military" debate.

I do, however, follow official Chinese military reporting and propaganda fairly closely. One thing that has stood out over the years is the prominence of female pilots in PLA media. Not just pilots, but often pilots who are, frankly, rather photogenic.

According to a Chinese government white paper released in 2025, women accounted for 50.76% of all higher education students in 2024, while female graduate students accounted for 50.01%. At the same time, the PLA continues its long march toward becoming a more technology-driven force, with drones, C4I systems, advanced sensors, and increasingly sophisticated platforms entering service. Slowly but surely, as is usually the Chinese way.

The need to attract educated recruits is not new. It is a well-documented challenge discussed by analysts both inside and outside China. As more technical roles open up, more opportunities are also opening up for women. Unsurprisingly, women are appearing with greater frequency in PLA recruiting campaigns and military media coverage.

I do not have hard statistics to back this up, but as someone who follows Chinese military developments regularly, I have noticed a pattern. The female pilots featured in official media are often both highly capable and, shall we say, above average in appearance. Many become minor celebrities. Some gain followings well beyond military enthusiast circles.

There is nothing inherently wrong with that. In fact, it makes perfect sense from a public relations standpoint.

Military organizations everywhere try to put their best foot forward. A young fighter pilot checks a lot of boxes. She is educated, disciplined, patriotic, technically proficient, and visually marketable. For a PLA that wants to project professionalism, modernity, and opportunity, she is an ideal ambassador. The message is simple: this is not your grandfather's army. This is a high-tech military with room for talented young people, including women.

That does not mean these pilots are merely PR figures. Quite the opposite. They earned their wings, completed the same demanding training pipeline, and are military professionals first and foremost. The public-facing role comes in addition to their military duties.

And sometimes the risks of the profession become very real.

Take Yu Xu (余旭), China's first female J-10 pilot. She was killed on 12 November 2016 during an aerobatic training exercise in Hebei Province when her J-10 was involved in a mid-air collision with another J-10. Whatever role she may have played in public outreach, she ultimately paid the same price that military aviators throughout history have paid in the pursuit of their profession.

The phenomenon is not unique to the mainland, either. Taiwan has featured its own highly capable and media-savvy military aviators. One example is Captain Chen I-tzu, an F-16V pilot from the Republic of China Air Force's Fourth Tactical Fighter Wing. Similar themes appear: professional competence, military service, and a strong public-facing image.

What differs is the messaging.

Chinese military media tends to promote women pilots as symbols of competence, modernization, and national service, all framed within a distinctly Chinese political and cultural context. The focus is generally less on individual identity and more on collective contribution.

One thing is certain: Chinese media is unlikely to feature a queen climbing into the cockpit for a recruiting segment. Then again, China no longer has a monarch. It is equally unlikely to run a military PR story centered around Western culture-war themes.  "Emma has two moms" for example.

No judgment on which approach is better. Just another example of military reporting, with Chinese characteristics.

https://news.tvbs.com.tw/english/3113496?from=english_content_pack

TAIPEI (TVBS News) — Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense showcased the Air Force's F-16V fighter jets at Chiayi Air Base (嘉義基地) on Wednesday (Jan. 28) during a 3-day combat readiness event for local media. The "115th National Military Spring Festival Enhanced Combat Readiness Media Invitation Event," running from Monday (Jan. 27) to Thursday (Jan. 29), highlights the F-16V's capabilities amid rising cross-strait tensions. The Air Force emphasized its commitment to training and airspace defense as Chinese military aircraft continue frequent incursions near Taiwan.

The event marked the F-16V's first demonstration of the Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod, capable of surveillance up to 187 kilometers (116 miles) without triggering radar warnings from Chinese aircraft. Capt. Chen I-tzu (陳怡慈), a female pilot from the Fourth Tactical Fighter Wing, demonstrated her professionalism by swiftly completing pre-flight checks on F-16V No. 6684. The Fourth Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Chiayi, plays a crucial role in Taiwan Strait air defense due to rising threats and frequent Chinese aircraft incursions.  

 

 

 

 

Longest Yet: PLAN's 48th Escort Task Force Returns After 378 Days

 The PLAN's 48th Gulf of Aden Escort Task Force has returned home after a 378-day deployment, making it the longest escort mission in the history of China's anti-piracy operations. The task force reportedly logged over 150,000 nautical miles during the deployment.(link)

What's more interesting than the record itself is the pattern behind it.

For years, PLAN escort deployments generally followed a fairly predictable rotation cycle. Then came the recent string of record breakers:

• 46th Escort Task Force: 339 days
• 47th Escort Task Force: 368 days
• 48th Escort Task Force: 378 days

Ten days here, thirty days there. Nothing dramatic. No grand announcement. Just a steady increase in time on station.

That is very much the PLAN way of doing things.

Observers often look for a headline moment that signals a major shift. The PLAN usually does the opposite. Capabilities appear incrementally, deployments become slightly longer, exercises become slightly more demanding, and before long what was once exceptional becomes routine.

Over the past year, the 48th Task Force did more than escort shipping. It participated in exercises with South Africa and Pakistan, joined celebrations in Seychelles, conducted port visits in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Malaysia, and made technical stops across the Indian Ocean region.

The larger takeaway is not that one task force stayed out for 378 days.

The takeaway is that the PLAN is becoming increasingly comfortable keeping surface combatants deployed overseas for extended periods. First 339 days. Then 368. Now 378.

Slowly but surely.

It is easy to dismiss an extra ten days at sea as insignificant. But viewed across multiple deployments, the trend suggests a navy quietly building endurance, logistics experience, and confidence in sustained far-seas operations.

No press conference declaring a new era.

Just another escort flotilla coming home after setting yet another record. That's often how the PLAN works: incremental progress, repeated often enough that one day it no longer looks incremental at all.

 

Saturday, October 11, 2025

48th PLAN escort mission in Gulf of Aden

What's there to hide?    The PLA Marine Special Operations troops (they are all from the Jiaolong Brigade) are publicly showcasing their Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) for the first time. Interestingly, this isn't exactly a debut, as they were previously seen wearing NVGs during earlier escort missions in the Gulf of Aden.

 

 

10月11日上午，由导弹驱逐舰唐山舰、导弹护卫舰大庆舰、远洋综合补给舰太湖舰组成的第48批护航编队从山东青岛某军港解缆起航，赴亚丁湾、索马里海域接替第47批护航编队执行护航任务

 

 

 

 

China sends new navy fleet on escort mission in Gulf of Aden, waters near Somalia

Source
    Xinhuanet
Editor
    Li Jiayao

Time
    2025-10-11 19:59:22

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/H_251454/L_251456/16414639.html

QINGDAO, Oct. 11 (Xinhua) -- A new fleet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy set sail from a military port in Qingdao, east China's Shandong Province, on Saturday to take over an escort mission from the previous fleet in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia.

This 48th navy fleet comprises a missile destroyer, a missile frigate and a supply vessel -- with two helicopters and dozens of special forces members on board.

In preparation for the mission, the fleet conducted training focused primarily on the use of weapons, the tasks involved in providing a convoy escort, and measures necessary for replenishment during the mission.

China in December 2008 began dispatching naval ships to carry out vessel protection operations in both the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia.

uesday, July 05, 2011

VBSS body armor adopted.

Judging by the photos of PLAN's 9th Task Force to the Gulf and Aden, it seems the PLAN SpOps team has adopted Clear Duty's VBSS body armor.    Also noted from the photo of a fore-gripped Type95, the PLAN is allowing its elites a greater leverage in customizing their gear.

All those adjustments show that the decision to participate in the anti-piracy duties is paying dividends in unexpected ways for the PLAN.

Friday, June 10, 2011

PLAMC testing new VBSS body armor vest for boarding team 

Clear Duty VBSS body armor vest is being tested by the PLAMC for boarding party. It's made by a local Chinese private company. VBSS stands for Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure operation.

The CD VBSS is more comfortable and offers quick-release that the standard issued Type 06 body armor lacks. The quick-release is a life saver if a boarding team member fall into the water. All he needed it is just pull the quick-release to remove the vest (which will be loaded down with hard plates, ammo, pistol, comm & other gears) and swim to the surface.

The vest uses Kevlar material and has large SAPI size hard plate pocket in the front and back. --- Timothy Yan

 

China's Two Different UUV Motherships Under Construction and More on China's Procurement Philosophy

 As many PLA watchers following Chinese social media have already noticed, photos have surfaced (pun, yes) of a second UUV mothership under construction in Guangzhou. The vessel appears to be in a fairly advanced stage of construction. From the available images (see below), with temporary supports and scaffolding still visible around the bridge structure, it is clearly not the same design as the first UUV mothership previously spotted in Shanghai.

Others have already written good technical analyses of the two vessels. My interest is less about the ships themselves and more about what they tell us about how the PLA approaches procurement and innovation.

Wait a minute, did I just say "innovation"? If some YouTubers are to be believed, China is incapable of innovation and does nothing but copy foreign designs. They have their arguments, of course. Anyway, moving on.

One thing I have written about before is that defense procurement is not just about building the best platform. It is usually a balance between three factors:

• Performance: Does it meet the requirement?
• Cost: What does it cost to buy and sustain?
• Scale: How many can be built, and how quickly?

Performance gets the headlines. Cost gets the finance department's attention. Scale wins wars.

The UUV mothership program appears to fit neatly into this framework.

Some observers have argued that the PLAN often builds one or two "working prototypes" before committing to large-scale production. The Type 054 frigate program is a good example. Only two original Type 054s were built before the far more numerous Type 054A entered service.

The Type 052C program followed a similar path. The lead pair, 170 Lanzhou and 171 Haikou, were commissioned in 2004 and 2005. After several years of operational experience and refinement, additional ships followed before the PLAN transitioned to the Type 052D, a class that has since grown into a fleet of more than 35 hulls with more still under construction.

The recently observed specialized landing barges believed to support cross-strait operations appear to follow the same logic. Prototype, test, refine,  then scale if the concept works.

Seen through that lens, the appearance of two different UUV mothership designs may not be particularly surprising.

In fact, it resembles a pattern seen elsewhere in Chinese procurement.

Earlier this month, StarAir's SA218 conducted its maiden flight and emerged as one of several contenders for the PLA's future basic trainer requirement, intended to replace the aging CJ-6. Alongside competitors such as the TA-20, the program illustrates how China is often willing to let multiple organizations pursue parallel solutions to a common requirement.

At first glance, this resembles the old Soviet design bureau system, where organizations such as MiG and Sukhoi competed for military contracts. The comparison works only up to a point. Modern Chinese firms such as Chengdu, Shenyang, and other AVIC subsidiaries are not merely design bureaus. Many are vertically integrated organizations capable of handling design, testing, development, and manufacturing under the same corporate structure.

The result is competition, but competition within a highly coordinated industrial system.

That distinction matters.

If China's EV industry, drone industry, and shipbuilding sector have demonstrated anything over the past decade, it is that once a design is considered mature, Chinese industry can often scale production very rapidly. In that environment, running multiple prototypes in parallel may not be viewed as wasteful. It may simply be viewed as a faster way to identify the best solution.

This is where I think some outside observers miss part of the picture.

A common criticism is that building two different UUV motherships simultaneously wastes resources. That's a fair argument. If shipbuilding capacity is constrained, parallel development can certainly appear inefficient.

However, if you possess the world's largest shipbuilding industry, massive civilian construction capacity, and extensive supplier networks, the calculations change. The cost of building two prototypes may be relatively small compared to the value of accelerating the learning process.

The same thinking can be seen in other sectors. China's civilian automotive industry supports military vehicle programs such as the Mengshi family. Its commercial drone ecosystem provides technologies and expertise useful for military UAV development. Its commercial shipyards contribute directly to naval construction. The broader concept is often described as Military-Civil Fusion, where civilian and military industries share parts of the same industrial ecosystem.

Whether every aspect of that strategy succeeds is open to debate. China has had its share of procurement problems, cost overruns, and corruption cases. No defense acquisition system is immune from bureaucracy.

Still, the appearance of two different UUV motherships under construction serves as another reminder that China's procurement process is often about more than just building a single platform. It is about finding the balance between performance, cost, and scale.

The Shanghai and Guangzhou UUV motherships may ultimately prove to be competing concepts, complementary concepts, or simply steps on the road to a future production design. Regardless of the outcome, they fit a pattern that has become increasingly familiar: let multiple ideas compete, iterate quickly, and once a winner emerges, leverage China's industrial base to produce it at scale.

As the old saying goes, quantity has a quality all its own. Performance, cost, and scale are not competing ideas. They are simply three parts of the same equation.

 

Friday, July 25, 2025

PLA Landing Barge Photos Of The Day: East Engineering 403

At last, a clear image of the landing barge bearing the pennant 'East Engineering 403.' According to PLAN naming conventions, 'East' clearly denotes she as organic to the East Sea Fleet, while 'Engineering' signifies the vessel's role as a support unit within the fleet.   Note the Bow thruster marking next to 'East Engineering 403.'

Should all "other roles" fall through, the PLAN might as well turn those barges into a sightseeing destination.   People will pay good RMB to see them.

Wednesday, October 14, 2026

122mm Naval MRL for Amphibious Firepower: Back in Service, or Never Bothered to Dismount?

 Continuing from the previous discussion on the PLA/NORINCO approach to procurement, particularly the way a successful concept gets replicated, adapted, and squeezed for every possible application, another interesting example recently surfaced. Pun fully intended.

Two photographs circulating on the Chinese internet appear to show a pair of 122mm multiple rocket launchers still mounted aboard a PLA Army Landing Craft Medium (LCM) from the Southern Theater Command. The vessel itself resembles a downsized version of the Type 073 landing ship medium, but what immediately caught attention was not the hull. It was the rockets.

Some readers may remember the considerable online discussion back in the early 2000s when the PLAN mounted five 25-round 122mm multiple rocket launchers on the Type 053H frigate Jiujiang (Hull 516). At the time, the concept struck many observers as unusual, if not outright bizarre.

My view then was largely the same as it is today.

Four launchers carrying a total of 250 rockets sounds impressive until one starts doing the math. Unlike dedicated shore bombardment platforms, there was no rapid reload capability. A 122mm unguided rocket also lacked the accuracy needed for precision strikes, particularly from a relatively small frigate moving in open water. Against hardened defensive positions, saturation and volume of fire matter, and 250 rockets simply did not seem sufficient to justify the effort.

By comparison, the U.S. Navy's WWII-era rocket support ships were built around overwhelming volume. During amphibious operations in the Pacific, particularly Okinawa, an LSM(R) could carry roughly 480 rockets dedicated solely to supporting troops ashore. That is not fire support. That is landscaping on a military scale.

Eventually the online debates faded away. Jiujiang was decommissioned in 2017, and many observers concluded the entire naval MRL experiment had been a one-off curiosity. An interesting chapter, perhaps, but not one with a future.

Fast forward to today, and these newly surfaced images suggest otherwise.

The appearance of 122mm MRLs aboard PLA Army amphibious craft raises an interesting possibility. Perhaps the concept never died at all.

In fact, there is an equally plausible explanation: the PLA Army and the PLAN may have been experimenting with the concept simultaneously all along. While Jiujiang received most of the public attention, the Army side may have quietly continued operating its own rocket-equipped landing craft with little outside notice.

And if that is the case, there is another factor that should surprise absolutely nobody.  The PLA is famously reluctant to throw away a solution that still works.

This brings us back to the Bv206-inspired articulated tracked vehicle discussed previously. Once the PLA identifies a concept that proves useful, it tends to expand it across every imaginable role. Ambulance becomes command post. Command post becomes logistics carrier. Logistics carrier becomes something carrying a machine gun. The platform never really retires; it simply acquires another mission.

The same logic may apply here.

A rocket launcher mount already installed on a serviceable landing craft still launches rockets. The hull is still operational. The supporting logistics chain already exists. Why spend money removing a capability that still functions?

To borrow a phrase that has probably appeared on more than one procurement briefing somewhere:

"New equipment costs money. Existing equipment is already paid for."

Viewed through that lens, the continued presence of navalized 122mm MRLs aboard amphibious craft becomes far less surprising. It may not represent a revived capability at all. It may simply be a capability that never went away because nobody could come up with a compelling reason to remove it.

After all, this is the same military culture that sees a useful idea and asks, "How many different jobs can we make this thing do?"

Sometimes the answer is an articulated tracked carrier that ends up doing everything short of filing taxes.

Sometimes the answer is a rocket launcher that remains bolted to a landing craft for two decades because taking it off would require a budget request.

And if there is one lesson from watching PLA procurement over the years, it is this: Never underestimate the lifespan of a capability that is still "good enough" and already paid for.

 

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

PLAN decommission of the day: FFG516 "Jiujiang" China's only MLR fire-support frigate

Cal: 122mm
No tubes: 50 x 5 (250)
Weight: 5,000kg
Max effective range: 20km
Max range with extended range rocket: 30km
elevation: 0-60 degrees
Field/angle:+- 120 degrees.
Rate of fire: 50 rounds: 18-20 seconds.
Max change rate of elevation: 16 degrees per second.
Max change rate of direction: 16 degrees per second.

First Look at the Upgraded Type 051C Destroyer Shenyang (DDG 115)

Here is a recently surfaced photo of upgraded Type 051C destroyer Shenyang (DDG 115) at sea. As rumored for quite some time, the Russian S-300F "Rif-M" system appears to be gone. The distinctive revolving launchers and associated fire-control radar have been removed, with four 8-cell HQ-10 short-range air-defense launchers now visible in their place. Other modifications can also be seen.

Honestly, I am not surprised.  The S-300 was a stopgap solution from day one.

The PLAN needed a fleet-area air-defense capability immediately while its indigenous naval air-defense ecosystem was still maturing. The Type 051C was the answer: a Chinese hull wrapped around a Russian S-300F system. It solved a problem at the time, and it solved it well (I think)

What's interesting is that the S-300 never really spread throughout the PLAN. Outside of the two Type 051Cs, the system never found a home on other PLAN surface combatants. The future belonged to the HQ-9 family and the domestic combat systems that came with it.

The same thing happened on the air-defense side more broadly. China imported the S-300, learned from it, operated it, and then rather quickly moved to its own solutions. The imported system served its purpose, but it was never the final destination.

The other clue was that the two 051Cs have been largely absent from public view for well over a year. Many observers suspected they were undergoing some sort of modernization program, and the appearance of Shenyang seems to confirm that something substantial has been taking place behind the fence line.

To me, however, the bigger story isn't the missile.  Again,  it's the ecosystem.

I've argued before that modern military power is increasingly less about individual pieces of equipment and more about whether everything belongs to the same command-and-control, logistics, software, sensor, and weapons architecture.

The PLAN of 2026 is built around a domestic ecosystem, not an imported one.

 

Last photo that I have from March 2024

Friday, October 02, 2026

Counting Down the PLAN's Kilo Class

Photos out of China today show what appears to be the second of the PLAN's two original Project 636 submarines, ordered in 1997, making its way toward the Mawei Shipyard waterfront in Fuzhou as a future museum ship. The first Project 636 already ended up in Guangdong. At this point, both of the original 636s are doing what they were ultimately brought to China for: serving as atmospheric backdrops for military fiction writers and tourists looking for a submarine selfie.

 

 

     "The novel concerns an attempt by the People's Republic of China to obtain a fleet of Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and a series of covert operations carried out by the United States Navy using a Los Angeles-class submarine and Navy SEALs in order to prevent the Chinese from receiving the new boats. The submarines are wanted by China because their ability to operate silently at low speed would make it possible to dominate the Taiwanese Strait even against US Naval opposition. The novel is set in the United States, Russia, China, Taiwan and the Southern Ocean Kerguelen Islands." (Link)

Back to topic:

 

Back in March, I blogged that Kilo 877EKM pennant 365 had already been decommissioned and pointed out how the boat underwent extensive modernization during its service life, including the replacement of Russian subsystems with Chinese communications and electrical equipment, along with installation of the H/ZQQ-5 photoelectric mast. The imported platforms rarely stay purely imported for long in China. If a subsystem can be replaced with a domestic equivalent, eventually it usually is.

That gives us three confirmed retirements from China's total Kilo acquisition:

• 2 Project 877EKM boats (ordered 1993)
• 2 Project 636 boats (ordered 1997)
• 8 Project 636M Improved Kilo boats (ordered 2002)

Three boats down, nine to go. For a class that once represented the cutting edge of the PLAN's underwater force, the retirement process seems to be gathering momentum. The Kilos are slowly losing weight in the fleet structure (Kilo pun, inserted, ha) 

The retirement of these boats highlights something that often gets lost in discussions about hardware. The PLA increasingly evaluates platforms not as individual weapons, but as nodes inside a larger combat system. A submarine, destroyer, aircraft, or missile battery is valuable to the extent that it contributes to an integrated kill chain. The platform itself is becoming secondary.

The modern PLAN fights as a strike package.

A submarine is not simply a submarine. It is a sensor and shooter connected to satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, over-the-horizon radars, unmanned systems, shore commands, and surface combatants. The value of the platform lies in how effectively it can exchange data, receive targeting information, and contribute to the wider network.

This is where many of the older Russian-origin systems begin to run into problems.

Historically, if the PLAN can retrofit a platform with domestic weapons, sensors, communications gear, combat management systems, and C4ISR architecture, it will find a way to keep it around. The PLA has never been known for discarding useful hardware before extracting every last bit of value from it.   There are many blog posts on this very topic here

On paper, the Project 877EKM and 636 are not particularly old submarines. Many navies around the world would happily operate boats of similar vintage after a life-extension refit. The issue may be less about hull age and more about whether the platform remains worth integrating into the PLAN's evolving combat ecosystem.

Simply put, not every platform is worth dragging into the future.

Another data point is China's handling of retired Ming-class submarines. Rather than scrapping them, the PLAN transferred two Type 035G Ming-class boats to Bangladesh and one Type 035B Ming-class boat to Myanmar.

On paper, the Kilo is clearly the superior submarine. But from the perspective of Bangladesh or Myanmar, there is an argument that a former PLAN Ming may actually be easier to operate than a second-hand PLAN Kilo. The Ming sits entirely within a Chinese logistics, training, maintenance, and support ecosystem. The Kilo may be more capable, but it remains fundamentally Russian in origin, with all the associated sustainment challenges that come with it.

Which raises an interesting question: why haven't we seen retired PLAN Kilos exported the way the Ming-class boats were?

One possibility is simply that they are not attractive enough. Another is that they are too complicated to support outside of the PLAN. A third possibility is legal rather than technical.

Most modern arms sales contracts contain end-user and third-party transfer restrictions that prevent a buyer from reselling military equipment without the original supplier's consent. That would mean China could not simply pass a Kilo submarine to another customer without Russian approval.

I went looking for details on the original Sino-Russian Kilo contracts and found nothing publicly available that addresses this question. That doesn't prove such restrictions exist, but it does leave open the possibility that Moscow still has a say regarding any future re-export.

Yes I am aware of INS Sindhuvir → Myanmar 

For now, the evidence suggests that retired PLAN Kilos are heading to museums rather than foreign navies.

And perhaps that tells us something important. The Kilos were purchased as an emergency capability during a period when China's indigenous submarine programs were struggling. They filled the gap, provided valuable operational experience, and likely influenced later Chinese submarine development. But in today's PLAN, platforms increasingly live or die based on how well they fit the network.

A Kilo operating alone is still a capable submarine. A Kilo that cannot fully participate in the PLAN's integrated combat architecture is just another aging platform taking up pier space.

That's a very different calculation, I think.   

 

Wednesday, March 04, 2026

Kilo Class, Boat 365

 

Kilo 877EKM pennant 365 was imported from Russia, arrived in 1995, and decommissioned in 2021. During her service life she saw relatively limited operational use, spending long periods undergoing refits. One major focus of these refits was the integration of Chinese‑made communication and electrical subsystems. A notable example is the installation of the H/ZQQ‑5 photoelectric mast, which replaced the traditional optical periscopes originally fitted on Project 877 boats. Later variants of the improved Kilo class (Project 636.3) are built with modern photoelectric masts from the outset. Bonus photo of PLAN's encrypted communication system

Much like the PLAAF, the PLAN consistently prioritizes domestic subsystems over imported ones, even on foreign‑built platforms.

 

 Encrypted communication system

 

Friday, June 19, 2020

Photos of the day: Sino-ized Sovremenny-class destroyer on patrol.

First pair commissioned into the PLAN China Navy in December 1999 and November 2000.  After a prolonged period of midlife upgrade, they are now back into 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, Eastern Theater Command Navy's orbat.

They ripped out everything - including the kitchen sink - out, leaving only the AK-130 automatic naval gun mounts in place.  Type54A's electronic warfare and radar suites are clearly visible

Before 

After

Monday, March 20, 2023

PLN Decommission of the day: One of China Navy's Kilo Class Submarines To Be Turned Into A Museum Ship

 As part of the Zhanjiang Bay Cultural Tourism Base tourist attraction