Sunday, November 15, 2026

An 8th Combined-Arms Division Type 86A Sighting

 Fun with the PLA on a lazy Sunday afternoon.

A set of PLA publicity photos happened to pass across my radar today, and what immediately caught my eye was a collection of Type 86A/ZBD-86A infantry fighting vehicles, essentially China's BMP-1 lineage vehicle, later upgraded with a 30mm cannon turret and improved fire-control system. Despite the modernization, the hull remains unmistakably BMP-1 at heart.

The accompanying caption was a fairly standard PLA press-release line:

"Recently, a regiment of the Xinjiang Military Command conducted an all-element emergency deployment exercise."  近日,新疆军区某团展开全要素紧急拉动演练。

And that is about as generic as military PR gets. But for PLA watchers, the clues are already there. "Xinjiang". "A regiment". "Tracked infantry fighting vehicles in the photos"

That is enough to narrow the possibilities considerably. There are two PLA divisions in Xinjiang,  since the 11th Combined-Arms Division is equipped primarily with wheeled platforms, the tracked vehicle formation points squarely toward the 8th Combined-Arms Division. Looking closer, a Type 86A carrying the vehicle number 1105 is practically a dead giveaway, identifying the unit as the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, 8th Combined-Arms Division.

What I find interesting is not simply the unit identification exercise. It is the equipment itself.

One recurring theme of the PLA is that it rarely throws anything away. Looking at a Type 86A in 2026, it is easy to dismiss it as obsolete. After all, the BMP-1 design has performed poorly in several recent conflicts, and few would consider it survivable as a frontline infantry fighting vehicle on a modern battlefield.

But that also raises an important question: what role is the vehicle actually expected to perform?

As a modern IFV charging headlong into a high-intensity fight, the Type 86A's prospects are not particularly encouraging. As a protected battlefield taxi, however, it remains useful. The vehicle is mobile, tracked, amphibious, and available in large numbers. For a force that still expects much of its infantry to dismount and fight on foot, there is a certain logic in keeping these aging "armored trucks" around.

Interestingly, one of the photos also appears to show a Type 89 APC, another reminder that not every PLA formation is equipped with the latest ZBD-04A or ZBL-08 family. The further one looks beyond the headline units, the more variety appears.

And that, perhaps, is one of the most enjoyable aspects of watching the PLA.

There is a tendency among casual observers to view the PLA as a monolithic force equipped entirely with the newest hardware rolling off the production line. In reality, it is a massive organization spanning elite amphibious brigades, heavy combined-arms formations, border-defense units, mountain troops, garrison forces, and everything in between. One brigade may field some of the most advanced equipment China produces, while another continues operating vehicles whose origins trace back to the Cold War.

Sometimes observing the PLA reminds me of the old parable of the blind men describing an elephant. Each observer sees a different part and reaches a different conclusion. Someone watching naval construction at Hudong sees one PLA. Someone following carrier aviation sees another. Someone spending their Sunday afternoon staring at Type 86As in Xinjiang encounters something entirely different.

That diversity is precisely what makes PLA watching can be so much fun.  And yes, I don't have much of a life

 






 

Saturday, September 19, 2026

131st Medium Combined-Arms Brigade TOE Update, September 2026

Trying to identify a PLA unit from an official news report is an art form in itself. Chinese state media generally goes out of its way not to mention unit designations. In the case of a recent report about "a brigade of the 83rd Group Army, Central Theater Command, equipped with the new 'Big 8-Wheeler' vehicles," CCTV even physically taped over the tactical vehicle markings.

That said, they almost always leave a few breadcrumbs behind.

The ZBL-19 itself is not particularly mysterious. Its specifications are already available from a variety of open sources. The more interesting question is not what the vehicle is, but who is getting it. This post is about how to identify the receiving unit and track a probable TOE upgrade using the clues left behind in official reporting.

The title of the report already provides the first major hint. The reference to the new "Big 8-Wheeler" immediately narrows the field to a wheeled formation.

Within the PLA's combined-arms force structure, 8×8 and 6×6 wheeled APCs and IFVs are generally associated with Medium Combined-Arms Brigades. Heavy brigades operate tracked armored vehicles, while light brigades are equipped primarily with lighter platforms such as the Dongfeng Mengshi series.

That immediately reduces the candidate pool within the 83rd Group Army to four brigades:

  • 58th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 60th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 131st Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 193rd Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
 The decisive clue appears later in the report with the mention of Red First Company (红一连), one of the PLA's most famous "red heritage" units.

At that point, the puzzle is essentially solved.

Unlike many honorary unit titles whose exact modern affiliations remain murky, Red First Company is unusually well documented. The unit traces its lineage back to the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the formative years of the Red Army. It is widely associated with the birthplace of the principle of "the Party branch is built at the company level" (支部建在连上), with a lineage stretching all the way back to the founding period of the PLA in 1927.

Following successive reorganizations, Red First Company is currently associated with the 131st Medium Combined-Arms Brigade of the 83rd Group Army, specifically 1st Company, 1st Battalion.

The vehicle markings shown in the accompanying Central China Television footage appear to support that identification. One ZBL-19 can be seen carrying the marking 1101, which would be consistent with a vehicle assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Company, Vehicle No. 01.

In other words, CCTV may have taped over the obvious identifiers, but they left enough of the puzzle visible for anyone willing to look closely.

The final piece is the equipment history. The 131st Brigade was previously recorded operating the Type 92 (ZSL-92A) wheeled APC family. Assuming the identification is correct, the arrival of the ZBL-19 represents a significant modernization step, bringing improvements in mobility, protection, situational awareness, and firepower compared to the older Type 92-series vehicles.

For an official report that never actually names the unit, it ended up telling us quite a lot.  PLA watching is fun, right? right?






Friday, August 01, 2025

Reading The PLA Tactical Vehicle Markings And Unit Numbering System

Recently, there was a news report about the PLA jumping into S&R effects for the Beijing major flood (link), which made me think of doing a blog post on understanding the PLA tactical marking placed on the side of their vehicles.

 In the following photos,  the PLA with Tactical Vehicle Marking of unit that took part can be easily identified as "Combat Support Brigade",  "Second Group Army of a Theater Command"

LZ45 translates into  L = Lu (Ground) Z= Zhong (Central),  "4" is Combat support brigade within the second Group Army,  5 is the brigade number within that Group Army.     

  • 3204 = Third Battalion/Second Company,  04 = fourth vehicle of Second Company.

Look at LZ45 again, consider that each of the five PLA Theater Command has 2 to 3 Group Armies.

The first Group Army of the Central Theater Command, in this case, all combat line brigades of the 81st Group Army is assigned with "1" as in LZ1*.

  • LZ11 - 7th Combined-Arms Brigade, 81st GA
  • LZ12 - 70th Light Combined-Arms Brigade, 81st GA
  • LZ14 - 189th Medium Combined Arms Brigade, 81st GA

Support brigade of the 81st GA is assigned with "2",  LZ2*

  • LZ21 - 81st Artillery Brigade, 81st GA
  • LZ26 - 81st Service Support Brigade, 81st GA
  • LZ25 - 81st Engineering and Anti-Chemical Warfare Brigade, 81st GA

Central Theater Command's second Group Army would be the 82nd GA

  • LZ36 - 196th Light Combined-Arms Brigade, 82nd GA
  • LZ35 - 188th Heavy Armor Combined-Arms Brigade, 82nd GA
  • LZ31 - 6th Heavy Armor Combined-Arms Brigade, 82nd GA

LZ45  the "4" indicate a support brigade of the 82nd GA as in LZ4*

  • LZ41 - 82nd Artillery Brigade, 82nd GA
  • LZ45 - 82nd Engineering Brigade, 82nd GA
 Central Theater Command's third Group Army would be the 83nd GA,  again, LZ5* = combat line unit
  • LZ54 - 113th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade, 83rd GA
  • LZ51 - 11th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade, 83rd GA
  • LZ55 - 131st Medium Combined-Arms Brigade, 83rd GA
83nd GA's supporting brigades LZ6*
  • LZ62 - 83rd Artillery Brigade, 83rd GA
  • LZ63 - 83rd Air-Defence Brigade, 83rd GA

LZ45 3204



LZ = Ground Central,  LB = Ground North (Bei),  LX = Ground West (Xi),  LD = Ground South (Nan) and LD = Ground Dong.   LJ= Ground xinJiang

 

LD21 - 71st Artillery Brigade, 71st GA reads Eastern Theater Command (LD),  support brigade of the 1st Group Army, in this case, 71st Group Army is the rated 1st within the  Eastern Theater Command.

LD32 - 124th Amphibious Combat Assault Brigade, 72nd GA, reads as,  Eastern Theater Command,  combat line brigade of the 2nd Group Army which is the 73rd GA

LD52 - 91st Amphibious Armored Assault Brigade, reads as,  Eastern Theater Command,  combat line brigade of the 3rd Group Army, which is the 73rd GA


LN12 - 16th Heavy Armored Combined-Arms Brigade, 74th GA = Southern Theater Command,  combat line brigade of the 1st Group Army, which is the 74th GA

LN36 - 123rd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade, 75th GA = Southern  Theater Command,  combat line brigade of the 2nd Group Army, which is the 75th GA

LN42 - 75th Artillery Brigade, 75th GA =  Southern  Theater Command, support brigade of the 2nd Group Army, which is the 75th GA

Please note the above system does not apply 100% to garrison unit nor the Tibet MD


Monday, January 18, 2021

TOE update: LD52 - 91st Heavy Amphibious Combat Assault Brigade

 The famed "2nd Jinan Regiment" ex- 91st Motorized Infantry Division has completed its "Heavy Amphibious Combat Assault Brigade" upgrade by trading in its old PL-96 122mm towed Howitzer,  Type63As APC and Amphibious Tank for PLZ07B Amphibious 122mm SPH, ZTD05 Amphibious Assault Gun, and ZBD05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

 The HQ17A SAM is new.

 


 



HQ-17A SAM to the right





Saturday, November 14, 2026

In the PLAN, Numbers Matter More Than Headlines. The YJ-83J Example

 One of the first publicly available photos of the YJ-83J anti-ship missile has recently surfaced. At first glance, it is not a revolutionary weapon. The missile appears to be an incremental improvement over the long-serving YJ-83 family, reportedly featuring a better seeker, upgraded sensors, and a longer range that is believed to exceed 200 km. The original YJ-83 entered service in the late 1990s and has gone on to become one of China's most widely deployed and exported anti-ship missiles.

On paper, the YJ-83J is not particularly flashy. It is not hypersonic. It is not even truly supersonic for most of its flight profile. Yet focusing on headline specifications misses the point.

The PLAN has never relied on a single "wonder weapon." Instead, it has built a force designed around volume, availability, and persistence.

A single YJ-83J may not look like much when compared to newer weapons such as the YJ-12 or YJ-18. However, dozens of YJ-83Js arriving from multiple directions are an entirely different problem. Launched from ships, aircraft, and potentially shore-based platforms, these sea-skimming missiles can be employed in saturation attacks against naval forces operating inside the First Island Chain during a crisis. The missile itself may not be state-of-the-art, but quantity has a quality all its own.

The same logic applies to the platforms that carry it.

The Type 056A corvette is often dismissed as a small coastal combatant. Individually, that criticism is fair. A single Type 056A is not going to dominate a naval battle. But the PLAN retained 50 Type 056A corvettes after transferring the earlier Type 056s to the China Coast Guard. Suddenly, the conversation changes.

Fifty hulls mean fifty opportunities to be at sea, escorting traffic, conducting ASW patrols, monitoring chokepoints, or simply maintaining a visible naval presence. No single Type 056A is particularly impressive, but a fleet of fifty ensures that there are always enough boats on station to keep watch and, if necessary, keep trouble away.

This is a lesson often overlooked when examining Chinese naval development. Analysts tend to focus on the latest destroyer, aircraft carrier, or missile. The PLAN certainly values those systems, but some of its most effective capabilities come from programs that are merely "good enough" and built in large numbers.

A single YJ-83J is not scary. A single Type 056A is not intimidating.

But dozens of missiles and fifty corvettes? That's where the math starts looking very different for naval planners on the other side of the table.


 YJ-83J long-range anti-ship cruise missile, equipped with an infrared thermal imaging seeker


 

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Zhuhai Airshow season is here

Airshow China, the Zhuhai Airshow, is held every two years in Zhuhai, Guangdong. The 16th edition, marking its 30th anniversary, runs December 7–13, 2026, per the organizers’ countdown announcement.  

Some of the hardware are arriving, including The VT-4B, export MBT

 





 

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

New Leak Suggests the Y-15/30 Could Become a Tanker... and That Might Be the Most Interesting Part

 A newly surfaced diagram out of China appears to show yet another potential variant of the emerging Y-15/30 medium transport aircraft family. As always with these kinds of leaks, a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted. A diagram is not a prototype, a prototype is not a flight test aircraft, and a flight test aircraft is not an operational program.

Still, even if the diagram ultimately proves inaccurate, it offers an interesting glimpse into what Chinese designers and planners may be thinking about when it comes to the future of the platform.

The tanker variant is what immediately caught my eye.

For years, discussion around PLA aerial refueling has naturally centered on the YY-20. That makes sense. The YY-20 is China's premier tanker platform and is increasingly being seen supporting fighter and bomber operations. But one question that came to mind is whether a YY-20 could realistically refuel helicopters.

Technically, the answer is likely yes. The bigger challenge is speed.

A helicopter equipped with an air-refueling probe can plug into a hose-and-drogue system. The problem is that most helicopters operate at significantly lower speeds than a large jet tanker. While a YY-20 may be perfectly suited to refueling fighters and bombers, slowing a large jet down enough to safely conduct prolonged helicopter refueling operations is a much more complicated proposition.

That naturally leads to the second question: why can aircraft such as America's KC-130 routinely refuel helicopters?

The answer is simple. The KC-130 is a turboprop. It can comfortably operate at the lower airspeeds required by helicopters during refueling. The U.S. military has been using KC-130s to support rotary-wing aircraft for decades because the platform inhabits a speed envelope that's much closer to the helicopters it is serving.

And that brings us back to the leaked Y-15/30 tanker concept.

If the aircraft is indeed envisioned as a medium-sized turboprop transport, a tanker variant would potentially be far better suited to helicopter refueling missions than a YY-20. Suddenly, the concept starts making a lot of operational sense.

To be clear, there is currently no evidence that the PLA is developing such a capability, nor do we know how far this particular concept has progressed beyond a drawing. But the appearance of a tanker option on the diagram suggests that planners are viewing the Y-15/30 not simply as a transport aircraft, but as a multi-role platform family.

In that regard, the parallels with the Y-20 are obvious.

The Y-20 started life as a strategic transport. Today, we've seen it evolve into the YY-20 tanker, alongside numerous reports and indications of additional specialized variants. The PLA has consistently demonstrated a preference for developing families of aircraft rather than standalone designs.

Viewed through that lens, it would actually be more surprising if the Y-15/30 didn't receive specialized mission variants.

A medium transport airframe could potentially support cargo transport, airborne command and control, maritime patrol, electronic warfare, special mission support, and tanker duties. Whether all of those variants are eventually built is another matter entirely, but they are exactly the kinds of missions military planners would evaluate during the design phase.

The tanker role may ultimately prove to be the most intriguing. The PLA's helicopter force has expanded dramatically over the past two decades, with platforms such as the Z-20 increasingly taking on long-range transport, special operations, and naval missions. If Chinese planners ever decide that helicopter aerial refueling is a capability worth pursuing, a medium-sized turboprop tanker would likely be a much more practical solution than relying on the jet-powered YY-20.

So while this latest leak should be treated cautiously, it may reveal something more important than a future aircraft variant. It may reveal how the PLA sees the Y-15/30 itself: not as a single transport aircraft, but as a flexible platform destined to fill a whole range of missions, with aerial refueling being one of them.

And if that's the case, we're probably only seeing the beginning of the Y-15/30 story.


 

 



Monday, October 26, 2026

Y-20 Airlifter: Platform as a Service

 A bit of 20/20 hindsight here.

The Y-20 is increasingly looking like a military version of "Platform as a Service" (PaaS), borrowing a term from the cloud computing world.

It has become a hot topic lately. One variant serves as an AWACS platform. Others have used satellite imagery to speculate on production rates and future airborne warning roles. More recently, reports have emerged of the Y-20B operating in a multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) configuration, fitted with modular underwing refueling pods that allow the same aircraft to switch between cargo and aerial refueling duties (link).


 

In many ways, the concept resembles the Airbus A330 MRTT, which dominates the global export tanker market. The U.S. Air Force took a different path. The KC-135, KC-10, and KC-46 are all dedicated tanker fleets first and foremost, rather than transport aircraft that can readily shift between missions.

The more I look at the Y-20 program, the more it appears that the aircraft itself is becoming the product. Everything else is merely a payload.

The Chinese Four-Engine Transport Saga

Writing from memory here.

Back in the mid-1990s, the PLAAF needed a large airborne early warning platform. The solution at the time was straightforward:

  • Russian Il-76 airframe
  • Israeli Phalcon radar system

The program became known as the A-50I/Phalcon project. Several Il-76s were acquired specifically for the effort, and at least one aircraft was sent to Israel for modification.

Then geopolitics intervened.

Under heavy U.S. pressure, Israel cancelled the Phalcon deal in 2000. China was left without the radar system but had already committed to the Il-76 platform. Rather than walking away, Beijing decided to develop its own solution, eventually resulting in the KJ-2000 airborne early warning aircraft.

That experience would prove to be a useful, if painful, lesson.

The Follow-On That Never Happened

After acquiring roughly fourteen Il-76 transports, China sought a much larger follow-on purchase.

In 2005, an agreement was signed for 38 additional Il-76 transports and Il-78 tankers. On paper, it looked like the PLAAF would rapidly expand both strategic airlift and aerial refueling capacity.

Instead, the deal fell apart.

The problem was that the aircraft were supposed to be built in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, at the original Il-76 production facility. By that point the production line was in serious decline. Russia itself was attempting to move manufacturing back home, but the transition was not ready.

No airplanes. No delivery.  No capability increase.

Had those 38 aircraft arrived on schedule, the PLAAF's strategic airlift capability would have expanded dramatically. The need was obvious during operations such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake relief effort.

Instead, China found itself staring at a familiar problem: a critical capability depended on factors completely outside Chinese control.

The Decision

The Russians later returned with offers related to the upgraded Il-476.  The PLA declined, see my post from November 2010 below

Looking back, that decision appears far more important than it seemed at the time.

Again, a word of caution. Nobody outside China has access to detailed PLA budgeting or R&D allocations. We can only observe outcomes.

And the outcome was clear: China doubled down on building its own heavy transport ecosystem. The result was the Y-20.

Twenty Years Later

Today the Y-20 is hauling cargo around the globe.

It shows up in humanitarian assistance missions, disaster relief operations, military diplomacy events, and increasingly in specialized mission roles.

China aid to the Nepal flood (link)



 

One recent example was Eagles of Civilization 2026, where a Y-20 tanker refueled an Egyptian MiG-29. A decade ago, that would have been difficult to imagine.

Now we are seeing reports of Y-20B MRTT configurations, AWACS variants, and continued expansion into new mission areas.

If China eventually offers export versions, I would not be surprised at all.  The platform is steadily evolving into an entire family of aircraft rather than a single transport.

The Bigger Point

The lesson is not that everyone should copy China.

Far from it.

The lesson is that importing critical platforms carries risks. Supply chains, foreign politics, export restrictions, production bottlenecks, and diplomatic pressure can all affect programs in ways customers cannot control.

China made a conscious choice to accept short-term capability gaps in exchange for long-term independence. During the 1990s and early 2000s, that meant living with fewer heavy transports than desired while investing in domestic alternatives.

Today, the payoff is visible.

The Y-20 is available when China needs it, can be modified when China wants it, and can evolve according to Chinese requirements rather than foreign export policies.

That approach worked for China.  But it is important to understand that China's circumstances were unique.

Not every country has China's budget, industrial base, engineering workforce, threat perception, political system, or willingness to spend decades developing indigenous alternatives. What worked for Beijing is not automatically a model for everyone else.

This is a Chinese approach to a Chinese problem.

The same pattern can be seen elsewhere, including the PLA's broader push toward indigenous sensors, weapons, propulsion, and command systems. The objective is not merely self-reliance for its own sake. It is control over timelines, upgrades, production rates, and future development.

Not every nation can afford that approach.

Not every nation needs to.

China decided that it did.

And the Y-20 may be one of the clearest examples of that decision paying off.  Not a bad career for an aircraft that originally existed because China couldn't buy enough Il-76s.

As a final note, the Y-20 is now even showing up in PLAAF recruitment material.


 



Monday, November 09, 2026

PLAN-AF Decommission Of The Day: Y-8X Maritime Patrol Aircraft Spotted Heading to a Museum

Recent photos circulating on Chinese social media appear to show a PLAN Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft being transported to what is reportedly a museum display site. While there has been no official announcement regarding the aircraft's retirement, the imagery strongly suggests that one of the PLAN's longest-serving special mission aircraft may be entering its final chapter. The Y-8X holds a unique place in PLAN aviation history as China's first true long-range maritime patrol aircraft 



 

 

For modern observers accustomed to seeing the far more capable KQ-200 regularly patrolling China's near seas, it's easy to overlook just how significant the Y-8X was when it entered service. Delivered to the PLAN in the mid-1980s, the type introduced a dedicated fixed-wing maritime surveillance capability that could remain on station for extended periods and search vast areas of ocean far beyond the reach of coastal radar coverage.
 
What made the aircraft particularly interesting was its timing. Developed during the brief period of Sino-Western defense cooperation, the Y-8X incorporated Western-origin maritime surveillance systems, most notably the Canadian Litton AN/APS-504 maritime search radar. At the time, this represented a major leap forward for PLAN maritime domain awareness
 
The Y-8X fleet was never large, but its influence far exceeded its numbers. It gave the PLAN its first practical experience in long-endurance maritime patrol, surveillance, search-and-rescue operations, and anti-submarine warfare support missions. Many of the operational lessons learned from the Y-8X era would ultimately contribute to the development of later special mission aircraft, culminating in the modern KQ-200 maritime patrol and ASW fleet.
 

Interestingly, the aircraft's service extended beyond purely military surveillance duties.

Due to its regular patrol presence over the South China Sea, Y-8X aircraft were reportedly utilized on occasion to assist with the medical evacuation of seriously ill personnel stationed on Yongshu Reef (永暑礁, Yǒngshǔ Jiāo). While not designed as a dedicated aeromedical platform, the aircraft's long range, endurance, and established patrol routes made it a practical asset when urgent transportation from the remote outpost was require

 In many respects, the Y-8X was the PLAN's maritime patrol workhorse before the term became fashionable. It lacked the sophisticated sonobuoy processing systems, magnetic anomaly detector, and advanced mission suite found aboard today's KQ-200, but it gave China something arguably more important at the time: experience
 
If the aircraft seen in these photos is indeed headed for permanent museum preservation, it would be a fitting fate. The Y-8X may never have been produced in large numbers, nor did it receive the public attention enjoyed by newer platforms. Yet few aircraft can claim to have contributed more to laying the foundation for China's modern maritime patrol aviation capabilities.
 
 
 

Sunday, November 08, 2026

First clear photos of the advanced carrier trainer JL-10T are finally here.

With its reinforced landing gear, strengthened tailhook section, and other navalized modifications, there's really no mistaking the JL-10T's intended role. This is a trainer built with carrier operations in mind.

For years, one of the biggest questions surrounding PLAN naval aviation wasn't what fighter would fly from the next carrier, but how the navy intended to train enough pilots to keep pace with a rapidly expanding carrier force. After all, steel can be built faster than experience.

The emergence of the JL-10T offers an interesting glimpse into how the PLAN appears to be tackling that problem.

China will soon have a dedicated progression path for carrier aviators,  before JL-10T:

JL-8 / JL-10 advanced training → JL-9G carrier approach training → J-15S/J-15T carrier conversion

In many ways, this mirrors a broader trend seen across Chinese military aviation. While outside observers often obsess over radar ranges, catapult performance, missile loadouts, and deck counts, the PLA seems equally focused on ensuring that pilots themselves don't become the bottleneck.

Building a carrier is hard.

Building an air wing is harder.

Building enough qualified air wings to sustain multiple carrier strike groups operating simultaneously is harder still.

Today, a PLAN carrier pilot's progression likely looks something like this before JL-10T 

  • Basic flight training
  • JL-8 / JL-10 advanced jet training
  • JL-9G shore-based carrier approach training
  • J-15 conversion unit
  • Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) at Huangdicun
  • Carrier qualification aboard Liaoning or Shandong

One of the more interesting aspects of the Chinese system is that, unlike the U.S. Navy, the PLAN has not traditionally had a direct equivalent to the T-45 Goshawk routinely performing arrested landings as a dedicated carrier trainer. Instead, pilots appear to progress from the JL-9G and shore-based carrier practice into the two-seat J-15S/J-15T conversion pipeline before earning carrier qualifications.

The JL-10T may help close that gap, but perhaps more importantly, it provides additional training capacity at a time when China's carrier fleet is expanding rapidly.

What's particularly interesting is that the JL-10T may not be the PLAN's only answer.

Recent sightings of the JL-10 Twin-Tail suggest a familiar PLA aviation approach: a dual-track development strategy. We've seen this pattern before. Rather than betting everything on a single aircraft or training solution, the PLA often develops parallel programs, either as competitors or as complementary systems. Sometimes one emerges as the primary platform. Sometimes both enter service and split responsibilities.

At this stage, it isn't clear whether the JL-10T and the JL-10 Twin-Tail are competing solutions, a primary-and-backup arrangement, or two aircraft intended to supplement one another. What is clear is that the PLAN appears unwilling to leave pilot production dependent on a single pipeline.

That makes a lot of sense when viewed through the lens of long-term carrier operations. New carriers can be launched, catapults can be installed, and J-15s can roll off the production line, but none of that matters if the cockpit is empty.

While everyone on Youtube is counting VLS cells, catapults, stealth fighters, and carrier tonnage, the PLAN appears to be investing heavily in the least glamorous but arguably most valuable component of carrier aviation: the pilot.

The arrival of the JL-10T, alongside the appearance of the JL-10 Twin-Tail program, suggests that Beijing is not just building carriers and aircraft. It's building redundancy into the training ecosystem itself.

Because in naval aviation, the most difficult hardware to manufacture has always been the one sitting in the cockpit.

And a carrier without enough qualified pilots is just a very expensive helicopter pad.




Tuesday, October 28, 2025

China’s new Hongdu carrier-based advanced twin‑engine jet trainer

First look: China’s new carrier-based advanced twin‑engine jet trainer by  has completed its initial test flight. Previously, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) relied on the JL‑9G, a single‑engine trainer adapted from the Guizhou JL‑9/JJ‑7 airframe. However, as many observers have noted, all of China’s current carrier‑based combat aircraft are twin‑engine designs, making the older single‑engine JL‑9G a less suitable candidate for lead‑in fighter trainer (LIFT) roles.






 


China's upgraded JL-9 naval trainer jet featured in official report
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/Features_209191/16377828.html
Source
    Global Times
Editor
    Li Weichao

Time
    2025-03-30 21:51:40

 
 

A JL-9 trainer aircraft attached to a regiment affiliated with the Naval Aviation University of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) lands after a combat exercise in the spring of 2025. Photo: Screenshot from the Sina Weibo account of China Bugle, an official media account affiliated with the PLA news media center

An upgraded version of China's JL-9 naval trainer jet was featured in a recent official report, revealing newly added wingtip split rudders. A Chinese military affairs expert said on Sunday that the technology will enhance carrier pilot training and could be applied to future stealth aircraft.

A regiment affiliated with the Naval Aviation University of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) recently organized pilots to conduct an aerial maneuvering exercise under combat scenarios, China Bugle, an official media account affiliated with the PLA News Media Center, reported on Saturday evening.

By putting a red team and a blue team against each other in close-range combat training, the exercise tested the pilots' comprehensive combat capabilities in complex battlefield conditions.

The video report showed JL-9 trainer jets in action, with one deploying wingtip split rudders during landing.

Public reports indicate that wingtip split rudders are a new feature to an upgraded version of the JL-9 that made its maiden test flight in May 2020.

Compared to the original JL-9, the upgraded version of the aircraft removed the drogue parachute installation located at the vertical tail, and added wingtip split rudders, aiming to improve stability and low-speed performance, eastday.com, a Shanghai-based news website, reported at the time.

The JL-9 trainer aircraft is used to train pilots for aircraft carrier-based fighter jets, which do not use drogue parachutes, so it is normal for the trainer to remove this design. The new split rudders act as air brakes, helping pilots practice carrier landings more effectively, Song Zhongping, a Chinese military affairs expert, told the Global Times on Sunday.

Using split rudders instead of drogue parachutes can also help lowering the weight of the aircraft, improving overall performance, Song said.

The appearance of the upgraded JL-9 in an official report is an indication that the aircraft has technically matured, Song said.

Beyond the JL-9, Song noted that wingtip air brake and split rudder technologies have potential in future stealth aircraft. To achieve better stealth, next-generation aircraft tend remove vertical wings, so they need to use other types of stabilizers to control the aircraft, and this is when alternative control surfaces like wingtip rudders become relevant. 
 


 



Saturday, November 07, 2026

The H-6 J and K, Now With self-defense electronic warfare pods

 The PLA's H-6 bomber fleet, including both the PLAAF's H-6K and the PLANAF's H-6J, remains one of the key workhorse platforms supporting China's A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) strategy. While much of the discussion in defense circles tends to focus on China's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, bombers offer a level of flexibility that missiles simply cannot match.

For peacetime deterrence missions, a bomber can be launched as a visible signal of intent, loiter near an area of interest, and then be recalled if tensions ease. A ballistic missile, once launched, offers no such option. It is an advantage long appreciated by operators of the U.S. Air Force's B-52 fleet. Well, except in Dr. Strangelove (great movie, by the way).


 

Today, both the H-6K and H-6J are primarily employed in the maritime strike role, extending the PLA's ability to threaten surface vessels far beyond the range of its coastal missile batteries.

Below is an H-6J long-range bomber, formerly operated by the Naval Air Force, carrying four YJ-12 supersonic air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. Mounted on the wingtips are self-protection electronic warfare pods, providing the aircraft with an additional layer of survivability during long-range missions.  H-6K with a different set of pod also being photoed as of late.

After all, there is no guarantee that dedicated electronic warfare escorts will always be available or capable of accompanying the bomber throughout the entire mission profile. In those situations, the H-6J's organic electronic countermeasures offer a valuable measure of self-defense, especially given the bomber's significantly greater endurance and range compared to its fighter escorts.

 




 

Saturday, November 29, 2025

Photo Of The Day: PLAAF Su-35 of The PLAAF 6th Aviation Brigade

The PLAAF acquired 24 Su-35E fighters in a $2 billion deal signed in November 2015. With a ferry range of 4,500 km or 600 km greater than the J-16’s 3,900 km, the Su-35E is particularly well-suited for extended patrols over the vast expanse of the South China Sea. Indeed, this is precisely how the PLAAF has been employing the aircraft, as showed by the photo below.

No follow-on orders were placed beyond the initial batch of 24. As for the reasons behind this decision, your guess is as good as mine


 

Wednesday, February 07, 2018

PR photos of the day:Su-35 "Flanker-E" patrols over South China Sea

24 Su-35  "Flanker-E" were procured for about 2 Billion USD in Nov 2015 with first batch delivered to the Chinese air force in late 2016.  Second batch arrived in China December 22, 2017.

Photo source in Chinese (here)






China's Air Force part of joint patrol over S China Sea

http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-02/08/content_7936954.htm

Source:  China Daily
Editor:  Zhang Tao

Time:  2018-02-08

The Chinese air force recently sent its Su-35 fighter jets to take part in a joint combat patrol over the South China Sea. [Photo/Weibo of the Air Force]


The Chinese air force recently sent its Su-35 fighter jets to take part in a joint combat patrol over the South China Sea, the air force said in a release on Wednesday afternoon.

This is the first time the People's Liberation Army Air Force has made public the deployment of its Su-35s, built by Russia's Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association and introduced to China in late 2016. The air force did not reveal when the patrol took place.

The release said the multirole fighter jet's participation in combat exercises will help strengthen the air force's long-range operational capability.

The air force will continue pushing forward training to improve combat capabilities, it said.

Officials from Russia's state technology corporation Rostec said in November 2015 that Russia and China signed a contract that was estimated to be worth $2 billion for 24 Su-35s. The deal was later confirmed by Wu Qian, a spokesman for of the Chinese Defense Ministry.

The PLA's official website, 81.cn, previously said Su-35s started to be delivered to China in December 2016.

Russian news agency TASS said that as one of Russia's most advanced fighter jets, the Su-35 is equipped with phased array antenna radar and thrust vectoring engines. It has a maximum speed of 2,500 km per hour and is able to fly 3,400 km without refueling, according to TASS. The fighter is armed with a 30-mm gun and can carry 12 bombs or missiles, the report said.


Tuesday, April 03, 2018

Range matters

Once again, PLAAF's H-6K fleet is venturing to the South China Sea to conduct another "routine" patrol with the newly imported Su-35 as escort.   J-16's ferry range is reported to be 3,900 KM vs Su-35's 4,500 KM.





Bombers, jets hone skills over South China Sea, western Pacific
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-03/26/content_7983206.htm

The People's Liberation Army Air Force recently conducted combat exercises over the western Pacific Ocean and South China Sea, according to its spokesman, Senior Colonel Shen Jinke.

Shen said on Sunday that a group of aircraft including H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighter jets flew over the Miyako Strait earlier last week and then carried out combat training over the western Pacific to verify their long-range operational capabilities.

At the same time, another group of H-6Ks, Su-35 fighter jets and other aircraft conducted a joint combat patrol over the South China Sea, practicing aerial maneuvers and strike tactics at sea, he said in a statement published by the Air Force.
The PLA Air Force has become adept at organizing sophisticated joint operations and is able to safeguard the country's sovereignty, national security and interests, Shen said.

This is the second time the PLA Air Force has sent its Su-35s-built by Russia's Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association and introduced to China in late 2016-to take part in exercises over the South China Sea. The first was in early February.

Photos released by the Air Force showed air-launched cruise missiles under the wings of the H-6K bombers participating in the exercises.

The H-6K is the PLA's most advanced bomber and is capable of carrying supersonic cruise missiles to make precision strikes against land targets or ships. Foreign military observers said that the plane has a flight range of about 3,500 kilometers, while its cruise missile has a minimum range of 1,500 km, which means the bomber is able to hit targets at least 5,000 km from its takeoff point.

A news release published by Japan's Joint Staff on Friday said that in addition to bombers and fighter jets the Chinese Air Force had dispatched a Tupolev Tu-154 signal intelligence jet and a Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft to participate in the western Pacific training exercise.

The Air Force began performing long-range, ocean-bound drills in March 2015 and has organized dozens of such operations since then.

Fu Qianshao, an expert from the PLA Air Force, said that ocean-bound exercises verify not only the Air Force's long-distance combat capability, but also its logistics support and electronic warfare abilities.

According to the Air Force, China is developing a new-generation strategic bomber that will be much stronger than the H-6K. Analysts believe the new aircraft will have a range of at least 10,000 km, enough to perform intercontinental missions.