Word of caution: the following is simply my observation based on recent Chinese news releases, local media reports, blogs, and forum discussions. Since I do not have a direct line to the Central Military Commission's planning department, treat this as nothing more than the observations of someone who spends far too much time online.
In recent months, there has been a noticeable increase in reports of China's People's Militia manning air defense assets and conducting drills focused on counter-drone warfare. While the militia was originally intended to be one of China's key layers of defense against a potential Soviet invasion during the 1970s, its mass-mobilization role has largely faded into history. One could argue that many of its traditional civilian emergency-response duties have since been taken over by professional firefighters, police forces, and other specialized organizations that are better trained and equipped than the "sea of people" approach of decades past.
Back in the late 1990s, militia units still appeared regularly in propaganda photos, but they were usually carrying hand-me-down equipment: Type 56 carbines, Type 56 rifles, Type 56 light machine guns, and, for the lucky few, a Type 56 field gun. (See what I did there?)
Fast forward to today and the picture looks very different. Some militia units are now being shown with HN-6 MANPADS and PGZ-09/PG99 twin 35 mm anti-aircraft guns capable of firing AHEAD ammunition. These are not museum pieces or castoffs dragged out of storage. They are modern systems that remain relevant in contemporary PLA air defense formations.
As I have written before, having locally based crews responsible for defending critical civilian infrastructure makes a great deal of sense. Power stations, communications nodes, railway depots, ports, and other fixed facilities are not going anywhere. China's neighbors are also rapidly advancing their drone technology, doctrine, and operational experience. Rather than expecting militia personnel to stop a column of T-64s rolling across Inner Mongolia, a scenario straight out of the 1970s, it is probably more practical to have them operating air defense systems and shooting down relatively cheap drones threatening local infrastructure.
It almost goes without saying that Chinese planners are watching the war in Ukraine very closely. One of the clearest lessons from that conflict is that drones have pushed the air threat far deeper into the rear areas than many armies previously expected. Expensive missiles and fighter aircraft still matter, but increasingly so do cheap quadcopters, one-way attack drones, and the ability to protect targets that sit well behind the front lines.
Viewed through that lens, assigning People's Militia units to local air defense and counter-drone missions feels less like a revival of the militia's Cold War role and more like an adaptation of it. The mission is still territorial defense, but instead of looking for Soviet tank armies on the horizon, they are looking up.
PG99 towed twin-35mm anti-aircraft guns issued to a Liaoning Province militia anti-aircraft artillery unit (Reported in December 2025)
Militia air defense units equipped with Hongying-6B man-portable air-defense missile and the PG99 twin 35mm anti-aircraft gun 
In November 2025, a militia twin-35mm anti-aircraft gun detachment from the Shandong Provincial Military District conducted live-fire drills in Laizhou Bay.
Saturday, July 04, 2026
Return of the PG59 — China’s Nostalgia‑Powered Air Defense Debate
One of the more amusing trends floating through Chinese milblogs lately is the sudden rediscovery — and proposed recommissioning — of the old PG59 57mm anti‑aircraft gun. Yes, the same Soviet‑era AAA that saw heavy action in Vietnam, spraying the sky at F‑4s and A‑4s half a century ago. The argument goes like this: Taiwan’s defense strategy is increasingly drone‑centric, (link) and many of China’s soft logistics hubs, depots, and supply nodes are theoretically vulnerable to long-range drone attacks. So why not dust off the PG59 57mm AAA, bolt on a modern fire‑control system, and turn it into a cost‑effective point‑defense solution. In other words: if you can’t beat drones with lasers and railguns, beat them with something affordable already found in the warehouse.
The counterargument is equally predictable and equally valid: who exactly is going to man these guns, and how are they going to be trained. China’s military modernization has spent decades moving away from manpower‑heavy systems, not toward them. Reintroducing a weapon that requires a full crew, constant drills, and old‑school gunnery discipline is a romantic idea, but not necessarily a practical one
The point of highlighting this little trend isn’t to endorse the PG59 revival or dismiss it. It’s to note that there’s a real, active segment of China’s online population that follows military development closely and debates it seriously. How loud their voice is, and how much influence they actually have, is harder to measure. But they’re there, and every now and then, they latch onto something like a 1950s AAA gun and remind you that military enthusiasm in China spans everything from hypersonics to hardware that smells faintly of cosmoline. (old Type56 SKS reference inserted)
