who said General Liang does not have a sense of humor

Off all the people in the world, General Liang has to tell the Japanese Defence Minister about the decision to build an AC carrier. Interesting timing too, consider JMSDF just launched a new class of "destroyer". Now, that is an interesting looking DDG.

Here is a picture of this beautiful looking JMSDF ship.



The Hyūga class destroyers are a new type of helicopter destroyer (DDH) being built for the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. It is planned to replace the Haruna class destroyers currently in use. The new ships will be the largest combatant ship operated by Japan since the end of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In design it resembles an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship.

The class' code-name (16DDH) derives from the Japanese calendar, specifically the 16th year of the Heisei reign (2004), when the provisional title was given.

China tells Japan it wants aircraft carrier

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090323/wl_asia_afp/chinajapandefencenavy

BEIJING (AFP) — China will not remain the world's only major nation without an aircraft carrier indefinitely, state press Monday cited the nation's defence minister as telling his Japanese counterpart.

Liang Guanglie made the remarks to visiting Japanese Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, the Oriental Morning Post said, in discussions that took place after a recent spike in tension in the South China Sea.

"Among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the paper quoted Liang as saying, citing Japanese official sources.

"China's navy is currently rather weak, we need to develop an aircraft carrier."

Liang's comment is the highest-level recent confirmation that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation's shores.

It comes after several similar calls in recent months by senior members of the People's Liberation Army.

"Building aircraft carriers is a symbol of an important nation. It is very necessary," the China Daily quoted Admiral Hu Yanlin as saying earlier this month.

"China has the capability to build aircraft carriers and should do so."

In December, defence ministry spokesman Huang Xueping told reporters that China would "seriously" consider getting an aircraft carrier.

Defence Minister Liang was speaking after Chinese vessels confronted and nearly collided with a US naval surveillance ship in what Washington says are international waters off south China earlier this month.

The confrontation was described by US intelligence director Dennis Blair as the most serious military incident involving the two powers since a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001.

China said the US naval ship Impeccable was carrying out illegal activities in its exclusive economic zone.

Beijing has also reacted angrily to a Philippine law passed earlier this month that laid claim to parts of the Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea which are claimed by China and other nations in the region.

China called the law "illegal and invalid," and dispatched a civilian patrol boat to the region.

If China and Japan can work toward on a "maritime liaison mechanism", there is no reason US and China can not do that same. The 2002 ASEAN agreement on South China Sea Declaration on the Conduct could serve as a model.

Chinese navy ships to visit Japan in 2009, says press communique

english.chinamil.com.cn 2009-03-21


　　Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (L) hosts a welcoming ceremony for his Japanese counterpart Yasukazu Hamada in Beijing, capital of China, on March 20, 2009. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei)

　　BEIJING, March 20 (Xinhua) -- Chinese navy ships are expected to visit Japan in 2009, according to a press communique released by the defense departments of China and Japan on Friday.

　　The release followed talks between Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and visiting Japanese Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu.

　　It also said Liang would visit Japan in 2009 to return Yasukazu's visit to China.

　　China and Japan would hold defense and security consultations in Tokyo within this year, said the communique.

　　The two ministers agreed to exchange views on international peacekeeping operations, coping with natural disasters and cracking down on pirates, particularly with regard to information exchanges on operations in the Gulf of Aden off the Somali coast.

　　The two countries agreed that the Japanese chiefs of staff of maritime, ground and air self-defense forces would visit China respectively in 2009 or at convenient occasions for both.

　　The communique said China and Japan would continue to discuss building a maritime liaison mechanism, and the second expert group consultation in this regard would be held in the first half of the year.

　　The two sides agreed to launch dialogues among all services and arms, and between military commands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and armies of Japanese self-defense forces.

　　The two countries also encouraged exchanges of the field officers and junior military officers, as well as the cooperation between their military institutes.



　　Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (R) shakes hands with his Japanese counterpart Yasukazu Hamada during the welcoming ceremony Liang hosts for Hamada in Beijing, capital of China, on March 20, 2009. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei)

Tough Talks, Crafted Messages, and Real Actions.

Both Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of US forces in the Pacific and Robert Gates, U.S. Defense Secretary, released statements regarding the recent USNS Impeccable incident; on the surface, they seems to have a different thrust, but are they?


Tough Talks:

Adm Keating's tough statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Here) (Here) (Here)

"aggressive and troublesome" run-in with an unarmed American ship shows that Beijing is not yet ready to behave acceptably.

and

Beijing's suspension of military contact last year because of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and last week's South China Sea confrontation are "vivid reminders" that it has yet to become a "responsible stakeholder."

and

"unlawful and dangerous."

The above statements seem to be inconsistent with his recent push for a greater cooperation with the Chinese military; in a 2007 visit to China, he famously (here) told Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, PLAN's commander, that United States would be willing to help China to build an aircraft carrier if that is what China decides to do" and ""if something comes up, I'd like to call you."


Crafted Messages:

At the same time, Defense Secretary Gates made some very reconciliatory statements in opposite of what Keating stated above at a Pentagon briefing (Here) (Here)

"I don't think that they're trying to push the 7th Fleet out of that area. And I hope, based on the diplomatic exchanges that have taken place since the aggressive acts against the Impeccable ... that there won't be a repetition of this,"

and

"And I would like to see us put this behind us, not have another incident like it, and continue that improvement in the relationship."

and

"I hope, based on the diplomatic exchanges that have taken place since the aggressive acts against the Impeccable, will mean that there won't be a repetition of this.

Real Actions:

Gates later called off the idea of sending US warships to escort "route operations" suggested by Keating last week (here) with this statement: "So it would make it unnecessary to send warships."



Few hours later, the Chinese seems to be happy with the Gates decision and quickly responded with a China Daily article headlined "Sino-US sea standoff appears to have ended". (here)

"It is time to call an end to it," said Li Jie, a senior naval researcher at the Chinese Navy's Military Academy.

and

Top commanders do not have plans to increase the military presence in the South China Sea following a confrontation earlier this month between a US spy ship and five Chinese vessels, naval sources told China Daily, also on condition of anonymity.

The US defense chief said on Wednesday that diplomatic exchanges since the confrontation would prevent a similar incident to that of March 8.

Interesting Timing:

Gates yesterday also announced the nomination of Admiral Robert Willard, head of the US Pacific Fleet, to replace Timothy Keating as the commander of US Pacific command. (here)

Stupid PR photos from PLA daily

Oh, PLA Marine, so tough....

PLA daily's special report (Here) on Marine garrison of South China Sea. Seriously, if they want to scare those sailors from USN off that region, those are NOT the photos you want to show them.

routine mission huh?

"Routine" is now my word of the week, that means I will use it at lease once a day until next Monday. Also, I neither confirm nor deny the rumor of me resigning from CDF so I can spend more time with my family.




Yuzheng 311

China stresses fishery vessel on "routine mission" in South China Sea

english.chinamil.com.cn 2009-03-18


　　China's largest fishery administration vessel, China Yuzheng 311, arrives in the Xisha Islands March 17, 2009. The vessel will patrol the South China Sea.(Xinhua Photo)

　　BEIJING, March 17 (Xinhua) -- China on Tuesday denied it was "flexing military might" by sending a fishery administration vessel to the South China Sea, saying the ship was on a "routine mission" in Chinese territorial waters.

　　"China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and their adjacent waters," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told a regular press briefing.

　　His comments came after he was asked to respond to accusations of China "flexing military might" by sending vessel to the South China Sea.

　　"The vessel was heading there for a routine fishery administration mission," said Qin.

　　The vessel, China Yuzheng 311, would be mainly used to patrol waters of China's exclusive economic zones including the Nansha, Xisha and Zhongsha islands, said Wu Zhuang, director of Administration of Fishery and Fishing Harbor Supervision for South China Sea.

　　"The Chinese government has all along attached great importance to the fishery administration of the South China Sea," said Qin.

　　The vessel arrived in the Xisha Islands around Tuesday noon after a week-long voyage from its home port in Guangzhou.

　　The vessel is operated by the Agriculture Ministry's South China Sea Fishery Administration Bureau and is the largest of its kind with a maximum displacement of 4,450 tonnes.

China's Military After Taiwan

It seems there have been a lot of debates on PLA's missions beyond Taiwan recently. The topic first gained public attention in the 2007 edition of the Annual Report on China's military published by DOD, then it was discussed in the 2008 US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute’s Colloquium Brief (Here). Now, Joffe, one of the most respected PLA watchers out there adds his take in the current edition of FEER.

FEER was my regular diet back in the days, but its editorial standards have suffered greatly since it became an "online" only outlet. But with the return of Joffe (speaking of the good ole days), Jonathan Anderson, Andrew Chen, and Mark Valenica, I think I will give FEER another try.

March 2009
China's Military After Taiwan
by Ellis Joffe

Posted March 18, 2009

http://www.feer.com/international-relations/20098/march58/chinas-military-after-taiwan

The recently concluded session of the National People’s Congress brought news of another double-digit boost to China’s official defense budget. While the 14.9% increase is a little less than the 17.6% rise in 2008, it is still substantial, especially in view of the looming economic difficulties and improving relations with Taiwan. Although the official line is that the money will go mainly for raising the living standard of troops, Premier Wen Jiabao in his speech highlighted the need for the continued buildup of the armed forces, which will presumably absorb much of the increase.

This fits with the existing trend of more than a decade, as the Chinese armed forces have been undergoing an intensive buildup that has substantially increased their combat capabilities. Although these capabilities had plummeted drastically during the Maoist period, no concerted modernization drive--primarily to acquire new weapons--was launched until after the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96, because the Chinese had perceived no strategic military threat to their security.


This perception changed dramatically when the dispatch of two American carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan forced a humiliating Chinese retreat from missile firing exercises that had been designed to put pressure on Taiwan. This crisis convinced the Chinese that the U.S. would intervene if they attacked Taiwan and confronted them with a new and urgent strategic threat that became the impetus for a major force buildup and a focus for its direction.

This threat, stemming from China’s determination to block Taiwan’s moves toward separation, had been the catalyst for China’s efforts to build up its armed forces. Their focus was defensive: to acquire a capability needed to invade Taiwan and to deter the U.S. from intervening; failing that, to delay the advance of U.S. forces by protecting the maritime approaches to the Taiwan Straits and China.

However, relations between China and Taiwan have improved greatly following the election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan president in March 2008. Although the unification issue remains unresolved, Mr. Ma has rejected his predecessor’s policy of pursuing de facto independence from China.

This dramatic change has removed the specter of war from the Taiwan Strait. It has also removed the primary rationale behind China's decade-long rapid military buildup and the vast investment of funds that it required. However, no letup in this effort should be expected.

The reason is that other factors beside Taiwan have become operative, and these will continue to drive the buildup. The first is the strategic defense of China, which has become an acute issue, paradoxically, as a direct result of the Taiwan tensions. After a decade of gradual post-Mao military modernization, the Chinese greatly accelerated war preparations in the mid-1990s, prompted by the dispatch of two U.S. carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.

However, these preparations have been viewed as increasingly threatening by the U.S. which, in turn, has adopted a “hedging” strategy aimed at strengthening American military power in the Pacific. The Chinese, for their part, have looked upon this as a threat to their security, requiring continuous enhancement of their military posture. It also requires the Chinese to be constantly on alert against what they view as U.S. probing of their defenses, as demonstrated by the recent incident in which Chinese vessels harassed a U.S. Navy surveillance ship.

The second factor derives from the military’s mission of providing support for China’s nationalistically inspired great power aspirations: to obtain for China the international respect, recognition, and ranking that has been accorded to great powers. Although China’s global status received a tremendous boost from its economic surge, China still lacks the military capabilities that are also essential for great power status.

The Chinese are well aware that until now these capabilities have been beyond their reach. Although they possess a minimal but credible nuclear deterrent, they still do not have the conventional forces needed to project military power in wartime for extended periods at a distance from China's borders, and they have only begun to acquire the capabilities necessary for protecting the maritime approaches to China. For this reason, China’s leaders have not viewed their military power as relevant to China’s global aspirations.

This situation is changing. China’s new global standing combined with its Taiwan-driven military progress has convinced the Chinese that they can begin narrowing the gap between their economic standing as a great power and their military capabilities and to begin playing a military role on the international stage.

More important is the desire to assert China’s regional pre-eminence. Whereas China’s global aspirations are long term and require currently unattainable levels of military power, its regional objectives impinge directly on national security and require achievable military backing.

These objectives are to counteract the presence of a potentially unfriendly power in its neighborhood--most immediately, the United States, but also India, Japan and Russia over the long haul. Critical to these objectives is the development of military capabilities that will enable the Chinese to respond to what they might view as a threat to their growing continental and maritime regional interests--primarily sea lines of communication.

The final factor is the sheer force of momentum. The military buildup has set in motion a wide range of long-term programs backed by powerful interests--such as the military-industrial complex--which cannot be easily terminated. There is no reason to assume, moreover, that China’s leaders will want to terminate them, since they and the generals share nationalistically inspired global and regional aspirations. Most important, China’s leaders need the support of their generals and, barring a severe economic crisis, continuous military modernization is a price they will readily pay out of both conviction and self-interest.

These are basic long-term factors that are not likely to change and they will drive the modernization effort for decades. After Hu Jintao became chairman of the Central Military Committee in 2004, new objectives were introduced to underpin this effort and to make it more relevant to current needs. Touted as new “historical missions” and “diversified military tasks,” these objectives clearly reflect Hu’s desire to put his own imprint on the military and to bolster his position among the generals. After the rapprochement with Taiwan, they also provide an additional rationale for China’s continued military buildup.

While Taiwan remains the Chinese army’s main mission, the new “military objectives other than war” include anti-terrorist operations, maritime security, rescue missions, and peace-keeping duties. To carry out them out, it is necessary to divert resources and energies from “core military capabilities.” How much to divert has apparently become a contentious issue among China’s generals.

The most forceful proponents of such objectives are presumably the admirals. Since 2000, the navy has commissioned five nuclear-powered and 22 conventionally powered submarines, in addition to 10 destroyers and six frigates, and nearly 30 amphibious ships. In a Taiwan scenario, the role of the navy would be central: to transport assault troops to Taiwan, and, more importantly, to deny access to U.S. aircraft carriers and warships.

Now the Chinese admirals apparently want to move beyond defensive perimeters and to position the navy as the prime military supporter of China's aspiration to gain recognition as a great power. This was an angle highlighted by Chinese comments on the dispatch of Chinese warships off the Somalia coast to participate in international efforts to protect shipping from pirates.

More important have been renewed reports that the navy is embarking on a program to build aircraft carriers--an issue that has been unresolved for years. If the Chinese go ahead, it is clear that the mission of their aircraft carriers will not be to defend China against the U.S. or to protect sea lanes in wartime. The mission, at immense cost, will be to augment China’s dominant political and military presence in the region and to bolster its international prestige.

The preoccupation with new missions--demands have also been made to upgrade the People’s Armed Police for security purposes and military units for rescue missions--has aroused dissatisfaction in the military, probably among conservative ground force generals. Criticism has been directed at the damage to combat training caused by performance of other tasks; at the inability of the military to effectively carry out both traditional and non-traditional functions; and at inadequate attention to the military’s basic mission of coping with threats to the nation’s sovereignty and vital interests.

There have been no demands to abandon the new tasks, only to focus more on combat preparations. At several recent sessions of the top military policy-making body, the Central Military Commission, such a compromise has apparently been reached. However, if the navy is allowed to go ahead with grandiose development plans, the question is how long it will hold.

Mr. Joffe is a professor emeritus of Chinese affairs at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and has written widely on the Chinese military.

Another great study by the US Naval War College folks

Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein's "Gunboats for China's New "Grand Canals"? Probing the Intersection of Beijing's Naval and Oil Security Policies" is out, go check it out. Click (Here) to download the PDF.

This excellence study offers a grand-view on China not just from the prism of oil/energy security, but more importantly, an examination on what possible directions China is going to use her found naval power and ways to build cooperation between the two nations and their navies.


It is a timely release, consider the recent geopolitical nature of the Feb 2009 Sino-Russian Siberia pipeline which developed into a full zero-sum energy game between China and Japan (Here is a good 2005 NYT write up). However, the other recent major oil deals seems to has less of a political overtone; as others have noted, China has been using China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), Sinopec and other Chinese "companies" to inject funds to the struggling foreign oil companies instead of buying the ownership rights to those fields. The case of the 8 Billion joint venture with Venezuela’s PDVSA, China Development Banks’ 10 Billion loan to Brazil, and the March 15th 3 billion to develop Iran’s long delayed South Pars gas field can serve as good examples. This new involvement approach is welcomed by struggling oil companies according to Philip Andrews-Speed and help to reduced some of the local nationalistic backlash against the fear of a Chinese "take-over"

Also, China seems to stay way from the political sensitive Cuban and Mexico offshore oil fields so far which suggests they still enjoy protections offered by the USN and
the recent much cited example of the anti-piracy deployment to Gulf of Aden (Erickson also wrote an other good article on this very topic) suggests in the area of MOOTW, there is much room for cooperation. In that light, I shared Erickson and Goldstein's suggestions of look ways to "integrate China into a global security architecture". Heck, we need it after the recent dog-and-pony show in South China Sea.

The rumors about my death have been greatly exaggerated...

Remember last week, everyone was talking about the collapsed of the Sino-Russian Su-33 deal and it's implication on the Chinese aircraft carrier program, well, as it turns out, the soap opera continues.........

An update from Janes (Here)

Negotiations for the sale of Sukhoi Su-33 carrier-capable combat aircraft to the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are still continuing with both sides interested in coming to a final agreement, Russian industry sources have told Jane's.

With that, I bring you the quote-of-the-day:

"It is almost like a series of waves, you could say. They come to us with a high level of interest, asking a lot of questions, then their interest seems to fade into the background and then sometime later - the next wave - they are back with more questions again

Which makes you wonder; are they negotiating on a state-of-the-art carrier fighter or an old used car like a 1999 Toyota Corolla?


For those who believe conspiracy theories... News about the negotiation broke down was released on March 10th, J-10B surfaced on the net few days later and the negotiation continues. Now, I really want to see if the new J-10B prototype comes with a arrestor hook.


Here is the report from last week.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090310/120493194.html

Russian-Chinese Su-33 fighter deal collapses - paper
13:58 | 10/ 03/ 2009


MOSCOW, March 10 (RIA Novosti) - Russia has refused to sell its Su-33 carrier-based fighters to China over fears that Beijing could produce cheaper export versions of the aircraft, a Russian daily said on Tuesday.

The Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper said that China and Russia had been in negotiations on the sale of 50 of the Su-33 Flanker-D fighters, to be used on future Chinese aircraft carriers, since 2006, but that the talks collapsed recently over China's request for an initial delivery of two aircraft for a "trial."

Russian Defense Ministry sources confirmed that the refusal was due to findings that China had produced its own copycat version of the Su-27SK fighter jet in violation of intellectual property agreements.

In 1995, China secured a $2.5-billion production license from Russia to build 200 Su-27SKs, dubbed J-11A, at the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.

The deal required the aircraft to be outfitted with Russian avionics, radars and engines. Russia cancelled the arrangement in 2006 after it discovered that China was developing an indigenous version, J-11B, with Chinese avionics and systems. The decision came after China had already produced 95 aircraft.

This time, Russia refused the Chinese offer even after Beijing had offered to buy 14 Su-33 aircraft, saying that at least 24 jets should be sold to recoup production costs.

However, the Moskovsky Komsomolets said that the Su-33 deal may be reviewed later because China desperately needs carrier-based aircraft to equip its first indigenous 48,000-ton aircraft carrier, due to be built by 2011. Beijing has also announced plans to build a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier by 2020.

Chinese media recently quoted China fleet commander Adm. Xu Hongmeng as saying: "China will very soon have its own aircraft carrier."

The Su-33 is a carrier-based multi-role fighter, which can perform a variety of air superiority, fleet defense, air support and reconnaissance missions. The aircraft entered service with the Russian Navy in 1995 and are currently deployed on board the Nikolai Kuznetsov aircraft carrier.

Russian Su-33 naval fighters are significantly cheaper than any similar foreign models, such as the French Rafale-M, or the U.S F-35C or the F/A-22N Sea Raptor.

A follow up on the Sino-Vietnam relations and the other South China Sea Dispute

The following is from Today's VOA which touched a similar theme on the items I posted during the past week.

Interestingly enough, Philippine has recently started to receive a small military aid from China (Here) and handed over their national grid to a China-led consortium (Here)

http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-17-voa15.cfm


New Philippine Border Law Re-ignites Territorial Disputes in South China Sea
By Heda Bayron
Manila
17 March 2009


A new Philippine law reasserting Manila's claim to disputed islands in the South China Sea has rankled its neighbors, drawing criticisms from Vietnam, Taiwan and China. Earlier this week, China sent a patrol boat to the South China Sea, once again highlighting why the area has long been considered one of Asia's flashpoints.

Philippine President Gloria Arroyo signed the Baselines Law, last week, without fanfare. However, reaction from the country's neighbors have been swift and scathing. The law defines the extent of what the Philippines' considers its exclusive economic zone and reaffirmed claims to the disputed Spratly Islands, off its western seaboard.

Vietnam called it a "serious" violation of its sovereignty over the islands. China criticizes the claim as illegal and stresses that Beijing has what it calls "indisputable sovereignty" over the islands and its adjacent waters.

Sunday, China dispatched a patrol boat to the area. China's move came in the wake of a confrontation in the South China Sea between an American naval ship and Chinese vessels. Beijing claims the U.S. ship entered its exclusive economic zone; Washington says it was in international waters.

These incidents have again highlighted the problematic territorial delineation in the South China Sea and the potential outbreak of conflict in the area.

"When you actually do put it together with the clashes between the Chinese and the U.S. ships, it does highlight, I think, the whole spectrum of potential maritime instability in the area," said Sam Bateman, a maritime security analyst at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, in Singapore. "There are a lot of country interests in the South China Sea and it's a very sensitive area."

The South China Sea stretches 1.7 million square kilometers, with more than 200 mostly uninhabitable islands, rocks and reefs. Aside from being a major shipping lane, it is also believed to be rich in oil and gas.


China claims a wide swathe of the South China Sea, extending far south from the mainland. Its exclusive economic zone overlaps with that of Vietnam and the Philippines. As China consumes more energy and as its naval capability grows, analysts say Beijing is likely to be more assertive in defending its exclusive economic zone.

Few nations along the South China Sea have the capability to match China's military.

Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales says the Philippines is protecting its national interests. He says China's decision to send a patrol boat to the area is not surprising, because it is also acting in accordance to its national interest.

Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, exclusive economic zones extend some 370 kilometers from a state's coast. Within the EEZ, coastal countries have the right to explore and exploit natural resources and have jurisdiction over establishment of artificial islands, marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment.

Other states are allowed to conduct activities in the EEZ with "due regard" to the rights and duties of the coastal state.

But countries interpret this differently, as in the recent incident between the U.S. and China, as Bateman explains.

"Another part of the Chinese argument would be that, another state conducting activities in an exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, in this case the United States conducting activities in China's EEZ, is supposed to not conduct activities in the coastal state's EEZ that might be perceived as being contrary or prejudicial to the security and national defense of the coastal state," said Bateman. "The United States argues that defense activities are acceptable under international law."

That incident underscored long-held fears of potential military clashes resulting from disagreements on exclusive economic zones. A brief naval battle between China and Vietnam broke out in 1988 about the Spratlys. Some 70 Vietnamese sailors died. Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan also claim the Spratlys.

Bateman says confidence-building measures and multilateral engagement are important in preventing any maritime conflict in the region.

"The South China Sea, at this stage, is generally being managed by their countries with respect to the fact that nobody wants to see open conflict break out," he said.

To prevent hostilities, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China signed a declaration of conduct in the South China Sea in 2002.

Gonzales says the Philippines is committed to the agreement and that the dispute should be resolved through dialogue.

The leaders of ASEAN and their dialogue partners, including China, will hold their annual summit next month in Thailand. Smoothing out territorial issues is expected to be on the agenda.

J-10B

The long waited J-10B finally surfaced today and if the following photos are indeed real, we can check off what is being claimed against we can tell:



New features claimed:




*. Redesigned Diverterless Supersonic Inlet or DSI intake. Check





*. IRST/LR. Check
*. Wide-angle Holograhpic HUD, similar to the one installed on the J-11B. Check.
*. Enlarged vertical tail session for an enlarged EW suite. Check
*. A new RWR. Check.
*. Redesigned F-16 style nose to support either a PESA or AESA radar. PESA…. maybe, ASEA …..questionable.



*. More Hard points for A2G / SEAD missions. Too early to tell.
*. Wingtip AAM mounts. Unlikely
*. Mimi-AWAC twin-seater J-10S, Total BS
*. WS-10A engine with 2D thrust vectoring engine. Not in this prototype and WS-10A is still inferior to AL-31FN in every aspect.

Red Capitalists of the world UNITE!

With all those excitement surrendering the recent "routine operations in international waters" according to Washington or "like a spy" according to Beijing, the recent warming of Sino-Vietnam relations seems to be overlooked. Both governments (and Republic of China as well) issued protests against Philippine’s recent Baseline Bill (Here). In their view, the bill upsets the 2002 ASEAN agreement on South China Sea Declaration on the Conduct.


Recent major Sino-Vietnam related events I am aware of:

They agreed to "properly handle South China Sea dispute" In January 2008 (Here)

Joint "survey of fishery resources and joint naval patrols" In June 2008 (Here)

Formed "a strategic cooperation pact between state-run China National Offshore Oil Corp and PetroVietnam" in Oct 2008 (Here)

Resolved of the 840miles of border dispute in Dec 2008 (Here)

To today’s shocker of (Here) "to advance the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership" by Pham Quang Nghi. Not sure I know what is that statement means in real life and I do understand one has to be careful when reading government’s PR release. However, they seems to be friends, a major far cry from 30 years ago.

Ok, enough detours from the real news, this is the stuff that matters.

The debate regarding F-16 sales to ROC is heating up again; back in March 10th, Reuters reported (Here) that the U.S. government has declined ROC's request of a $4.9 billion deal for 66 F-16s (D and E models). Predictably, On March 16 (Here), ROC renews its now 12 years old campaign for those F-16s. At the same time, the idea of ROC should build a strong homeland defense capability with less emphasis on air and sea power suggested by William Murray of US Naval War College's is gaining traction (Here). Those 4.9 Billion can be better utilized else where.

http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=20836630

International Herald Tribune
Taiwan: Time not right for reducing China tensions
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=20836630
The Associated Press
Monday, March 16, 2009

TAIPEI, Taiwan: Taiwan will not make concrete moves to reduce military tensions with China before the mainland renounces its threat to use force against the island and removes the missiles it has deployed against it, the defense minister said Monday.

The comments from Chen Chao-min appear to pour cold water on Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's call earlier this month to hold talks with Taiwan on military issues in the pursuit of ending hostility between the longtime rivals.

They come on the same day that senior officers reaffirmed their interest in acquiring advanced weapons systems from the United States and the Defense Ministry said in a far-reaching policy document that Taiwanese readiness "cannot be relaxed," despite improving relations between Taipei and Beijing.

Since taking office 10 months ago, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou has moved aggressively to reverse his predecessor's pro-independence polices, sanctioning a rapid expansion in trade relations with the mainland, and raising the prospect of a formal peace treaty between the sides.

But speaking to lawmakers in Taipei, Chen alluded to repeated Chinese threats to attack Taiwan if it moves to make its de facto independence permanent and long-standing Taiwanese concerns over the estimated 1,300 missiles Beijing has deployed against the island.

"A mechanism for building mutual confidence in military affairs cannot be established if China does not first give up its threat to use force against Taiwan and remove missiles targeted at us," he said.

China and Taiwan split amid civil war in 1949 and China continues to claim the democratic island as part of its territory. Four years ago it passed a special law formalizing its threats to attack if Taipei declared independence or put off unification with the mainland indefinitely.

Speaking to the lawmakers, Chen also said Taiwan will continue to develop the Hsiung Feng IIE surface-to-surface cruise missile as a defensive weapon, following the legislature's approval of the project last year.

"Unless the legislature demands us to stop, the Ministry of Defense will not halt (the project)," he said.

Taiwan reportedly test-fired a Hsiung Feng IIE missile with a range of 380 miles (600 kilometers) in October 2004, but its military has never displayed or deployed it.

Chen's comments came on the day the defense ministry unveiled its first "Quadrennial Defense Review," detailing Taiwan's expected military posture over the coming four years.

While acknowledging that tensions across the 100-mile- (160-kilometer-) wide Taiwan Strait have receded since Ma took office, it noted Beijing was still threatening the island.

"Vigilance for military readiness, therefore, cannot be relaxed," it said.

Speaking at a press conference to mark the defense review's publication, senior Taiwanese officers reaffirmed Taiwan's commitment to continuing to acquire cutting-edge weapons systems from the United States, including F-16 C/D fighter jets and diesel submarines.

Taiwan first approached the U.S. on the F-16 issue during the administration of former President Chen Shui-bian, but was repeatedly rebuffed. China strongly objects to American arms sales to Taiwan, and would view a new F-16 delivery to the island as a threat to its own growing military prowess in the Taiwan Strait.

Earlier this month the U.S. agreed to make Orion PC-3 submarine-hunting aircraft available to Taiwan and is believed to be close to signing off on a sales contract for Black Hawk utility helicopters.

But any serious consideration on the F-16s is believed to be months away — at the very least.
Correction:

Chinese Civilian Survey Ships

Just in case you want to know; here are some examples of the Chinese civilian survey ships for conducting "routine operations in international waters"


Hydrographic ship 852


WuanWang 1 to 6 (Look at all those dishes, clearly, they prefer Dish Network over Comcast, why not? they offer more HD channels!)





DongDaio 851 with three radar missile tracking radomes.



USNS Impeccable's better looking twin; Beidiao 991. According to rumor, it has an all "electric drive" to reduce noise level.




226, one of the five Dong Ce class AGI (Dong Ce means East Survey) 227, 420, 427 and 943







Dadie class (900 and 841)




871




Fishing boats that are organic to PLAN's South Sea Fleet HQ at Zhangjiang. Poor PLAN sailors, they have to catch their lunch, I think they should write a letter to CMC and complain against their lack of diet.

A well known China-watcher whom I have a great deal of respect sent me the following article by Valencia regarding the recent dog-and-pony show in the South China Sea, enjoy.

BBC "here" also has a good write up on background issues related to both "Law of the sea" and "Exclusive Economic Zone"

Policy Forum Online 09-020A: March 12th, 2009
Tempting the Dragon

By Mark J. Valencia

http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09020Valencia.html
Mark J. Valencia, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), writes, "the real issue of course is China's expanding blue water navy and its major submarine base on Hainan. Obviously it wants to protect its 'secrets' in the area including the activities and capabilities of its submarines and the morphology of the sea bottom. And just as intently, the US wants to know as much as it can about China's submarine capabilities and the area it may one day need to do battle in. Thus such incidents are likely to be repeated and become more dangerous and they do not pertain to China and the US alone."

This article was originally published in the Far Eastern Economic Review on March 11th, 2009.
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/20098/march58/tempting-the-dragon

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
II. Article by Mark J. Valencia

- "Tempting the Dragon"
By Mark J. Valencia

The 'harassment' of the US Navy military survey vessel Impeccable operating in China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea is but the tip of an iceberg of maritime legal differences between China and the US. Indeed this is not the first such incident and unless a compromise can be negotiated it certainly won't be the last.

According to the 1982 UN Convention Law of the Sea, marine scientific research in a foreign EEZ can only be undertaken with the consent of the coastal state. This is because such research and activities may have direct bearing on the exploration, exploitation, conservation or management of the coastal state's living and non-living resources. The research must also be for peaceful purposes only. China has ratified the Convention. The US has not although it maintains that most of it is binding customary law.

China maintains that what the US is doing comes under the marine scientific provisions of the Convention and that it did not give the required consent to the US. However, the US distinguishes between marine scientific research which requires consent and hydrographic and military surveys which are mentioned separately in the Convention. The US maintains that the latter do not require consent and that they are an exercise of the freedom of navigation and "other internationally lawful uses of the sea" protected by the Convention.

Critics of this position point out that collection of data even expressly for military purposes may also unintentionally or otherwise shed light on resources in the area. They also argue that a country that has not ratified the Convention does not have much credibility interpreting it to its advantage.

The mission of the Impeccable is to use both passive and active low frequency sonar arrays to enable detection and tracking of undersea threats. China argues that the collection of such data is a "preparation of the battle field" and thus a threat of use of force - a violation of the UN Charter and certainly not a peaceful use of the ocean as required by the Convention. The US argues that its data gathering is purely defensive and certainly not a threat of use of force.

Regarding the confrontation, China would say that its vessels were not harassing the Impeccable but simply trying to make it cease violating what China says is both international law and its law and leave the area. The US argues that according to the Convention, China must pay 'due regard' to its navigational and operational rights and that 'harassing' its vessel-particularly a naval vessel which has sovereign immunity-is a violation of the due regard principle.

The distinction between different categories of surveying and marine scientific research hinges on more than the intent and the purpose of collecting the data. The potential economic value and utility of the data to the coastal state should also be considered, and it is difficult to argue that hydrographic or military data collected today will not have some value in the future. A possible criterion for consent might recognize both the intent of the activity and the relevance to resources of the data collected.

Regardless, the real issue of course is China's expanding blue water navy and its major submarine base on Hainan. Obviously it wants to protect its 'secrets' in the area including the activities and capabilities of its submarines and the morphology of the sea bottom. And just as intently, the US wants to know as much as it can about China's submarine capabilities and the area it may one day need to do battle in. Thus such incidents are likely to be repeated and become more dangerous and they do not pertain to China and the US alone.

Indeed military and intelligence gathering activities in EEZs are likely to become more controversial and more dangerous. In Asia, this disturbing prospect reflects the increasing and changing demands for technical intelligence; robust weapons acquisition programs of the littoral states, especially increasing electronic warfare capabilities; and the widespread development of information warfare capabilities.

Further, the scale and scope of US maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities are likely to expand rapidly over the next decade, involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in peacetime. They will not only become more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. They will generate tensions and more frequent crises; they will produce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less stability in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.

Since the US is not a party to the Convention the issue can not be resolved by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Thus these disputes will likely be addressed through a chaotic and disorderly process whereby countries assert and defend their positions through state practices, followed by protests from offended countries, and eventually by the give and take of diplomatic negotiations. Sooner or later a consensus will emerge through this process. But meanwhile many sailors, pilots, and fishers may die and relations between some nations may become strained as assertions of unilateral positions result in violent interstate incidents.

A less confrontational option would be to increase dialogue, CBMs, and cooperative efforts among the states involved and strive for collective compromise and consensus. This dialogue might have as its objective the development of agreed voluntary guidelines regarding military and intelligence gathering activities in foreign EEZs.
III. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: bscott@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author's name, affiliation, and explicit consent.

Come, Hainan welcomes you.

March 15, 2009
Asia-Pacific Issue | Next Stop
The Surf’s Always Up in the Chinese Hawaii
By BONNIE TSUI


http://travel.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/travel/15next.html?ref=travel&pagewanted=print


THE sun is out, the sand gleaming white, the waves rolling toward shore in clean, regular sets. At the edge of this palm-fringed paradise, the sea is a pale, minty hue and empty of people. Launching my surfboard from the beach on Hainan Island, I paddle out to catch a wave.

Hainan Island has often been called the Chinese Hawaii, and indeed, it is the only tropical beach destination in China. With coasts on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, about a 90-minute flight southwest of Hong Kong, this island, slightly bigger than Maryland, is attracting hordes of Chinese in the market for a little sun and fun.

The warm, sandy south coast around the port city of Sanya is experiencing a luxury hotel boom: Ritz-Carlton, Banyan Tree, Le Méridien and Mandarin Oriental have all opened resorts there in the last year, with Fairmont and Raffles properties also in the pipeline. Look around, and you’ll encounter weekend warriors from Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Guangzhou, all seeking to escape the crush of big-city life for a quiet stretch of beach and a frozen cocktail.

In the past, Hainan had a romantic, Wild West frontier air about it; as the southernmost point in China, it served for centuries as a place of banishment for criminals, exiled poets and political undesirables. Thirty minutes from Sanya is the famously scenic Tianya Haijiao, a k a the Edge of the Sky and the Rim of the Sea, a boulder-strewn beach depicted on the Chinese two-yuan note. Today, it is an immensely popular tourist attraction.

After Hainan separated from Guangdong to become its own province in 1988, a development boom was quickly followed by a bust that left many building projects on the island half-finished. In the last few years, Hainan has welcomed back investors and become a fashionable draw for Russian tourists looking to escape winter — entire blocks in Sanya have signs lettered in Russian for their benefit.

More recently, Hainan has attracted younger international travelers like Drew Aras and Catherine Forman, both 24 and from Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Aras, a physical therapist, first heard about the island while watching the Beijing Olympics, since it was where organizers obtained the 17,000 tons of sand for the Games’ beach volleyball courts.

“Usually, when we travel together, we negotiate a place that is both interesting to travel to and has the added bonus of offering some surf time for me,” said Mr. Aras, who has been surfing since he was 5. “We thought we’d find a nice place to relax by the beach and maybe catch a few waves between cocktails.”

What they found were uncrowded waves, cheap and delicious seafood and a quirky landscape that skipped from isolated coastline to spots jammed with mainland package tourists outfitted in matching head-to-toe Hawaiian prints.

The couple were introduced to the island by Brendan Sheridan of Surfing Hainan, a small local company that leads surfing expeditions and rents surfboards to visitors. Mr. Sheridan, 29, attended high school in Hong Kong and learned to surf while at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Two years ago, he made it his mission to bring surfing to the Chinese people.

“It’s the right time for the Chinese to get into surfing,” Mr. Sheridan told me as we set out to surf at Riyuewan, a picturesque bay about an hour and a half northeast of Sanya. “There’s an emerging middle class that is finally learning how to spend their money and have some fun in life.”

Most of his customers are foreigners, as many Chinese have an aversion to the sun — having a tan still denotes “farmer” — and don’t have much experience with the ocean. But Mr. Sheridan, who speaks Mandarin, finds that more and more Chinese are interested in the culture of surfing, including his two Chinese staff members, who are both in their 30s and have taken to the sport with a vengeance.

Around Hainan, the surf is up pretty much year round. Between April and September, waves tend to come from the south, while October to March brings a northeastern winter swell.

It can be somewhat expensive to be an independent traveler exploring the island beyond Sanya — public buses are infrequent, and a one-way taxi ride from Riyuewan to Sanya, for example, can run upwards of 300 yuan, about $43 at 7 yuan to the dollar. But Mr. Aras thought it added to the sense of adventure.

“It was refreshing to go somewhere not set up for Western tourists,” he said. “My parents, who live in Hong Kong, already plan to go back to Hainan, and they know of other Aussie and Hong Kong expats who visit frequently. I don’t think it’ll take long for surfers to catch on.”

Development is already fast and furious. The economic downturn may have lessened visitor numbers, but the hotels, with their glass-tiled pools and grand marble staircases, keep coming.

Along Yalong Bay, a lovely four-and-a-half-mile stretch of beach about 15 miles east of Sanya that was developed as a national resort district, the new Ritz-Carlton sits at the end of a long string of resorts that went up before it, including the Hilton, Marriott, Sheraton and Crowne Plaza. Overlooking the water, the Yalong Bay Golf Club, designed by Robert Trent Jones Jr., is shaped like a dragon’s claw and has hosted tournaments on the European and Asian Tours. There are now 16 courses on the island, with a couple more in the works.

The sheer numbers of Chinese mean that remote, once-unspoiled locations like Tianya Haijiao (on the two-yuan note), Wuzhi Shan (the “five finger mountain” in the center of Hainan), and Wuzhizhou (a tiny, white-sand island just offshore northeast of Yalong Bay) have been developed with Disney-like fervor to entertain the throngs of flamboyantly dressed tourists who want to view them on a package tour (ferries every 10 minutes, waterfall rides, horse treks). In these places, the Chinese Hawaii more closely resembles a Chinese Miami, full of shiny resorts and artificial attractions.

But stretches of green, mist-covered mountain slopes do remain. The warm, humid climate makes Hainan a bounty of tropical crops — the island is an important producer of pineapples, coconuts, mangoes, sugar cane, coffee and rubber trees. On a drive I took north out of Sanya last November, the countryside quickly retreated from apartment and hotel blocks to hillsides heavy with mango trees and rice paddies worked by teams of farmers and water buffalo.

Of all the new high-end resorts I visited, Le Méridien Shimei Bay, about an hour and a half northeast of Sanya’s airport, had the most authentic sense of place, with lush forests, a pristine, white sand beach and no other development around as yet, though an adjacent series of hotels is planned by Starwood Hotels and Resorts.

Changes are happening all over China, and Hainan Island exemplifies this moment. The boom in tourism there is exposing mainland travelers to a foreign beach culture in new and interesting ways.

One afternoon, when Mr. Sheridan took two young Chinese couples out for a surf lesson in Sanya, he got an unusual request from one of the women. “Can I take this umbrella with me onto the surfboard?” she asked. Mr. Sheridan fought off laughter and soberly told her that he didn’t think it was a good idea.

But he did admire her effort. He said, “Why not have it both ways?”

LUXURY HOTELS AND LONGBOARDS

Hainan is an easy flight from any major Chinese city; Sanya is about 90 minutes from Hong Kong and Guangzhou and about three hours from Shanghai. China Southern (www.cs-air.com/en), Dragon Air (www.dragonair.com) and Air China (www.airchina.com.cn/en/index.jsp) offer frequent flights. You can fly to Haikou in the north of the island, but it is several hours from the southern beaches.

Of the many new hotels on Hainan, the most secluded is Le Méridien Shimei Bay (Shimei Bay, Wanning; 86-898-6252-8888; www.starwoodhotels.com/lemeridien; doubles from 1,040 yuan, about $149 at 7 yuan to the dollar). The infinity pool and open atrium are stunning, and the 275 rooms, including 25 villas, feature polished wood and indigenous motifs. There is excellent hiking nearby and exclusive access to an offshore island.

In Luhuitou Bay, the Banyan Tree Sanya (6 Luling Road, Sanya; 800-591-0439 in America; www.banyantree.com/en/sanya/index.html; from 3,100 yuan) is closer to the action, but the 61 pool villas make privacy and spa indulgence the priority.

Between Luhuitou and Yalong Bay is the Mandarin Oriental Hotel Sanya (12 Yuhai Road, Sanya; 86-898-8820-9999; www.mandarinoriental.com/sanya; from 1,600 yuan), where all 297 rooms have views of the sea.

To surf several breaks, rent a board or take a lesson with Surfing Hainan (8 Huayun Road, Sanya; 86-135-1980-0103; www.surfinghainan.com; from 350 yuan a person, with transportation and equipment).

Kokang Celebrate Liberation from Burmese Communists

Here is some back ground information about the First Special Region from Wiki. Normally I prefer not to cite Wiki as a source. However, since there is nothing available written about them in English, I really don't have much of choice. Also, It warms my heart to see Ming Dynasty is alive and well today.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokang

Kokang (Chinese: 果敢; Pinyin: Guǒgǎn) was the only Burmese Chinese feudal state in Burma. It was founded by the Yang dynasty, a Chinese military house that fled with the Ming Dynasty to Yunnan Province in the mid-1600s and later migrated to the Shan State in eastern Burma. Today it is the First Special Region of Burma and still has a mostly ethnic Han Chinese population. The Salween River passes its western side and it shares a border with China's Yunnan Province in the east. Its total land area is around 2,700 km². The capital is Laukkai (Chinese: 老街; Pinyin: Lǎojiē).

As a side note, it was the Chinese government that provided them with arms and uniform to fight against the Burmese Communists.










Kokang Celebrate Liberation from Burmese Communists
By WAI MOE Wednesday, March 11, 2009

http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=15282


The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a Kokang cease-fire group, started celebrations of its 20th anniversary of liberation from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) on Wednesday in the Sino-Burmese border town of Laogai.

Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst on the Sino-Burmese Border who is close to the Kokang, said the MNDDA started the three-day anniversary period in northern Shan State.

A Chinese-style ceremony marks the opening of a school in Kokang territory in February. (Photo: www.kokang.net)
“About 4,000 to 5,000 people joined the celebration today, including special guests from China and alliance armed groups,” he said. “But officials from the Burmese junta were absent.”

“Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng (Burmese: Phon Kyar Shin) gave a 30-minute speech to a crowd at 8 a.m. at a stadium in Laogai,” he said.

Khuensai Jaiyen, the editor in chief of The Shan Herald Agency for News, told The Irrawaddy that representatives of Kachin and Shan armed groups, and Wa and Mongla representatives as well, were scheduled to attend the Kokang anniversary this week.

Twenty years ago, Kokang commanders in the army of the CPB performed a coup against the Community Party, mainly dominated by Burmans.

Aung Kyaw Zaw said that when the Kokang separated from the CPB there were an estimated 900 troops with Kokang commanders.

“But the Kokang partition from the CPB significantly wobbled the CPB leadership because the Kokang were well-know during the Communist military operations as well as their influential Chinese background,” he said.

About a month later, Wa troops, another military backbone of the Burmese Communists, performed a coup in Panghsang, headquarters of the CPB. Later, the Wa formed the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The UWSA is scheduled to hold its 20th anniversary of separation from the CPB on April 17.

The Kokang and Wa rebellions against the Burmese Communists turned a new page in Burma’s history by effectively dismantling the CPB, Burma’s biggest insurgent group, which had a significant impact on the Burmese army’s anti-insurgency operations.

Following of cease-fire, the Kokang, Wa, Mongla and New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) formed an alliance group, the Peace and Democracy Front (PDF) in November 1989.

After a cease-fire with the Kokang and Wa, the Burmese military focused its offensive to win more cease-fire pledges and to isolate other insurgents in different parts of the country. Between 1989 to 1995, under the supervision of military intelligence chief Gen Khin Nyunt, the junta signed cease-fire agreements with 17 insurgent groups.

For nearly 20 years, there were internal conflicts among Kokang leaders. Some prominent commanders were killed or removed from the leaderships during the conflict. One Kokang leader was arrested by Burmese troops after the Kokang army split up, and later he died in prison.

“Although Kokang commanders were respected in battle [in the past], they split up. And then Kokang power was weaken. Burmese troops took over areas of the Kokang region, and now the Kokang are not as strong,” Khuensai Jaiyen said.

According to The Shan Herald Agency for News, the junta has established a Regional Operations Command (ROC) with seven infantry battalions in Kokang territory.

In recent months, the junta has pushed Burma’s ceasefire groups, including the Kokang and Wa, to participate in the forthcoming election in 2010. The junta reportedly encouraged them to give up their arms in the post-election period. So far, the Kokang and Wa have not announced their intentions on the election.

Ahead of the anniversary, Kokang leaders highlighted their community development plans during the past two decades and the benefits to the Kokang people.

However, Khuensai Jaiyen expressed skepticism on Kokang development efforts. He said Kokang leaders have benefited more than the Kokang people.

Along with the Wa, the Kokang are believed to be involved in the drug trade according to international anti-narcotic agencies. Kokang leaders claim its territory was drug free beginning in 2003.

Photos of PAP drinking their milkshake near a Chinese oil field in Iraq.

Do you think the Chinese government should express their gratitude to the Bush administration for making the world safe for democracy?

Iraq inaugurates oil deal with China's CNPC
(Adds CNPC comments)

By Ahmed Rasheed
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/idUSLB36965920090311?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0

WASIT, Iraq, March 11 (Reuters) - Iraq inaugurated a $3 billion oil project on Wednesday with the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), activating the country's first major oil deal with a foreign firm since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani joined Chinese officials at the al-Ahdab field in south-eastern Wasit province, which should eventually produce 110,000-130,000 barrels of oil a day.

CNPC will operate Ahdab under a contract, initially signed under Saddam, which the Iraqi government renegotiated last year to gain better terms by changing it from the production-sharing agreement reached in 1997 to a set-fee service deal.

Shahristani pushed the button on a seismic survey of the field and said the project, worth $3 billion, would begin drilling four appraisal wells "within months."

"The majority of oil extracted here will be used for export in order to add revenues to the budget," he said, adding part of Ahdab's oil would help fuel a nearby power station.

Zhi Yulin, CNPC's top official in Iraq, said the deal would include a total of 138 wells and that drilling rigs would reach the field in two weeks.

The project, while modest in terms of total output, is a milestone for Iraq as it seeks to reinvigorate its oil sector, which offers vast potential but is hindered by the effects of years of sanctions, underinvestment and war.

The government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is courting top foreign firms in two bidding rounds for long-term service contracts for major oil and gas development fields.

It hopes that, as violence recedes in most parts of Iraq, foreign investors will set aside security concerns and will be drawn by the world's third-largest proven oil reserves.

Some industry officials have complained about the terms offered by the government, which wants service contracts rather than the production-sharing deals oil companies prefer.

Iraqi oil production now stands at 2.4 million barrels per day, below levels before the U.S.-led invasion, but Shahristani hopes to increase it to a long-term goal of 6 million bpd.

Exports, which have been slowed by technical problems, are now lower than the post-invasion peak of 2 million bpd last May.

Iraq needs to boost exports more than ever to make up for the slump in oil prices that has clouded its budget outlook. Iraq relies on oil for more than 95 percent of state revenues.

CNPC, which is the parent company of PetroChina, began construction at Ahdab in January. No drilling has started "I have assured (CNPC) that if they are able to accelerate execution of this project, we will give them the chance to participate in developing other oilfields," Shahristani said.

The CNPC official said that, despite continued violence in Iraq, the company was pursuing other oil deals in Iraq.

"Security is quite challenging for us, but we see more opportunities than challenges here in Iraq," he said.

In addition to the Ahdab deal, the government has also negotiated a natural gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell. (Writing by Missy Ryan; Editing by James Jukwey)

Yellow River is evil, lets bomb it.

PLA Air Force Conducts Air Bombing on Ice-jams
2009-03-08 13:35:41 CRIENGLISH.com Web Editor: Zhang Xu


A PLA Air Force bomber flies over the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on Saturday March 7, part of a ice-jam flood prevention mission. [Photo: Xinhuanet]

At the request of the government of northern China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has launched the first air bombing mission to aid the local government in preventing an ice-jam flood in the Yellow River.

Ice-jams in the Yellow River often occur in spring and the situation in the Inner Mongolian section of the river is typically the most severe. The up stream of the Yellow River often thaws earlier than the down stream, which causes a flood peak in the down stream. When it comes to Inner Mongolian segment, the ice-jam later forms into an ice dam together with the un-thawed ice layers. As a result, the water level of the Yellow River rises rapidly and such disasters as flooding occur when the situation is serious.





Army forces mobilized to prevent Yellow River flood caused by ice blockage

english.chinamil.com.cn 2009-03-09

　　HOHHOT, March 8 (Xinhua) -- China is planning to use army forces to prevent flood threat caused by ice blockage on the Yellow River in northern Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as the river water thaws.

　　Three air force bombers carried out a trial ice blasting operation Saturday and an artillery unit has been stationed near the banks of the river in the region, said a spokesman for the Inner Mongolia Yellow River Ice Blockage Prevention Headquarters.

　　The maximum of the river's floodwater in the region has reached1.7 billion cubic meters, surpassing that of last year and posing a severe challenge to flood prevention.

　　The volume of floodwater conserved in the section from Sanhuheto Toudaoguai was continuing to rise after surpassing its historical peak of 1.13 billion cubic meters to reach 1.22 billion cubic meters on March 1, according to the spokesman.

　　As of Sunday, 204 km of the river's 800-km section in Inner Mongolia has thawed.

　　Sections of the Yellow River freeze and thaw at different times. When an ice run flows to a frozen section, it can become blocked. If the blockage persists, water levels may rise and cause floods and dam bursts, threatening lives and property. The ice-run phenomenon takes place at the start of winter and spring.

　　The 5,464-km river, the country's second longest, originates in Qinghai Province in the northwest and flows through Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Shandong before emptying into the Bohai Sea.

Is this legal?

http://www51.honeywell.com/honeywell/news-events/press-releases-details/02.22.09ChangheZ-11.html

Honeywell LTS101 Engine is Selected to Power the Changhe Z-11 Helicopter

High Performance Engine Back In Production

ANAHEIM, Calif., February 22, 2009 – Honeywell (NYSE: HON) announced today that its LTS101-700D-2 engine has been selected by Changhe Aircraft Industries of Jingdezhen, China, to power the Z-11 helicopter. Terms of the agreement were not disclosed.

“Honeywell Aerospace is expanding its presence in China to address growth and demand in the region – and will begin providing new production LTS101-700D-2 engines to Changhe during the first quarter of 2010,” said Doug Kult, Honeywell Director of Sales, Helicopter and Surface Systems. “The Z-11 is a multi-mission, single-engine helicopter with application for police and rescue, aerial observation, electronic news gathering, VIP and executives, and border patrol operations. The helicopter is also available for export. The LTS101 powered Z-11 will offer 7 percent more take off power, up to 10 percent lower specific fuel consumption, and greater than 30 percent lower operating costs.”

The new engines will mark a restart of LTS101 production in Honeywell’s Greer, S.C., facility.

The Z-11 was designed by Changhe, which holds all intellectual property rights and has obtained type certificate and production certificate awarded by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC).

Wei Song Lin, Changhe, Program Director for the Z-11, said, “The Honeywell engine will give the Z-11 the performance advantage it needs to succeed. Our customers will enjoy the low cost of operation, improved power, and high reliability.” Changhe has estimated the sale of more than 300 helicopters over the next 5 to 10 years in China.

The engine has most recently been part of an extremely successful retrofit program replacing the existing engine on the ASTAR 350 model B2.

Kult said, “In addition, the availability of new production engines will also benefit our retrofit customers – especially the new accessories that will further offset their cost of operation.” The new accessories will be available to both current AS350 operators with a LTS101 engine and any customer considering the engine upgrade to their ASTAR.

Honeywell’s LTS101-700D-2 is the latest in a lineage of the LTS101engines powering various models of the Eurocopter AS350 series helicopter. The engine family has accumulated more than 10 million flight hours of operation. Honeywell has continuously invested in engine improvements through the infusion of new technologies and upgrades. As a result the engine family has demonstrated a four-fold improvement in reliability since 1996 and it currently performs at world-class levels.

Honeywell offers a full range of helicopter equipment, from aircraft engines, auxiliary power units and other mechanical systems to Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) and a full range of helicopter safety systems. More information about Honeywell helicopter systems is at www.honeywell.com .

Honeywell International is a $37 billion diversified technology and manufacturing leader, serving customers worldwide with aerospace products and services; control technologies for buildings, homes and industry; automotive products; turbochargers; and specialty materials. Based in Morris Township, N.J., Honeywell’s shares are traded on the New York, London and Chicago Stock Exchanges. For additional information, please visit www.honeywell.com.

Based in Phoenix, Honeywell’s $12 billion aerospace business is a leading global provider of integrated avionics, engines, systems and service solutions for aircraft manufacturers, airlines, business and general aviation, military, space and airport operations.

This release contains forward-looking statements as defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including statements about future business operations, financial performance and market conditions. Such forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties inherent in business forecasts as further described in our filings under the Securities Exchange Act.

Media Contacts:
Cathy Gedvilas
602-365-5930
cathy.gedvilas@honeywell.com

Bill Reavis
602-365-2055
bill.reavis@honeywell.com

Yah, more dog-and-sea-pony shows, I love'em

Naval review to mark anniversary

http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200903/20090305/article_393200.htm
CHINA will hold a naval review in April off the coast of Qingdao City, Shandong Province, a Beijing-based newspaper reported today.

Three Chinese warships now on an escort mission in Somalia will return to China on March 25 and will be a highlight of the review, Wang Fushan, deputy commander-in-chief of the North Sea Fleet, said yesterday in Beijing.


The People's Liberation Army Navy was founded on April 23, 1949, and this year's review will mark the 60th anniversary of the founding.

Two Chinese naval ships took part in a fleet review held by the Republic of Korea on October 12 to celebrate the establishment of that country's navy. Twenty-four ships from 12 countries, including Russia and the United States, participated in the review at Busan.

Two PLA Navy missile destroyers and a supply vessel set off on December 26 for an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. It was the first time China had dispatched warships for such a mission so far from home.

China's military dress parade in Tian'anmen Square on October 1 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China will bring joy to the people despite having a prudent budget because of the global financial crisis, Zhang Li, deputy chief of staff of People's Liberation Army, said yesterday.