A lot of naval news has come out over the past two weeks, much of it focused on VLS cell counts per ship and related topics. It also just so happens that the PLAN released a batch of PR photos of DDG‑104 Wuxi, a Type 055 destroyer, launching the J-20 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile that was only recently revealed during the September 3rd parade. Interesting timing
If this is the second type of CCA drone to be carried by the 076 Sichuan, after the GJ-11, then she could carry other drones as well. No surprise here
Type076 drone carrier / amphibious assault ship
One notable detail from the Type 076 landing helicopter dock's launch ceremony on December 27, 2024, was that its CATOBAR system—comprising an electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear was covered from view. Now you can have a full view from the two photos below:
The Type 076 landing helicopter dock Sichuan has remained relatively quiet since her launch on December 27, 2024 especially when compared to her older, larger, and far more louder sister, the Type 003 Fujian, which recently made headlines by launching a bunch of birds from her electromagnetic catapult and arresting systems.
According to chatter on Chinese social media, Sichuan is now preparing to set sail, promising fresh material for PLA watchers and armchair generals alike to dissect every move and detail. Youtube will be busy for sure.
Finally a confirmation that the PLAN 6th Marine Brigade is now equipped with Type15/ZTQ-15 light tank. Previously, the 6th was equipped with ZTD05 assault gun for 105mm direct fire support.
6355 and 6359 = 6th Marine Brigade, 3rd Battalion,
The PCL-181 is a wheeled artillery system, and
its selection over heavier tracked alternatives like the PLZ-05 likely
reflects a strategic preference for enhanced mobility and reduced
logistical burden for the PLAN Marine. Its lighter weight and
road-friendly design make it well-suited for rapid deployment and
maneuverability, those are key advantages for the 6th Marine Brigade.
Recent media coverage has highlighted the PLAAF’s efforts to protect its aircraft along the East China Sea. Hardened shelters can certainly help shield warplanes from cluster munitions and drone strikes, but they don’t solve a fundamental vulnerability: if the runway is knocked out, those aircraft are effectively grounded in a conflict. The PLAAF is well aware of this reality, which is why it has been investing heavily in training its maintenance crews in rapid runway repair and explosive ordnance disposal. Strengthening these capabilities is just as critical as protecting the aircraft themselves.
The QZS183 quick-draw holster could host all PLA service handguns from Type54, Type92 to QSZ193
The pace of the Y‑20 program—its rapid development cycle and the steady stream of new aircraft entering service—makes it clear that the PLA places far greater priority on this four‑engine “fat bird” than on the Y‑9, despite the Y‑20’s higher cost and heavier maintenance burden. The contrast is hard to miss: China’s strategic jet engined‑transport fleet is expanding quickly, while the tactical turboprop fleet grows at a far more measured rate. The activity around the PLAAF’s 13th and 4th Transport Aviation Divisions, both home to Y‑20 units, reinforces this trend.
This emphasis fits neatly with the PLAAF’s evolving strategic air‑transport doctrine. We’ve seen it demonstrated in MOOTW deployments and in the rapid reinforcement of remote regions such as Tibet. From my perspective, China’s extensive high‑speed rail and modern highway networks reduce the urgency of maintaining a large tactical airlift force. That may help explain why meaningful Y‑9 airdrop activity is rarely observed outside of occasional publicity clips, while Y‑20s are constantly on the move across China and even making appearances in friendly countries. Several posts here at this blog have already documented some of those Y‑20 trips.
Which brings us to the Y‑15 program. I’d argue that the Y‑9’s real success has been less about its performance as a traditional tactical transport and more about its evolution into a versatile platform for specialized “high‑noon” missions across multiple services. The Y‑15 appears to be following that same pattern for the PLAAF’s turboprop transport line. Its value may not lie in raw transport endurance but in its potential as a next‑generation specialized platform. something hinted at by the adding of a mid‑air refueling probe, a capability the older Y‑9 lacks.
Home to 28 Y-20 Heavy Transport of the PLAAF as of Oct 11th.
https://china-defense.blogspot.com/2020/04/plaafs-airlft-to-wuhan.html
The 2,600 military medical personnel are drawn from the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Joint Logistic Support Force and Armed Police Force. According to the above two hospitals’ treatment capacity and construction progress, the military medical personnel will be deployed in batches. The first group of 1,400 personnel has arrived in Wuhan on February 13 and scheduled to carry out medical treatment as soon as possible.
A Y-9 large transport aircraft airdrops three ZBD-03 airborne armored infantry fighting vehicles during airborne combat training. An airborne regiment with the PLA Air Force conducted airborne combat training at the Gobi Desert in the northwest China in late July, 2016, including such subjects as heavy equipment airdrop, logistical support, parachute skills, fire strike and so forth. (81.cn/ Chen Lichun)
http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2009/07/y-9-tactical-transport-aircraft-program.htmlTuesday, July 14, 2009
Y-9 Tactical Transport Aircraft program back on track?
大 运研制按计划要求正常推进。但 由于任务繁重、研发能力和资源不足，对现场生产组织提出挑战，多项工作进度不同程度滞后；零件生产、部装、总装、试飞等能力未填平补齐，受现场技术质量问 题处理影响，生产不畅，任务不均衡，严重影响产品交付效率；因违反程序、操作规程等原因，多次发生质量、安全事故，安全生产形势严峻
