This Aggression Will Not Stand — PAP “Realistic Training” enhancement

This one gave me a good chuckle. The PAP’s latest “high‑altitude anti‑terrorism drill”, read Tibet, decided to dial up the realism by issuing the mock terrorists… non‑Chinese face masks.

  Somewhere in the planning meeting, someone clearly said:

“Look, if we’re going to do PR photos, the bad guys need to look non-Chinese.”

And voilà — out come the masks that look like they were borrowed from a discount Halloween bin.

If I didn’t know any better, I’d almost mistake the PAP for fans of The Big Lebowski. The whole setup feels like they’re trying to underline the movie’s classic point that “The Chinaman is not the issue” when identifying the source of terrorism. Or… something along those lines.

Is it realistic? maybe

Is it unintentionally hilarious? totally.

 

 

 

Two Birds, One Brigade: A Curious CCTC PLAAF News Report

Most PLAAF aviation brigades are textbook single‑type formations:  J‑20 brigades flying nothing but stealth fighters, J‑16 brigades built around strike and EW,  J‑10C brigades for multirole work, H‑6 brigades hauling bombs and havy ASM, KJ‑500 brigades running AEW&C, and Y‑20 brigades moving cargo. It’s a clean, modular system with one brigade, one aircraft type, one mission set. 

But in a July 7th Central China TV segment, something interesting slipped through: a brigade flying two different aircraft types (see captures below). There are really only two plausible explanations. Time will tell which one sticks. 

 

Possibility One: The brigade is receiving a dedicated J‑16 variant to beef up its organic electronic‑warfare capability .

The J‑16 family is built for this kind of role. It carries more pods, more power, and more EW kit than anything the PLAAF has fielded before. If the brigade is adding J‑16s, especially J‑16Ds, it could be shifting toward a self‑contained strike package with its own EW escort baked in. That would be a doctrinal upgrade, not just a hardware swap.

 

Possibility Two: The unit is starting to phasing out its JH‑7A

The JH‑7A is a 1970s‑era design that’s been stretched as far as it can go. Its 5,000‑kg bomb load and ~900‑km combat radius were respectable, but they’re cramped by modern standards. The J‑16, by contrast, carries roughly 9,700–12,000 kg depending on the source, basically double the payload, with greater range and plugs into the PLAAF’s modern sensor and EW ecosystem. 

 

Either explanation fits the footage. Either way, a mixed‑type brigade is a sign that something inside the PLAAF’s force structure is shifting. And as always, the PLAAF won’t explain it; they’ll just fly it until the pattern becomes obvious.

 

Bonus photo:  JH‑7A Flying Leopard fighter‑bomber conducts a low‑altitude penetration run while carrying a YJ‑91 anti‑radiation missile.

 

Thursday, October 03, 2024

High Res Photos Of The Day, JH-7A Elephant walk

 

Saturday, July 17, 2010

JH-7A's WS-9 Qinling engine

This July 14th PLA Daily article (here) confirms that the WS-9 Qinling engine reached 100% indigenization from the original R&R Spey MK202s by Spring of 2009. This marks one of the few bright spots in otherwise troubled PRC aviation sector.

中国国产秦岭发动机主要装备飞豹系列战机

本报记者 钱晓虎 通讯员 江 明 杨 薇　　

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2010-07-14/0704600552.html

　　2009年10月1日，新型“飞豹”战机分秒不差地飞越天安门广场，以出色的表现接受祖国人民检阅时，古都西安市郊的一幢大楼内几十双眼睛紧盯 着屏幕。10多分钟后，当渤海之滨负责战机保障的海军某军代室副总代表屈鹏电话传来“海军受阅的最后一架战机也轻盈地滑向跑道，以完美的姿态通场，稳稳地 停在了停机坪”时，整个大楼沸腾了。

　　这一刻，幸福的泪花在航空发动机专家、海军某军代室总代表叶新农眼眶里滚动。

　　发动机是工业强国一个重要标志

　　记者：有人把航空发动机誉为“机械工业的皇冠”，这话怎么理解？

　　叶新农：这个比喻非常恰当。发动机中最关键的部分，是由压气机、燃烧室、涡轮组成的发动机核心机。吸入发动机的空气在压气机中逐级增压，涡轮驱 动压气机以每秒数百转高速旋转。增压后的空气进入发动机燃烧室，与燃油混合、燃烧产生1000多摄氏度的高温燃气。此时还要保持燃油火焰在以每秒100多 米高速流动的高压气流中稳定燃烧，这就好比要在超强12级台风中保证手中蜡烛不灭一样困难。

　　航空发动机的外部运行环境极其严苛，要适应从地面高度到万米高空缺氧环境，从地面静止状态到每小时数千公里的超音速状态，从沙漠干燥环境到热带 潮湿环境……总之，要让航空发动机在极端恶劣环境下，达到数千小时的正常工作寿命，这对航空发动机的设计、制造、安装提出了极高的要求。

　　可以说，研制航空发动机的能力是一个国家进入工业强国的重要标志。

　　新“飞豹”拥有一颗纯正“中国心”

　　记者：航空发动机一直是制约中国航空工业发展的重要因素。能不能介绍一下“秦岭”航空发动机的发展历程？

　　叶新农：中国的航空工业是在一穷二白的基础上发展起来的。近50年来，我所在的工厂承担着中国多种型号大中型航空发动机的研制生产，从涡喷发动 机到高性能新型涡扇发动机；从航空动力到舰船动力，为我军战机和舰艇的动力装备建设和发展做出了卓越贡献。

　　特别是工厂在70年代引进的“斯贝”型涡扇发动机制造专利技术，一步就使我们具备了西方当代军用航空发动机制造能力。这些国外原装的涡扇发动机 启封、分解、更换必换件，重新试车后，以强劲的动力驱动某新型歼击轰炸机威震长空，大大振奋了国人的心。

　　从第一台部分国产化某涡扇发动机试车、装机试飞成功，到第一台全面国产化的“秦岭”涡扇发动机试车、装机试飞成功；从“秦岭”涡扇发动机通过投 产鉴定转入小批量生产，到新型“飞豹”歼击轰炸机批量列装部队，成为威震长空的国防利剑，我国的航空发动机工业取得了长足的进步。

　　新技术让“中国心”更加强劲有力

　　记者：一提到飞行安全，大家往往联想到发动机问题。在提高发动机安全性能方面，我们有什么好的办法？

　　叶新农：的确是这样的。以海军航空兵战机为例，每天巡航在祖国的万里海疆。在大部分人眼中，举目是蓝天、白云、沙滩、海岛、碧波万里的蓝海，太 美了。可你也许不知道，在这美景中却有着一个“隐形杀手”。

　　航空发动机每秒要吸入近百公斤的空气，而湿润的海风中饱含的氯化钠等多种腐蚀性气体，对航空发动机有着腐蚀性损害，严重降低了航空发动机的寿 命。为保证发动机正常性能，延长发动机寿命，我们采用在发动机零部件涂装防腐涂层等技术，为发动机穿上防腐的“衣裳”，成功地解决了战机发动机腐蚀难题。

　　航空发动机压气机气流通道中总有一些堆积“附着物”，就像人的血管壁上的脂肪等附着物影响人体健康一样，也是影响飞行安全的重要因素。我们研发 出了“心脏洗澡车”，通过特殊的方法，有效地去除航空发动机压气机流道中堆积的“附着物”，彻底解决了因压气机流道中堆积“附着物”造成的发动机性能衰减 问题。

　　2009年春，首台外场完成排故的航空发动机，固定到了移动式试车台架上。随着电源的启动，“秦岭”发动机历史上第一次，也是我军历史上第一次 完成了航空发动机外场快速排故和验证试车，改写了航空发动机外场深度修理的历史。

Boring Logistics of the Day: Degaussing at Sea and the Quiet Naval Worker Bee Behind PLAN Readiness

A recent photo captures a very PLAN moment: the Type 072A landing ship Baxianshan getting degaussed at sea, with the Type 911 degaussing vessel Dongqin‑870 working fore and aft. It is not headline‑worthy, and definitely not the kind of thing CCTV runs in prime time. But it’s exactly the sort of quiet, routine sustainment work that keeps the fleet moving without sending ships back to port for every minor calibration task.

Dongqin‑870’s job here is simple and very practical. As a mobile degaussing ship, it handles magnetic‑signature maintenance for PLAN vessels while they’re still in the operating area. Instead of tying up a berth at a naval base, a ship like Baxianshan can have its magnetic field measured, adjusted, and tuned right at sea. The PLAN does care about short on dedicated military repair yards pushing small‑scale maintenance out to the water is a meaningful efficiency gain. Every task done afloat is one less slot consumed ashore.

Ship's magnetic signature discipline is one of the oldest,  but still a relevant survivability measures in naval warfare. Steel hulls naturally accumulate magnetic fields over time. Left alone, that magnetic buildup makes a ship more vulnerable to:

• Magnetic‑influence naval mines, which trigger when a large magnetic mass passes overhead
• MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection) sensors carried by ASW aircraft
• Interference with onboard navigation and sensitive instruments 

 

Degaussing trims that magnetic footprint, making a ship harder to detect, harder to target, and less likely to set off a mine.  In my book, just my book, not getting blown up by a mine is generally considered a good day for any naval ship, agree?  Just carelessly citing a Gulf of Hormuz reference here,

 

 

Degaussing ship Nanqin 207 (front) attached to aflotilla with the navy of Chinese PLA conducts magnetic risk management for another ship (rear) under the help of a tugboat on November 12, 2025. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Jiang Mengda) 

 

PLA TACP: What We Actually Know (and What’s Still Guesswork)

Information on the PLA’s TACP  "Tactical Air Control Party” is fairy limited on the internet.  Still, there’s enough scattered evidence to sketch out what these teams look like and where they sit in the force structure. Based on the limited official reporting, TACP‑type elements appear to be found at the brigade level, though the exact echelon inside of the brigade: company, battalion, or a dedicated brigade fire‑support cell, remains unclear.  One official article (link) describes a reconnaissance platoon equipped with: 

• Laser target designators
• Forward air‑control terminals
• Digital fire‑support tablets
• Secure datalinks to PLAAF strike aircraft, in the article example, 2x PLAAF  strike aircraft against an ammo depot guided by the ground force.  

 That’s not just “recon.” That’s a full air‑ground integration package.

Well, PLA doesn’t publish equipment designations or performance specs, but given how much emphasis Beijing places on joint operations and informationized warfare, it’s hard to imagine these capabilities being confined to a single platoon. The most plausible placement is inside a combined‑arms battalion’s combat support company, specifically the reconnaissance platoon (侦察排), which already handles UAVs, target acquisition, and forward observation.

And realistically, none of this would be surprising to find in PLA special operations detachments as well. If the PLA is serious about precision fires and joint strike coordination with all evidence says it is, then TACP‑equivalent teams are going to be embedded wherever the PLA expects to fight fast, dispersed, and with real‑time air support.

 

http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0123/c1011-40651279.html

 

第81集团军某旅与空军某旅携手开展空地联合引导员人才培养——

陆军单兵顺畅呼叫空军战机

2026年01月23日08:58 | 来源：解放军报

收藏小字号

 

该旅侦察引导组观察远方目标，为呼叫空中火力支援收集信息。曾阳程摄

“‘金雕01’，现将航空简令报送你……”深冬塞北，野外训练场，第81集团军某旅侦察排排长陈聪隐蔽在灌木丛中，通过电台呼叫空中火力支援。

不一会，两架战机低空掠过山脊，精准投弹，火光照亮天际。

“陆军单兵顺畅呼叫空军战机，这是我们紧盯一体化联合作战能力短板狠下功夫取得的实效。”走下训练场，陈聪向记者介绍旅队开展跨军种联训取得的成果。

“与空军部队并肩作战不是新鲜事。”陈聪一边整理战术简报一边说道，“但以前很多时候，是‘你打你的，我打我的’，协作‘契合度’与实战要求相距甚远。如今，我们实现了互通有无、配合默契，取得‘1+1>2’的效果。”

该旅郝参谋长介绍，在过去一段时间里，陆军部队呼唤空中火力支援，很多时候要等空军引导员到位、靠引导员指挥。2024年深秋的一场跨军种对抗训练，让该旅官兵至今记忆犹新。

当时，红方侦察组深入“敌”后，发现一处隐蔽的装甲集结点，立刻请求空中火力打击。可陆军上报的目标坐标格式与空军不兼容，两边官兵只能反复核对确认。等空军引导员赶到现场，蓝方装甲部队早已转移阵地，红方还因暴露位置遭到反扑，导致3名战士“负伤”。

“战场态势瞬息万变，稍有耽搁便可能贻误战机。单纯依靠空军引导员，信息传递链条长、响应效率低，难以满足实战需求。”郝参谋长坦言，陆军官兵对空域管控规则、战机技战术性能、火力打击精度知之不深；空军飞行员对地面部队的战术节奏、实时战场感知、前沿火力需求也是“雾里看花”。双方指挥体系分属不同建制，术语规范不统一、通联手段不兼容、数据接口不互通……凡此种种，成为掣肘联合作战效能释放的“隐形壁垒”。

陆军新军事训练大纲明确：基层作战分队必须编配兼职引导员，侦察专业军官须具备空地联合引导能力。这一要求，为破解联合作战难题提供了制度保障。

在集团军协调下，从去年开始，该旅与常年配属协同的空军某旅打破建制界限，携手开展空地联合引导员人才培养。

在相关集训中，该旅官兵走进空军飞行塔台、指挥所，学习空域管理规则、联合通信协议、战机打击性能参数；空军战友则深入该旅侦察班排，了解地面态势研判流程、目标识别标准、战场动态更新机制……集训结束时，双方明确6项训练标准、完成7个训练课目的组训与考核，制订《战术引导员训练手册》，用统一的术语、标准化的流程、可复用的模板，把“陆军语言”和“空军语言”翻译成彼此听得懂的“联合代码”，摸索出一套联合训练机制。

本着谋联合、共成长的原则，集训结束没多久，双方就组织了一场空地联合对抗训练，针对引导打击过程中发现的难题，共同改进演训方案、研究协同良策、探索“最优”思路。陆军引导员从“被动接收指令”转向“主动研判协同”，空军飞行员从“单向接收信息”转向“双向感知战场”……这次训练，让两支部队在实战环境中，逐步熟悉对方的作战节奏、战术逻辑、战场习惯。

此后，他们又在多个复杂课目中反复锤炼，从夜间引导到电磁干扰环境下的协同，从多目标分批打击到临机突发目标的快速响应……每一次训练，都是对默契配合的考验；每一次成功，都是向“联合制胜”的迈进。经过近一年的磨合，他们已建立常态化联合合作机制，并依托大项演训任务，围绕重难点课目展开攻关。

前不久，双方组织联合对抗训练，该旅空地联合引导员迅速完成建立联络、指挥交接、态势更新、攻击规划等操作，引导多波次空中火力，对“敌”弹药库、指挥所等高价值目标进行定点摧毁。

联合作战演训场上，“隔墙对话”的尴尬消失无踪，取而代之的是“同屏研判、同频指挥、同向发力”的协同图景。“如今，在我们的作战指挥链条上，空地联合引导员已成为融合战场信息、实施火力打击的重要节点。”该旅领导介绍，他们将与更多军种单位建立联系，携手培养联合战术引导员。（曾庆旺、王若龙、宋子洵）

亲历者说

站在联合的前沿

■第81集团军某旅侦察排排长 陈 聪

作为空地联合引导员，我第一次在实兵对抗训练中呼叫空中火力支援，是去年6月。

当时，硝烟笼罩着靶区，我站在远处，感觉心跳比耳边的风声还响。直到耳机里传来指令，仿佛整个世界都突然安静下来——“准备引导，目标坐标已锁定。”

我深吸一口气，手指在战术平板上快速滑动，调出电子地图，将“敌”前沿指挥所的坐标输入系统：“‘敌’炮兵阵地，确认为高价值目标，请求打击。”“收到，目标已确认，攻击编队正在转向，预计90秒后进入攻击航线。”

2架战机呼啸而至，爆炸声未落，我已通过态势感知系统更新目标状态——“已摧毁”。

看着目标建筑化为废墟，我忽然想起空地联合引导员集训刚开始时的场景——在空军某旅的飞行塔台，我和参训战友被一群飞行员围着问：“你们地面部队，到底想让我们打哪儿？”

实话说，这个问题我们当时并不知如何回答：一个在地上跑，一个在天上飞，怎么协同？怎么联合？我们又靠什么引导空中火力？

果不其然，第一次实操课，双方沟通就遇到了“障碍”。我打开地面态势图与飞行员对接，对方却一脸茫然：“这个红点是什么？是炮位还是装甲群？”我也是一愣——原来，我们习以为常的战术符号，在对方眼中却很陌生。当我们说到“敌方指挥所隐蔽在林地边缘”时，飞行员们更是直皱眉头：“林地边缘？哪片林地？面积多大？我们飞得高，看不清地表细节。”

集训期间，我们和空军飞行员一起坐在电子沙盘前，从最基础的通信频率、识别代码、坐标格式学起。他们教我们如何用空地协同简令传递信息，我们则把地面侦察流程、目标优先级判断、战场动态更新规则等，一个个掰开揉碎讲给他们听。

一位空军飞行中队中队长曾对我说：“地面部队是‘眼睛’，我们是‘拳头’。‘眼睛’看不清，‘拳头’再硬也没用。”我意识到，身为空地联合引导员，不仅要找准目标、引导火力，更要成为一座打通军种的“桥梁”。

如今，我已能熟练使用空地联合通信系统，在规定时间内完成目标识别、坐标传递、任务规划与简令发送。像我这样的官兵，以后会越来越多。那道曾经横亘在军种之间的“隐形壁垒”，正被一点一点打破。何其有幸，我亲身经历并见证了这个过程，站在了联合的前沿。（卢大力整理）

Just High Res Photos: JL-3 'Giant Wave 3' 巨浪-3

China's third-generation intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 

 

Just photos: J-8F fighters are being dismantled, heading to an aircraft boneyard

 

July 4th, happy 57th birthday, J-8I

 J‑8I turns another year older every July 4th, PLAAF's Cold War interceptor sharing a birthday with fireworks. Born from China’s push for a true high‑altitude, high‑speed fighter, the J‑8I was ole-school, fast, and unapologetically 1970s. It never became a superstar, but it marked China’s first real step toward actual airpower.

 

 

Return of the PG59 — China’s Nostalgia‑Powered Air Defense Debate

One of the more amusing trends floating through Chinese milblogs lately is the sudden rediscovery — and proposed recommissioning — of the old PG59 57mm anti‑aircraft gun. Yes, the same Soviet‑era AAA that saw heavy action in Vietnam, spraying the sky at F‑4s and A‑4s half a century ago. The argument goes like this: Taiwan’s defense strategy is increasingly drone‑centric, (link) and many of China’s soft logistics hubs, depots, and supply nodes are theoretically vulnerable to long-range drone attacks. So why not dust off the PG59 57mm AAA, bolt on a modern fire‑control system, and turn it into a cost‑effective point‑defense solution. In other words: if you can’t beat drones with lasers and railguns, beat them with something affordable already found in the warehouse.

The counterargument is equally predictable and equally valid: who exactly is going to man these guns, and how are they going to be trained. China’s military modernization has spent decades moving away from manpower‑heavy systems, not toward them. Reintroducing a weapon that requires a full crew, constant drills, and old‑school gunnery discipline is a romantic idea, but not necessarily a practical one

The point of highlighting this little trend isn’t to endorse the PG59 revival or dismiss it.  It’s to note that there’s a real, active segment of China’s online population that follows military development closely and debates it seriously. How loud their voice is, and how much influence they actually have, is harder to measure. But they’re there, and every now and then, they latch onto something like a 1950s AAA gun and remind you that military enthusiasm in China spans everything from hypersonics to hardware that smells faintly of cosmoline.  (old Type56 SKS reference inserted) 
 

 

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