Xi’an HYJ‑7: The PLAAF Bomber Trainer — The “PLA on a Budget” Example

Only three air forces on Earth still fly actual heavy, long‑range strategic bombers: the USAF, the Russian Aerospace Forces, and the PLAAF. You can argue all day about whether heavy bombers still matter in a battlefield increasingly run by drones, but the fact remains: all three countries still operate them, still fund them, and still need crews who know which button does what. And let’s be honest here: when you’re flying a giant metal turkey capable of carrying nuclear weapons, having a crew that presses the right button is generally considered a good idea.

And if you need crews, you need training. This is where the story gets… very PLAAF.

 While the USAF and Russians train their bomber crews the normal way by flying actual B‑52s(link), Tu‑95s, Tu‑160s, and Tu‑22M3s and burning fuel like it’s still the Cold War, the ever‑thrifty PLAAF went full “creative frugality” in the late ’90s and simply converted the Xian Y‑7-100 transports (and later imported An‑34s) into HYJ‑7 bomber trainers, complete with a three‑man crew, a big bombing‑compartment bulge, and ten wing bomb bays, proving once again that if there’s a cheaper way to do something, the PLAAF will absolutely do it.     Those imported Russian D-30KP-2 engines can't be that cheap or long lasting.

Nobody outside the PLAAF has any clue how effective the HYJ‑7 really is as a bomber substitute, and the PLAAF isn’t exactly publishing peer‑reviewed results. The takeaway is simply this: if there’s a way to stretch a budget until it squeals, the PLAAF will do it.

 

Ripley: "How many drops is this for you, Lieutenant?" Lieutenant Gorman: "Thirty-eight... simulated. Private Vasquez: "How many combat drops?"Lieutenant Gorman: "Uh, two. Including this one."

 

 

 

Monday, January 05, 2015

Photo of the day: The aggressor H-6K practicing a low-level penetration bomb run against a PLAAF anti-defense brigade during a confrontational drill

The newsworthy of this picture is not the low-level penetration bomb run -- which the K model is primarily designed to perform -- rather the serial number of 11193 confirming that the PLAAF 8th Bomber Division now has at least 14 H-6K (god of war) model in its orbat.

The other H-6K unit is the PLAAF 10th bomber division

 

Sunday, November 17, 2013

PLAAF "in the news" of the day: H-6K, god-of-war (small g)

 H-6K bombers delivered to PLA Air Force

By Chen Boyuan
     China.org.cn, June 22, 2013

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-06/22/content_29197824.htm

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force recently received 15 H-6K bombers with nuclear capabilities, according to British military digest Jane’s Defence Weekly.

The H-6K, an updated version of the H-6 bomber, is a medium-sized craft designed for long-range attacks, stand-off attacks and large-area air patrol. Unlike its predecessor, the H-6K can carry cruise missiles under its wings. The H6-K also maneuvers more deftly than the H-6 and requires a smaller crew to operate. Jane’s Defence was the first media outlet to confirm that the H6-K had formally entered active service.

The most visible departure from the H-6 is the H6-K’s nose, where a nose randome has replaced a navigation cabin. Military expert Fu Qianshao said that the H6-K’s nose should greatly improve avionics, search and detection, navigation, fire control and weapon precision.

Fu said that the H-6K has a larger engine inlet than does the H-6, which may mean that the newer bomber’s engines have greater thrust. If so, the H-6K would also have a greater maximum takeoff weight and payload than the H-6. A more favorable weight-to-thrust ratio would improve fuel efficiency and lengthen cruising range, Fu said.

H-6K reportedly has a combat radius of 3,500 KM. The nuclear-capable Changjian (long sword)-10 cruise missiles it carries have a range of 1,500-2,000 KM, effectively extending the bomber’s combat range to 4,000-5,000 KM - long enough to reach Okinawa, Guam and even Hawaii from China’s mainland.

Analysts stipulated that PLA Air Force missiles be able to reach Taiwan, southwestern Japan and Guam, a range of control that requires a 3,000-KM combat radius and powerful attack capability. Only the combined combat radii of the H6-K and Changjian-10 currently satisfy the length requirement.

 

Sunday, August 29, 2010

New photos of the H-6K variant

With a pair of imported Russian D-30 engines.




Unrelated photos of H-6 performing a good ole style carpet bombing.

On August 16, a flight regiment of the East China Sea Fleet under the Navy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army carried out low-altitude mass-bombing training on a water range located between China’s Jiangsu Province and Anhui Province. According to Li Dashan, political commissar of the regiment, the low-altitude mass bombing features high demands and risks. In recent years, the regiment accomplished training on highly-difficult tactical subjects of pelagic attack, maritime extra-low bombing, mass bombing in formation and maritime mine-laying, so as to acquire the masterly skills for future sea and air combat.

　　By Wang Chaowu

 

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Final installment of D-30KP-2 delivered to China

The following is a Google translated news from (here), the same in Chinese (here).   Thus far there are two known use of D-30KP-2 by the "Chinese customer" they are the H-6K "God of War" bomber program and the KJ-2000 Mainring AWAC fleet.  Since the existing KL-2000 fleet does not require 55 new engines, it is likely that more H-6K will be manufactured in due course.

NPO "Saturn", 25 March 2011

http://www.aviatablo.ru/node/37485/
March 23 fifth installment of D-30KP-2 production of JSC "NPO Saturn" put the Chinese customer. This is the final party of 11 engines, the contract between Rosoboronexport and the China People's Republic, which entered into force in April 2009, to supply 55 engines for the period until 2012.
Delivery of the final installment of D-30KP-2 is scheduled before the end of March this year. Contract also provides technical support from the manufacturer within the warranty period.

The previous four parties of D-30KP-2 were delivered by the Russian side, respectively, in November 2009, March, May and October 2010.During the acceptance of work members of the Chinese delegation and a representative of the PRC Embassy in Moscow, Zheng Kai noted with satisfaction the early and qualitative performance of OAO "Saturn" contractual obligations.

According to the commercial director of NPO Saturn, Sergei Popov, "for" Saturn ", which has longstanding friendly relations with Chinese customers, a great honor to successfully complete the work under this contract. We look forward to an early extension of the Russian-Chinese cooperation. In particular, the continued supply of engines to China, the D-30KP-2.

Photos of the Day: PLA Type 56 85 mm Gun, where and when.

 Came across two old PLA propaganda photos, decided to do some forensic anthropology to see when and where those two were taken

Clue #1: The Type 56 (No, the other Type 56):

the Type 56 85 mm anti‑tank gun, China’s clone of the Soviet D‑44 divisional gun. Factory 247 started cranking these out in 1956, eventually producing over 11,000 of them. For decades, every PLA infantry division had a full battalion of these things (18 guns per division), and they saw action everywhere (link):

• 1958 Kinmen artillery duels
• 1969 Sino‑Soviet border clashes
• 1979 Sino‑Vietnam War
• And basically every border skirmish with Vietnam afterward

Clue #2: The GK80 steel helmets:

These helmets were rushed into production for the 1979 Sino‑Vietnam War, but they didn’t become common until the early 1980s. By then, border defense units and infantry regiments in Yunnan and Guangxi were wearing them like it was the new summer fashion line (link)

So: post‑1979, likely early 1980s.

Clue #3: No leggings — a big clue:

The troops in the photos aren’t wearing the traditional PLA puttees (绑腿). These leg wraps have a 2,000‑year history — Qin Dynasty terracotta soldiers wore them, Korean War troops wore them, and 1979 Sino‑Vietnam War infantry definitely wore them (link).  Photos of them can be found all over the internet 

The practice only died out when the PLA rolled out the Type 85 and Type 87 uniform series.
So: mid‑1980s or later.

Clue #4: Type 56‑1 under‑folder rifles:

The so‑called “Type 56 submachine gun” (yes, that’s what PLA called it) — the milled‑receiver, under‑folding stock variant. Before and during the 1979 war, squad leaders carried these while the rank‑and‑file lugged the other SKS based Type56s.

But in these photos? Most of them got one. That’s a big hint:
By the early–mid 1980s, Type 56‑1s were widely issued in border units, especially in Yunnan and Guangxi.

Clue #5: Summer uniforms + towing an 85 mm gun uphill:

Nothing says “PLA border defense in the 1980s” like a bunch of conscripts in summer cotton uniforms towing a 1.7‑ton artillery piece up a slope.

(Yes, towing. Get it? Tow‑ing a Type 56. I’ll see myself out.)

Put all the clues together - These photos were almost certainly taken in the mid‑1980s near the Sino‑Vietnam border.

 

 

Photos of the Day: PLAAF/PLANAF Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Pod

The PLAAF/PLANAF do, of course, use Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pods. It is the same real‑time telemetry and simulated‑weapons pods every modern air force relies on to make air‑combat training measurable instead of anecdotal. They track positional data, maneuver geometry, missile shots, gun envelopes, and feed it all back for real‑time kill calls and post‑sortie reconstruction.

What’s been missing in the open source world is a clean, unambiguous photo of a PLAAF/PLANAF ACMI pod in service. Those have been notoriously hard to find  until now. Below is one of the first clear public images/screen captures of a PLAAF ACMI pod mounted on two naval  J-11BSH, the familiar missile‑shaped training round that bolts onto a standard hardpoint with no aircraft mods required. It’s a small piece of hardware, but a critical one: no modern air force trains seriously without it.

For readers who want to go deeper than hardware spotting  and into how the PLAAF actually trains, organizes, and evaluates its aviators,  there’s no better guide than Kenneth W. Allen. He remains the most meticulous Western researcher on PLAAF organization, personnel systems, training institutions, and the grade structure that quietly governs everything the PLAAF does. If you want to understand PLAAF training as an institution rather than a collection of aircraft, Allen is the starting point.  Some of his works are found here (link)

 

The Belarusian Are Coming, The Belarusian Are Coming

So apparently we’re all supposed to act surprised that a certain neighbor of China has been quietly training military personnel on the side.  And now, the Belarusians, a different and further away friend of China are in China for training drills.  Not leaked, and surely not covertly, as they are here with photos, official write‑ups, the whole package. 

Maybe, just maybe, those Belarusian paratroopers will spill a few beans about what they’ve seen down south in their neighborhood. Stranger things have happened.    

 

China-Belarus Swift Eagle 2026 joint training kicks off in Hubei
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/C_251453/TE/16479201.html

Source China Military Online
Editor Li Jiayao

Time 2026-08-12 21:43:07

BEIJING, Aug. 12 -- The opening ceremony of the Swift Eagle 2026 joint training of airborne troops from China and Belarus was held at a Chinese PLA Air Force's training center in central China's Hubei Province on August 12, 2026.

Under the theme of "joint counter-terrorism operations in urban terrain", the training will focus on subjects including surveillance and counter surveillance, seizure-and-control and protection, and elimination and defense.

As the 4th iteration, the joint training will help enhance combat capabilities of the participating troops and deepen substantive cooperation between the two militaries.

 

 

 

 

A Mental Exercise on the H‑6K and UMPK‑Style Glide Kits

First things first: I hope none of this ever becomes real. Let’s start from that baseline.

One of the more interesting lessons Chinese mil‑bloggers have been chewing on from the Ukraine war is Russia’s enthusiastic use of the UMPK aerial bomb glide kit. As with most things in that conflict, hard data is scarce and performance claims are fuzzy. But one thing is undeniable: the Russians love these things. Their social media is full of UMPK drops, and they’re flinging 250‑kg glide bombs like confetti.
It’s the old line: “Quantity has a quality all its own.”

Drop enough dumb iron with wings and eventually something important gets hit.

The UMPK (Unified Gliding and Correction Module) is a low‑cost bolt‑on kit that turns old unguided bombs into long‑range, semi‑smart glide munitions. It’s Russia’s budget‑tier answer to the American JDAM‑ER.
 

Ukraine, for its part, has been using JDAM‑ER on MiG‑29s and Su‑27s since 2023. So both sides are essentially doing the same thing: adding brains and range to legacy dumb bombs to get more standoff punch without burning through expensive precision stocks. 

As I’ve written before, the PLA is watching the Russo‑Ukrainian war like a hawk (last one right below). Real battlefield lessons delivered in real time, from the comfort of your own living room. It would be ashamed not to study it. 

Which brings us to the H‑6K.

China fields over 100 H‑6Ks, each with a maximum payload around 15 tons. That conveniently matches the loadouts seen in photos:

• 36× 250‑kg bombs on external pylons
• 24× 250‑kg bombs in the internal bay

Other PLA strike aircraft such as Su‑30, JH‑7, Su‑35, J‑16 could also employ a UMPK‑style kit. But the H‑6K stands out for one reason: volume. It’s a flying warehouse. If you want to drop a lot of glide bombs in one sortie, this is the platform. Again, quantity has a quality all its own. 

 

The Mental Exercise (Let’s keep this strictly hypothetical and academic):.
 

Base Point 1

• A UMPK‑style kit extends reach to 40–70 km from high altitude.
• Jet‑assisted variants (UMPB) reportedly push 100–200 km (link).

Base Point 2

• The Taiwan Strait is 130–180 km wide.
• The median line sits ~65–90 km off both coasts.

 The Question:

At what distance today and in what role could a 250‑kg glide kit matter in a Taiwan contingency?
This is not prediction, not advocacy, not inevitability. It’s just a thought experiment/mental exercise. 

"Anyone tracking Chinese strike reach has already run these numbers". Anyone watching how fast glide‑bomb kits proliferate understands why this topic keeps surfacing in PLA circles, inside and outside of China

New "kit" in town.   

 

Ole "Dumb and Dumber" 

 

Sunday, January 19, 2025

There it is, Tian Gang, Chinese UMPK aerial bomb glide kit for 500KG bomb

Given China's manufacturing advances and enormous stocks of FAB bombs, it would be a great surprise if they didn't have their own version of UMPK.

I'm sure there are kits for other types of unguided bombs as well. 

Saturday, February 25, 2017

H-6K going ole school.

H-6K, China's only long-range strategic bomber is better known for carrying six CJ-10A cruise missiles geared for long-range and stand-off attacks.  It also made news recently for its "routine" drills over the West Pacific.   What is being overlooked here is its ole-school, iron bomb payload --  increased by the pair of Soloviev D-30 turbofans and extra fuel capacity -- it's 9-ton can of whoop ass can make short work of any "new structure" in the South China Sea.

6x6=36!

Case-in-point:  Cavite, Luzon Island, Philippines after being bombed by American B-24 Liberators, January 1945 

Before and After

 

Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics of the day: Armor Breaching Drone Conversion

 One thing the war in Ukraine has made clear, pun interned, is that mine clearing  with tracked breaching vehicles have a rather short life expectancy. Anything tasked with driving straight into a minefield so the rest of the armor column doesn’t has, let’s say, a high crew turnover rate.

China, meanwhile, is sitting on a mountain of surplus Type 59 hulls, and you can practically hear the NORINCO product managers brainstorming: “What if we just turn these into remote‑control minefield‑breaching drones and sell them? Someone out there will buy it, right?"

The PLA already fields several tracked breaching vehicles. The GSL‑133, based on the Type 96 MBT (link), is the main in‑service system. It’s a proper, modern breacher with the usual dozer blade, line charge, and engineering kit.
Then there’s the Type 84 Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), built on the old Type 59/69 chassis (link). It has a with wide mine plough mounted at the front to get clearing done.

China has exported thousands of Type 59/69/79‑family tanks across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. On paper, that makes those same countries natural candidates for receiving the Type 84 AVLB, since armies usually want engineering vehicles that match their existing chassis fleets.

There’s no confirmed export success for the Type 84. No photos, no SIPRI entries, no parade sightings, no “accidentally leaked” procurement documents.  Still, the logic remains: China pushes goods and services wherever a market might exist, and engineering vehicles are no exception. If someone wants a cheap bridgelayer or a remote‑control breaching drone built on a 1950s‑era hull, NORINCO will happily oblige.

This is just another reminder of how China approaches defense exports: If there’s even a theoretical market, they’ll build something to fill it. Whether anyone buys it is a separate question—but the catalog keeps growing. 

Type59MBT based  Breaching drone (note 5 wheels)

 

Type 84 AVLB in PLA service. "An assault breacher vehicle fires obstacle-breaching shells to clear obstacles in the way during a barrier-breaking training exercise at a comprehensive military training base on June 5, 2021. This training exercise was jointly conducted by a chemical defense detachment and an engineering detachment under the PLA 73rd Group Army. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Liu Zhiyong)"  (link)  

 

 

Thursday, July 02, 2026

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Cheaper to buy new than used.

Over the last two years, China’s Y‑8 tactical transport has kept up its quiet, steady export run. Yes, this Soviet‑era Antonov An‑12 derivative is somehow still in production, and that’s exactly the point: in a niche market where buyers can get a freshly minted mid‑size transport straight off the assembly line, the Y‑8 beats the alternative of a “lightly used” ex‑Soviet airframe that spent the last decade dissolving in a leaky warehouse. For a certain tier of customers, new beats questionable used every time. 

Take Myanmar, where budgets are tight, runways are rough (there's war going on), and Western procurement channels have long since closed. They can still pick up two new Y‑8F‑200s and keep their national airlift backbone functioning without having to gamble on ancient Antonovs. 

Sri Lanka continues to run its Y‑8s for maritime patrol and transport because Western MPAs are priced into the stratosphere, and China provides support without the geopolitical fine print. 

Kazakhstan’s National Guard is also expanding its fleet, with three additional Y‑8 Pegasus aircraft arriving in 2025, bringing its operational total to six.  

As with many Chinese military exports, the Y‑8 keeps winning small orders for three very simple reasons. First, price and politics: if you’re under sanctions or just not on Washington’s Christmas card list, the Y‑8 is one of the few tactical transports you can actually buy. Second, ruggedness over refinement: it’s not a C‑130J, and it doesn’t need to be. It’s a medium‑lift truck with wings, and for many militaries, that’s exactly what they need. Third, China delivers fast and without drama: no congressional hearings, no export‑control purgatory, no multi‑year wait times. For some of buyers, that alone is worth more than any avionics upgrade. 

The Y‑8 isn’t glamorous, but it’s dependable, politically accessible, and still rolling off the production line. In this corner of the global market, that’s enough to keep the production line open.

 

 

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Hawking cheap ATGM (AFT-11E/Red Arrow 11E/GTS9)

 The war in Ukraine offers many military lessons to the world, one of them being that using hard to produce, expensive weapons against, cheap, easy to deploy OpFor in a static war of attrition does not make a lot of economic sense.    Norinco, being a good communist as they are, actually listen to customer demand and the ever change marketing condition now offers.  They are now offering an lower cost variant    of the current in service Anti-tank Guided Missile, called AFT-11E/Red Arrow 11E/GTS9. 

This new missile model being offered to export prioritizes affordability, lightweight design, precision, and resistance to electronic countermeasures (quoting marketing here). Typically, it operates in two modes:  man-portable or vehicle-mounted. It is manned by a two-person crew. The entire weapon system features a launch tube, thermal/daylight sights, a laser designator, and a lightweight tripod for faster deployment time and foot mobility.  

The missile weighs approximately 14–15 kilograms and has a diameter of 140 millimeters; its effective engagement range from 100 to 5,000 meters. Utilizing laser beam-riding guidance for high hit probability. It is equipped with a tandem shaped-charge warhead designed to defeating explosive reactive armor, with a penetration depth of 1,000–1,200 millimeters of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA)

 

Saturday, May 17, 2025

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Hawking fiber optic FPV

With the widespread deployment of fiber-optic FPV drones in Eastern Ukraine, Chinese entrepreneurs are keen to seize every available business opportunity. While direct drone sales in that region may not be viable, numerous opportunities exist elsewhere.

Descriptions indicate that models ranging from 3KM to 15KM per fiber-optic drum are being offered, including a mothership variant.

 

 

Wednesday, September 10, 2025

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Missile theme pillows

Chinese Capitalism: Because nothing says sweet dreams like spooning a missile-shaped pillow.

 

Friday, April 18, 2025

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics example of the Day: Warship billboard advertisements

Yesterday, a photo of a fourth batch Type052D DDG under construction at the Dalian Shipyard leaked on the "China Internet" together with a series of billboard advertising pushing Sinopec's "X-power" marketing campaign (link), acting as a great representation of today's Chinese capitalism. 

Here are some considerations for advertising (link) on a modern DDG as borrowed from City Bus (link)

 Why advertise on a bus errr I meant on a PLAN Naval Major Surface Combatant like a Destroyer? 

• The answer here is simple: Exposure. Based on the location of your advertisement, you’re appealing to a fixed audience for a longer period of time than other outdoor advertising media types. If your ads are inside a bus, you have a captive audience in the passengers for the duration of their ride

How to select your route? (now change to PLAN's ocean-going route to maximize the commercial impact)

• There are a few factors that can contribute to how you pick the bus route you’ll use for advertising and relying on the expertise of an outdoor media company like Effortless Outdoor Media is a great way to narrow your choices down. By conducting a needs analysis with each client, we help figure out the goal of your outdoor advertising campaign and then work to locate the right places to advertise. Having a partner in ad placement is crucial because it saves time and money while ensuring a higher level of success with your campaign, however, some additional things to consider when selecting a bus route are: