Just photos: J-8F fighters are being dismantled, heading to an aircraft boneyard

 

July 4th, happy 57th birthday, J-8I

 J‑8I turns another year older every July 4th, PLAAF's Cold War interceptor sharing a birthday with fireworks. Born from China’s push for a true high‑altitude, high‑speed fighter, the J‑8I was ole-school, fast, and unapologetically 1970s. It never became a superstar, but it marked China’s first real step toward actual airpower.

 

 

Return of the PG59 — China’s Nostalgia‑Powered Air Defense Debate

One of the more amusing trends floating through Chinese milblogs lately is the sudden rediscovery — and proposed recommissioning — of the old PG59 57mm anti‑aircraft gun. Yes, the same Soviet‑era AAA that saw heavy action in Vietnam, spraying the sky at F‑4s and A‑4s half a century ago. The argument goes like this: Taiwan’s defense strategy is increasingly drone‑centric, (link) and many of China’s soft logistics hubs, depots, and supply nodes are theoretically vulnerable to long-range drone attacks. So why not dust off the PG59 57mm AAA, bolt on a modern fire‑control system, and turn it into a cost‑effective point‑defense solution. In other words: if you can’t beat drones with lasers and railguns, beat them with something affordable already found in the warehouse.

The counterargument is equally predictable and equally valid: who exactly is going to man these guns, and how are they going to be trained. China’s military modernization has spent decades moving away from manpower‑heavy systems, not toward them. Reintroducing a weapon that requires a full crew, constant drills, and old‑school gunnery discipline is a romantic idea, but not necessarily a practical one

The point of highlighting this little trend isn’t to endorse the PG59 revival or dismiss it.  It’s to note that there’s a real, active segment of China’s online population that follows military development closely and debates it seriously. How loud their voice is, and how much influence they actually have, is harder to measure. But they’re there, and every now and then, they latch onto something like a 1950s AAA gun and remind you that military enthusiasm in China spans everything from hypersonics to hardware that smells faintly of cosmoline.  (old Type56 SKS reference inserted) 
 

 

Moscow oil refinery hit by long-range suicide drones from Ukraine

Capitalism with Chinese characteristics of the day: Cheaper to buy new than used.

Over the last two years, China’s Y‑8 tactical transport has kept up its quiet, steady export run. Yes, this Soviet‑era Antonov An‑12 derivative is somehow still in production, and that’s exactly the point: in a niche market where buyers can get a freshly minted mid‑size transport straight off the assembly line, the Y‑8 beats the alternative of a “lightly used” ex‑Soviet airframe that spent the last decade dissolving in a leaky warehouse. For a certain tier of customers, new beats questionable used every time. 

Take Myanmar, where budgets are tight, runways are rough (there's war going on), and Western procurement channels have long since closed. They can still pick up two new Y‑8F‑200s and keep their national airlift backbone functioning without having to gamble on ancient Antonovs. 

Sri Lanka continues to run its Y‑8s for maritime patrol and transport because Western MPAs are priced into the stratosphere, and China provides support without the geopolitical fine print. 

Kazakhstan’s National Guard is also expanding its fleet, with three additional Y‑8 Pegasus aircraft arriving in 2025, bringing its operational total to six.  

As with many Chinese military exports, the Y‑8 keeps winning small orders for three very simple reasons. First, price and politics: if you’re under sanctions or just not on Washington’s Christmas card list, the Y‑8 is one of the few tactical transports you can actually buy. Second, ruggedness over refinement: it’s not a C‑130J, and it doesn’t need to be. It’s a medium‑lift truck with wings, and for many militaries, that’s exactly what they need. Third, China delivers fast and without drama: no congressional hearings, no export‑control purgatory, no multi‑year wait times. For some of buyers, that alone is worth more than any avionics upgrade. 

The Y‑8 isn’t glamorous, but it’s dependable, politically accessible, and still rolling off the production line. In this corner of the global market, that’s enough to keep the production line open.

 

 

Monday, June 16, 2025

Are those two Y-8 transports newly acquired by the Myanmar Air Force?

 As reported in Jan 2025 that the "The Myanmar Air Force has inducted at least eight new aircraft to partly replace losses in aircraft incurred since 2021" (link).  One of them identified as Y-8F200 transport aircraft.  Recently two newly produced Myanmar Air Force Y-8F200 were spotted in China (tail numbers MAF 5923 and 5924), suggesting that delivery has been completed.    

Interesting item number one - China can restart older aircraft manufacturing line open as the case of  the Y-8.    

Interesting item number two -  The Myanmar Air Force has chosen not to upgrade to the newer, more capable Y-9. Is this a cost-saving measure? To maintain consistency in training, logistics and maintenance across their Y-8 transport fleet? Your guess is as good as mine.

 

 

Hi Res Photos Of The Day: J-20 mid air refueling probe, mid air

When it comes to refueling solution, clearly there's a different between PLAAF's J-20 and the USAF's F-22

 

 

F-22 photo credit goes to https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/202122/jefx-08-demonstrates-f-22-raptor-sensor-capabilities/

 

 

 

Just PR Photos: 10xY-20B, elephant walk

 In a rather short spin,  the 37th Regiment, 13th Transport Aviation Division, Central Theater Command Air Force HQ  now has at least 10 Y-20B domestic WS‑20 high‑bypass turbofan.

 

PLAAF Unit Of The Day: 37th Regiment, 13th Transport Aviation Division, Central Theater Command Air Force HQ

 Home to 28 Y-20 Heavy Transport of the PLAAF as of Oct 11th. 

Tuesday, November 11, 2014

China Defense Blog Recommends: China Maritime Report #55 – Loading the Well Deck: The PLA Navy’s Maturing Role in Projecting Joint Ground Forces

 The China Maritime Studies Institute’s China Maritime Report series remains one of the most consistently valuable resources for anyone tracking China’s maritime development. CMSI’s work stands out for its disciplined methodology, heavy use of primary Chinese‑language sources, and the academic rigor long associated with the U.S. Naval War College. (link)

The latest installment, China Maritime Report #55, titled “Loading the Well Deck: The PLA Navy’s Maturing Role in Projecting Joint Ground Forces,” (link) continues that tradition. In this study, Joshua Arostegui provides a detailed examination of how the Central Military Commission is refining the logistics backbone of China’s amphibious forces - particularly the Type 071 LPD - and how recent foreign joint exercises are being used as benchmarks to measure progress.

The report paints a clear picture of a PLA steadily improving its maritime expeditionary logistics, integrating ground and naval elements with increasing sophistication. It is a holistic, pattern‑driven analysis that adds meaningful depth to the growing body of PLA literature.

In short: another excellent CMSI contribution, and essential reading for anyone following the evolution of China’s amphibious and expeditionary capabilities. (link)

 

PLAAF Unit Of The Day: 4th Transportation and SAR Brigade, Central Theater Command Air Force

The 4th Transportation and SAR Brigade recently ran a low‑key, routine search‑and‑rescue drill featuring the usual suspects: Z‑8K and Z‑9 helicopters working under a standard MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) scenario. Nothing flashy, nothing dramatic, it was just the kind of bread‑and‑butter training that rarely makes headlines.
 

But one detail did jump out.

For the first time in a while, we see the appearance of a Y‑7G military transport converted for a medevac role. The footage doesn’t show the interior, so we don’t get a look at the medical equipment or layout, the report only just on the airframe itself, quietly doing its job in the background. Still, the fact that it’s there its worthy of a blog post, given how rarely the Y‑7G shows up in public drills. 

 The 4th Brigade is confirmed by serials of (55×1×) to operate 11 Y‑7G transports. That’s a sizable share when you consider the bigger picture: there are fewer than 100 Y‑7s in PLA service overall. For an aircraft that’s been in production since 1977, that’s a surprisingly small fleet.

The Y‑7 program has never been considered a major success. It’s serviceable, but it never reached the scale or relevance of its successors. The Y‑9 has effectively replaced it in the tactical transport role, and the Y‑20 has become the backbone of China’s strategic lift. The Y‑7, by comparison, is the quiet, aging workhorse that still shows up because it has to, not that because anyone is particularly excited about it, outside this blog, of course.