Stride-2015: Bigger Longer & Uncut

 Nine changes in Stride-2015 Zhurihe series exercise
( Source: China Military Online  )         2015-June-3 16:36

　　HOHHOT, June 3 (ChinaMil) -- The curtain of the PLA's trans-military area command (MAC) actual-troop confrontation training in 2015 has risen with the "Stride 2015• Zhurihe A" series exercise kicking off at the Zhurihe training base in North China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on June 1.

　　According to a person from the exercise commanding team, the "Stride 2015 • Zhurihe" series exercise has nine new changes compared with last year.

　　Larger scale: ten combined brigades of the PLA Army will participate in the "Stride 2015 • Zhurihe" while the number of the brigades in last year's exercise was seven.

　　More rounds of confrontation: compared with last year's single round of positional battle of attacking and defending, this year's confrontation has three more rounds of troops' advancing and deploying, positional battle of attacking and defending, and seizure of city landmarks.

　　Intensified operational commanding training: the "Stride 2015 • Zhurihe" highlights building up of strategic mindset, application of IT-based commanding system, planning of precision operations, improvement of combat tactics, and asymmetrical combat fighting method innovation and practice.

　　Intensified systemic confrontation: according to operational requirements, new strength including air force, army aviation force, special troops, technical reconnaissance troops, electronic countermeasure troops and psywar units will coordinate the participating land forces in the "Stride 2015 • Zhurihe" .

　　Higher difficulty and intensity: the battlefield maneuvering distance of wheeled vehicles in the exercise is increased by 100km, and 10km is added to the march distance in the long-range raid. Participating troops will come cross difficult situations including dangerous terrain conditions, complex electromagnetic environment, air reconnaissance, long-range strike, harassing attack by special operation forces, nuclear and biochemical attacks in the exercises while they are given less time for launching a combat than last year.

　　Verification of operational experiments highlighted: the participating troops are scheduled to use the operation testing system in the combined operation experiment center of the training base to verify their combat schemes before the actual troop confrontation begins.

　　Night combat training enhanced: It is stipulated that the maneuver distance at night in the periods of long-distance force projection and battlefield maneuver shall be no less than 100 km. The number of night-time targets for live ammunition shooting training was increased, and aviation was also dispatched at night to carry out reconnaissance and attack for battlefield maneuvering and on evacuation areas.

　　Realizing air-to-ground simulated confrontation: The air force actual-troop combat system is improved and the interconnection between the actual-troop combat systems of the ground and air forces has become possible for the first time, which ensures the preliminary integration of the ground and air battle situations.

　　Stringent avoidance system: The group armies to which the participating troops belong are not allowed to interfere in the operational commanding in the exercise. The members of the exercise directing team coming from the PLA's military area commands shall not participate in the directing and evaluating of the exercises conducted by the troops from their own military area commands.

Monday, June 09, 2014

Photos of th day: playing laser tag at Zhurihe

"Stride 2014 Zhurihe" series exercise unveiled

(Source: China Military Online)   2014-06-03

　 　ZHURIHE, June 3 (ChinaMil) -- As an armored brigade under the Nanjing Military Area Command (MAC) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvered for thousands of kilometers into the hinterland of the grassland in northern China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the "Stride 2014 Zhurihe" series exercise was unveiled at the Zhurihe Training Base under the Beijing MAC of the PLA on May 31, 2014.

　 　In the following two months, a combined army brigade from each of the five MACs, namely the Guangzhou MAC, the Jinan MAC, the Shenyang MAC, the Chengdu MAC and the Lanzhou MAC, will enter the training base successively according to the randomly selected sequence to carry out a concentrated examination and assessment.

　　This series exercise aims at providing an example and standard for the PLA to carry out normalized actual-combat training at military base by relying on the Zhurihe Training Base and the first professional "blue army" of the PLA as well as through the whole-process confrontation and assessment by centering on the combat missions of the troop units participating in the exercise, according to the leaders from the Military Training Department of the General Staff Headquarters (GSH) of the PLA.

　　 At least 85 percent of the actual strength of personnel and equipment of the troop units participating in the exercise must be assigned, including all personnel in the key posts and all new equipment.

　 　The exercise' directing department has classified the exercise into four stages including maneuvering projection, battlefield maneuvering, actual-troop confrontation and comprehensive examination with 1,062 assessment points and 65 factors and will precisely assess the overall combat capability of the troop units based on the quantified indexes according to a score system with 1,000 as full mark.

　　In addition, the directing department also launched a series of "bans": no strength and equipment adjustment without permission, no repeated use of the lost forces, no entrance to the exercise field in advance to carry out reconnaissance and survey, no change of the actual-combat system's performance, no preplans, no deduction, and so on.

Editor:Guo Renjie

QJG02 14.5mm AAA in Iraq

It is a common sight now a day to find a Chinese weapon on news photos out of Middle East war zones.  Now it seems that the North Korean is jumping into the fray with their Type73 light machine gun export.  If the Type73 looks like a blast from the past, well, it is based on the old and proven ZB vz. 26 of the WWII fame after all.

Norinco QJG02 14.5mm AAA in Iraq

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Photos of the day: Kurdish HJ-8 ATGM in action

While the source of this Chinese ATGM remains unknown -- one thing is for certain -- Chinese arsenal is making its way to the middle east war zones, one way or the other.

August 12, 2013
Arms Shipments Seen From Sudan to Syria Rebels
By C. J. CHIVERS and ERIC SCHMITT

 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/world/africa/arms-shipments-seen-from-sudan-to-syria-rebels.html?hp&_r=0&pagewanted=print

Syrian rebels, frustrated by the West’s reluctance to provide arms, have found a supplier in an unlikely source: Sudan, a country that has been under international arms embargoes and maintains close ties with a stalwart backer of the Syrian government, Iran.

In deals that have not been publicly acknowledged, Western officials and Syrian rebels say, Sudan’s government sold Sudanese- and Chinese-made arms to Qatar, which arranged delivery through Turkey to the rebels.

The shipments included antiaircraft missiles and newly manufactured small-arms cartridges, which were seen on the battlefield in Syria — all of which have helped the rebels combat the Syrian government’s better-armed forces and loyalist militias.

Emerging evidence that Sudan has fed the secret arms pipeline to rebels adds to a growing body of knowledge about where the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria is getting its military equipment, often paid for by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or other sympathetic donors.

While it is unclear how pivotal the weapons have been in the two-year-old civil war, they have helped sustain the opposition against government forces emboldened by aid from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah.

Sudan’s involvement adds yet another complication to a civil war that has long defied a diplomatic resolution. The battle has evolved into a proxy fight for regional influence between global powers, regional players and religious sects. In Sudan’s case, it has a connection with the majority Sunni rebels, and a potentially lucrative financial stake in prosecuting the war.

But Sudan’s decision to provide arms to the rebels — bucking its own international supporters and helping to cement its reputation for fueling conflict — reflects a politically risky balancing act. Sudan maintains close economic and diplomatic ties to Iran and China.

Both nations have provided military and technical assistance to Sudan’s state-run arms industry and might see sales of its weapons by Sudan to help rebels in Syria as an unwanted outcome of their collaboration with Khartoum, or even as a betrayal.

In interviews, Sudanese officials denied helping arm either side in the Syrian war. “Sudan has not sent weapons to Syria,” said Imad Sid Ahmad, the press secretary for President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

Al-Sawarmi Khalid Saad, a spokesman for the Sudanese armed forces, added that the allegations defied common sense, except perhaps as a smear.

“We have no interest in supporting groups in Syria, especially if the outcome of the fighting is not clear,” Mr. Saad said. “These allegations are meant to harm our relations with countries Sudan has good relations with.”

A Qatari official said he had no information about a role by his country in procuring or moving military equipment from Sudan.

Sudan has a history of providing weapons to armed groups while publicly denying its hand in such transfers. Its arms or ammunition has turned up in South Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Chad, Kenya, Guinea, Mali and Uganda, said Jonah Leff, a Sudan analyst for the Small Arms Survey, a research project. It has provided weapons to Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army; rebels in Libya; and the janjaweed, the pro-government militias that are accused of a campaign of atrocities in Darfur.

“Sudan has positioned itself to be a major global arms supplier whose wares have reached several conflict zones, including the Syrian rebels,” said one American official who is familiar with the shipments to Turkey.

Western analysts and officials said Sudan’s clandestine participation in arming rebels in Syria suggests inherent tensions in Mr. Bashir’s foreign policy, which broadly supports Sunni Islamist movements while maintaining a valued relationship with the Shiite theocracy in Iran.

Other officials suggested that a simple motive was at work — money. Sudan is struggling with a severe economic crisis.

“Qatar has been paying a pretty penny for weapons, with few questions asked,” said one American official familiar with the transfers. “Once word gets out that other countries have opened their depots and have been well paid, that can be an incentive.”

Analysts suspect that Sudan has sold several other classes of weapons to the rebels, including Chinese-made antimateriel sniper rifles and antitank missiles, all of which have made debuts in the war this year but whose immediate sources have been uncertain.

Two American officials said Ukrainian-flagged aircraft had delivered the shipments. Air traffic control data from an aviation official in the region shows that at least three Ukrainian aviation transport companies flew military-style cargo planes this year from Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, to a military and civilian airfield in western Turkey. In telephone interviews, officials at two firms denied carrying arms; the third firm did not answer calls on Monday.

Mr. Ahmad, the Sudanese presidential spokesman, suggested that if Sudan’s weapons were seen with Syria’s rebels, perhaps Libya had provided them.

Sudan, he said, has admitted sending arms during the 2011 war to oust Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Libya’s new leaders have publicly thanked Sudan. Libya has since been a busy supplier of the weapons to rebels in Syria.

However, that would not explain the Sudanese-made 7.62x39-millimeter ammunition documented by The New York Times this year in rebel possession near the Syrian city of Idlib.

The ammunition, according to its stamped markings, was made in Sudan in 2012 — after the war in Libya had ended. It was used by Soquor al-Sham, an Islamist group that recognizes the Western-supported Syrian National Coalition’s military command.

When told that the newly produced Sudanese cartridges were photographed with Syrian rebels, Mr. Saad, the Sudanese military spokesman, was dismissive. “Pictures can be fabricated,” he said. “That is not evidence.”

Sudan’s suggestion that any of its weapons in Syria had been provided by Libya also would not explain the presence of Chinese-made FN-6 antiaircraft missiles in Syrian rebel units. Neither the Qaddafi loyalists nor the rebels in Libya were known to possess those weapons in 2011, analysts who track missile proliferation said.

The movements of FN-6s have been at the center of one of the stranger arms-trafficking schemes in the civil war.

The weapons, which fire a heat-seeking missile from a shoulder launcher, gained nonproliferation specialists’ immediate attention when they showed up in rebel videos early this year. Syria’s military was not known to stock them, and their presence in northern Syria strongly suggested that they were being brought to rebels via black markets, and perhaps with the consent of the authorities in Turkey.

After the missiles were shown destroying Syrian military helicopters, the matter took an unusual turn when a state-controlled newspaper in China, apparently acting on a marketing impulse, lauded the missile’s performance. “The kills are proof that the FN-6 is reliable and user-friendly, because rebel fighters are generally not well trained in operating missile systems,” the newspaper, Global Times, quoted a Chinese aviation analyst as saying.

The successful attacks on Syria’s helicopters by Chinese missiles brought “publicity” that “will raise the image of Chinese defense products on the international arms trade market,” the newspaper wrote.

The praise proved premature.

As the missiles were put to wider use, rebels began to complain, saying that more often than not they failed to fire or to lock on targets. One rebel commander, Abu Bashar, who coordinates fighting in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces, called the missiles, which he said had gone to Turkey from Sudan and had been provided to rebels by a Qatari intelligence officer, a disappointment.

“Most of the FN-6s that we got didn’t work,” he said. He said two of them had exploded as they were fired, killing two rebels and wounding four others.

Detailed photos of one of the FN-6 missile tubes, provided by a Syrian with access to the weapons, showed that someone had taken steps to obscure its origin. Stenciled markings, the photos showed, had been covered with spray paint. Such markings typically include a missile’s serial number, lot number, manufacturer code and year of production.

Rebels said that before they were provided with the missiles, months ago, they had already been painted, either by the seller, shipper or middlemen, in a crude effort to make tracing the missiles more difficult.

Reporting was contributed by Andrew E. Kramer, Nikolay Khalip and Andrew Roth from Moscow; Robert F. Worth from Washington; Sebnem Arsu from Istanbul; Nicholas Kulish from Nairobi, Kenya; Isma’il Kushkush from Khartoum, Sudan; and Karam Shoumali from Turkey and Syria.

Friday, April 05, 2013

Rumor Control: .50 caliber Sniper Rifle in Syria IS NOT an AS50 , it's Chinese M99

The media is awash with "news" of how the Syrian rebels now have the AS50 Accuracy International .50 caliber sniper rifle...but they don't.

Many Western media sources have erroneously identified the video in this video as an AS50.  However, the rifle is in fact a Chinese M99 sniper rifle in 12.7x108mm:

If you were a member of the world's premier internet Chinese military discussion, China-Defense.com Forum, you would have known weeks ago that the Syrian rebel forces had Chinese M99 .50 caliber sniper rifles.  Forum members generally agree Sudan is the most likely source of the rifles.

M99 is visually similar to AS50, but is a different weapon. The AI is like a FAL while the M99 is more like an M-16. M99 is a direct gas, rotating bolt action, whereas the AS50 is a short stroke, tilting bolt action.  The M99 is also 2 kg lighter than AS50.

Here's a pic of the M99 in service with PLA Marines:

China-defense.com can be accessed here: http://www.china-defense.com/smf/index.php

We are currently vetting new members, register with a distinguished email address, or ask a current member for access.

New wine, old bottle

One way the PLAAF maintains its current bomber fleet's ORBAT in constant is by recycling its pennants with newer and more capable variants.   Take the H-6 for example, older D modes are being replaced by the newer K modes on a near to one-to-one basis. 



Old D model 20201

 New H model 20210

Old D model of 20119

new H model 20119

Sunday, December 29, 2013

Photo of the day: H-6M of the 108th Regiment, 36th Bomber Division, PLAAF

It seems that PLAAF's H-6K is making the round in the news lately with its capability to carry
CJ-10 cruise missiles (range between 1,500 to 2,000 KM).  What is lesser-known is that the older K-6M bomber can also deliver the CJ-10s at two per sortie.   The newer H-6K has a payload of 7 CJ-10s (3 at each wing plus one inside of the fuselage)

Sunday, November 17, 2013

PLAAF "in the news" of the day: H-6K, god-of-war (small g)

 H-6K bombers delivered to PLA Air Force

By Chen Boyuan
     China.org.cn, June 22, 2013

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-06/22/content_29197824.htm

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force recently received 15 H-6K bombers with nuclear capabilities, according to British military digest Jane’s Defence Weekly.

The H-6K, an updated version of the H-6 bomber, is a medium-sized craft designed for long-range attacks, stand-off attacks and large-area air patrol. Unlike its predecessor, the H-6K can carry cruise missiles under its wings. The H6-K also maneuvers more deftly than the H-6 and requires a smaller crew to operate. Jane’s Defence was the first media outlet to confirm that the H6-K had formally entered active service.

The most visible departure from the H-6 is the H6-K’s nose, where a nose randome has replaced a navigation cabin. Military expert Fu Qianshao said that the H6-K’s nose should greatly improve avionics, search and detection, navigation, fire control and weapon precision.

Fu said that the H-6K has a larger engine inlet than does the H-6, which may mean that the newer bomber’s engines have greater thrust. If so, the H-6K would also have a greater maximum takeoff weight and payload than the H-6. A more favorable weight-to-thrust ratio would improve fuel efficiency and lengthen cruising range, Fu said.

H-6K reportedly has a combat radius of 3,500 KM. The nuclear-capable Changjian (long sword)-10 cruise missiles it carries have a range of 1,500-2,000 KM, effectively extending the bomber’s combat range to 4,000-5,000 KM - long enough to reach Okinawa, Guam and even Hawaii from China’s mainland.

Analysts stipulated that PLA Air Force missiles be able to reach Taiwan, southwestern Japan and Guam, a range of control that requires a 3,000-KM combat radius and powerful attack capability. Only the combined combat radii of the H6-K and Changjian-10 currently satisfy the length requirement.

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Final installment of D-30KP-2 delivered to China

The following is a Google translated news from (here), the same in Chinese (here).   Thus far there are two known use of D-30KP-2 by the "Chinese customer" they are the H-6K "God of War" bomber program and the KJ-2000 Mainring AWAC fleet.  Since the existing KL-2000 fleet does not require 55 new engines, it is likely that more H-6K will be manufactured in due course.

NPO "Saturn", 25 March 2011

http://www.aviatablo.ru/node/37485/
March 23 fifth installment of D-30KP-2 production of JSC "NPO Saturn" put the Chinese customer. This is the final party of 11 engines, the contract between Rosoboronexport and the China People's Republic, which entered into force in April 2009, to supply 55 engines for the period until 2012.
Delivery of the final installment of D-30KP-2 is scheduled before the end of March this year. Contract also provides technical support from the manufacturer within the warranty period.

The previous four parties of D-30KP-2 were delivered by the Russian side, respectively, in November 2009, March, May and October 2010.During the acceptance of work members of the Chinese delegation and a representative of the PRC Embassy in Moscow, Zheng Kai noted with satisfaction the early and qualitative performance of OAO "Saturn" contractual obligations.

According to the commercial director of NPO Saturn, Sergei Popov, "for" Saturn ", which has longstanding friendly relations with Chinese customers, a great honor to successfully complete the work under this contract. We look forward to an early extension of the Russian-Chinese cooperation. In particular, the continued supply of engines to China, the D-30KP-2.