One of the recurring themes on this blog is that the PLA is known for its measured, "slowly but surely" approach to military procurement. New equipment is typically introduced cautiously, tested extensively, and fielded incrementally.
Well, I may have been wrong.
Because the PLA has apparently decided to leap straight into a revolutionary new modular mobility platform: the camel.
As I have written before, in the PLA the requirement comes first. The platform is merely the solution. In this case, the requirement is obvious: desert mobility. And if there is one thing a camel excels at, it is moving across vast stretches of unforgiving desert while carrying people and supplies.
Think Lawrence of Arabia. Think the audacious crossing of the Nefud Desert to launch a surprise attack on Ottoman-held Aqaba. While everyone else sees miles of empty sand, the camel sees a highway.
Given that the Belt and Road Initiative remains Xi Jinping's signature foreign policy project, perhaps this development should not be surprising. After all, armed Chinese riders were escorting merchant caravans across Central Asia long before "connectivity" became a fashionable think-tank buzzword. For more than two millennia, camels were the heavy logistics vehicles of the Silk Road.
History, it seems, is not repeating itself. It is simply receiving an upgrade package.
According to the CCTV segment, the camels are stationed in Inner Mongolia. Naturally, this raises questions. Is this merely a practical training program? Or is it yet another indicator that the PLA is quietly preparing for operations along the ancient Hexi Corridor, the historic gateway connecting China proper to Central Asia?
Defense analysts would be wise not to dismiss this possibility. Today's camel detachment could be tomorrow's Camel Combined-Arms Brigade.
There is historical precedent.
One of the last great military uses of camels by Chinese forces came during Zuo Zongtang's reconquest of Xinjiang in 1876-77. To sustain operations across the deserts of northwestern China, his armies employed enormous camel trains that carried supplies across terrain where conventional transport struggled. While less famous than the Han and Tang dynasty expeditions into the Western Regions, it remains one of the largest examples of camel-supported military logistics in Chinese history.
Viewed from that perspective, the PLA is not embracing a new capability.
It is restoring a proven one.
There are plenty of observers who monitor every new Chinese military development through a particular Point of View. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, I eagerly await the inevitable analytical papers.
"What does the emergence of Chinese camel forces mean for the regional balance of power?"
"How many camels could participate in a Taiwan contingency?"
"Is the Type-CML modular camel platform expected to receive an active protection system?"
"Will the camel eventually replace the all-terrain vehicle?"
These are serious questions that serious people may soon be asking.
For now, however, I think it is safe to conclude that the PLA has once again demonstrated its willingness to think outside the box.
Way outside the box.
Roughly two humps outside the box.
Sunday, May 17, 2026
Any day now — any day — the Chinese military will finally enter the 20th century in communications technology.
A recent Central China TV (CCTV) segment from Kunming, Yunnan proudly showcasing one of the PLA Logistics Support Force’s “modern” communication solutions: homing pigeons. Yes, carrier pigeons. In 2026. As a key node in battlefield communications.
It’s almost poetic.
Over the last few years, we’ve witnessed the PLA modernize at breakneck speed or at least their version of modernization. First came the large riot‑shield‑style defensive gear. Then the polearms for “extended reach.” Then the long pikes for “phoenix formations.” Naturally, composite bows for the light cavalry followed. And now, the final jewel in the crown: airborne messaging and communication solutions
Surely this will strike fear into the hearts of China’s neighbors. PLA critics (you know they are out there), however, point out a small historical complication: the PLA hasn’t successfully mounted a cavalry charge since the mid‑Qing dynasty, roughly 200 years ago. So perhaps it’s understandable that handling such cutting‑edge equipment as carrier pigeons might present.... challenges.
Still, the expectations placed on these little birds are enormous. They are now responsible for battlefield logistics support communication, message delivery, and if CCTV is to be believed: The symbolic continuity of the Chinese military’s “cutting edge, innovative spirit”
Honestly, I feel bad for those little birds. They didn’t ask to become the backbone of a 21st‑century logistics network
Speaking of homing pigeon, here's to you "Cher Ami" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cher_Ami
Saturday, October 10, 2026
The weaknesses of the PLA cavalry continue to reveal themselves.
Recently, the Xinjiang Military Command concluded its inaugural cavalry training course, with around one hundred troopers participating in intensive drills tailored for border control missions. Training reportedly included mounted saber combat and obstacle jumping.
That is the official press release, anyway.
What the release does not mention is that these cavalrymen appear to be equipped at a level that would make even the most budget-conscious quartermaster blush. Judging from the published imagery, armor protection is effectively non-existent. There is no sign of chainmail, scale armor, lamellar armor, or even the sort of improvised protection one might expect from enthusiastic historical reenactors. The main weapon appears to be a saber, with no bows or lances in sight. To make matters worse, the issued saber seems to have a hand guard that would struggle to protect its owner's fingers from a strongly worded memo.
This leaves the PLA cavalry in an awkward tactical position. Against traditional Mongol horsemen, they would find themselves badly outranged thanks to the absence of bows. Against Russian steppe cavalry, the situation does not improve. Against European heavy cavalry such as the famed Polish Winged Hussars, one suspects the engagement report would be extremely brief.
And, of course, there remains the nightmare scenario: contact with the Rohirrim.
As countless professional PLA watchers have tirelessly pointed out, the PLA has not conducted a truly significant cavalry charge in roughly two centuries. Depending on where one draws the historical line, one has to go back to the Qing era to find anything remotely comparable. This raises understandable questions about institutional experience. It is difficult to develop expertise in large-scale mounted warfare when the organization's combat experience consists primarily of PowerPoint presentations, training exercises, and reminding everyone that they are definitely still a cavalry force.
Consequently, confidence in the PLA's ability to execute something on the scale of the Battle of the Pelennor Fields remains limited. Until the PLA demonstrates proficiency in defeating either Mongol horse archers or an angry king of Rohan shouting "Death!", skepticism will remain entirely justified. YouTuber is always right, of course.
Thursday, July 23, 2026
Adopting Land Heavy Infantry Tactics for Naval Combat in the China Coast Guard — A Suggestion
As noted in the April 11, 2026 entry, the PLA has been steadily evolving its infantry doctrine by moving from light skirmishers to heavy shield units and now experimenting with long‑pike, tight phalanx‑style formations. It’s a very “if it works on land, try it everywhere” progression.
And it’s hard not to notice the historical parallel: the Romans did exactly this in the Second Punic War, turning their heavy infantry into naval shock troops. Roman legionaries fought in tight, shield‑and‑sword formations that translated perfectly to the confined chaos of a ship’s deck. They didn’t out‑sail Carthage; they simply turned sea battles into land battles.
With those examples in mind, it’s no surprise there are renewed calls inside China to revisit the Mandarin Duck Formation 鸳鸯阵, Qi Jiguang’s famous 12‑man close‑quarters squad built around coordinated movement and mutual protection. The formation could split into two mirrored 5‑man teams, each covering the other like paired mandarin ducks. It was designed for tight terrain, disciplined teamwork, and controlled violence at arm’s length.
As argued, this is exactly the kind of structure that makes sense for the current South China Sea boarding operations. The idea isn’t about nostalgia. It’s about recognizing that the China Coast Guard increasingly operates in environments where deck‑level melee,
ship‑to‑ship confrontations, and close‑quarters control actions are not
hypothetical. A compact, well‑drilled, boarding team, built on proven
historical logic I might add, might be far more practical than people
assume. So they said.
CG by 大包CG.
China Coast Guard personnel confront Philippine Navy Sailors at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea in July 2026. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (link)
Saturday, April 11, 2026
They’ve finally done it: the PLA is now fielding units in a tight phalanx-style formation
Well, they finally went and did it. The PLA is now marching out in what looks unmistakably like a phalanx: long pikes, tight ranks, and a wall of shields up front.
Until now, we’d only seen PLAN
infantry armed with shorter polearms, weapons built for flexible
formations and brutal melee work. But on open ground, nothing beats the
raw stopping power of a heavy pike block. And with that extra shield
layer in front, the message is clear: this formation is meant to hold.
The photos don’t show the flanks, but I’d wager they’ll anchor the formation with fast movers, light cavalry or light infantry to keep the wings from being rolled up. In 21st centry modern combat, there's full of battles where the center held but the flanks collapsed. The PLAN high command surely knows the pattern.
PLA heavy infantry update
Finally, the PLA frontier defense heavy infantry is now receiving
much-needed equipment standardization and enhanced armor, including leg
and elbow guards. Yes, after more than 2000 years, the poor PLA
infantry is now headed in the correct way in terms of adequate armor
protection, closing the gap with their Han Dynasty counterparts.
I am not crying, just have sands in my eyes......
More Photos For Your Modern Infantry ToE Nerds Out There
Good to see that the Mandarin Duck formation is alive and well. With that being said, a plate armor upgrade would be a great next step upgrade.
Wednesday, October 02, 2024
The PLA still has a much to learn about modern warfare, particularly infantry tactics and related Table of Equipment in 2024
What's wrong this this PLA Phalanx? For starter, their spears are too short, lacking standards. What? no shield? Yikes, only four rank deep.
I am telling you, they would not stand a chance against Little Alex’s Macedonian phalanx of 323 BC. No not a chance.
Man,
oh man, the PLA Hastati border guard is carrying a cheap, Chinese
knockoff gladius that isn't even sharp to start. Their scuta also
appears to be of low quality.
Group photo of this 13-member Contubernium
\Saturday, October 12, 2024
Modern PLA Land Unit Of The Day. Light Cavalry
After reviewing the modern Chinese heavy shield infantry and Phalanx / Mandarin
Duck formations, next up is the mysterious PLA Light Cavalry. The PLA
Light Cavalry, like other Light Cavalries such as the legendary
Mongolian equivalent, is trained as swift scouts and battlefield
raiders. As a result, they traded heavy armor for speed and mobility,
allowing them to perform critical missions such as performing
reconnaissance, quick raids against the enemy's rear, and protecting the
flanks of the main army. At least in principle. In actuality, as
evidenced by the photographs below, they are not properly armed for
modern combat of 2024. While it is understandable that they are not
protected with plate armor, they are also not wearing mail shirts for
little protection against arrows or melee warfare.
As
several famous PLA professional analysts have properly pointed out, the
PLA has not performed a massive cavalry charge since the mid Qing
dynasty, 200 years ago, thus it is understandable that they will not
know how to handle modern combat. They are untested. Additionally,
they appear to be equipped just with a saber and a composited bow, with
neither shield or lance to be found. Furthermore, crucial two-way
communication technology such as Ram Horn is not available at the
squadron level; as some well-known PLA professional analysts have
pointed out, corruption at the top levels is to blame for not equipping Ram Horn to each troop.
